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Fragmentation and Hubris
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The China Question
Robert Ross: Why Our Hardliners Are Wrong
A.D.McLennan: Balance, Not Containment
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DEREK BOK

STATE OF THE NATION

GOVERNMENT AND THE QUEST FOR A BETTER SOCIETY



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

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Contents

ARTICLES

Fragmentation and Hubris
James Schlesinger 3

Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?
Anatol Lieven 10

Four Faces of Global Culture
Peter L. Berger 23

Yeltsin: the Problem, Not the Solution
Peter Rutland 30

The China Question:

Why Our Hardliners Are Wrong
Robert Ross 42

Balance, Not Containment
A.D. McLennan 52

Unsettled Succession
Bruce J. Dickson 64

china.com?
Diane P. Wolff 73

The Politics of Global Warming
Brian Tucker 78

Tin Cup Diplomacy
Hans Binnendijk 88

The Man Who Ran Françafrique
Kaye Whiteman 92

BOOKS

A Book for the Times
Anthony Hartley 101

Trading on Ideas
David S. Bruce 105

Another Country
Guenter Lewy 109

CORRESPONDENCE

Richard Kohn, Christopher Gray, David Gress, Daniel Mahoney 113

QUARTERLY

You Broker It, You Buy It
Adam Garfinkle 118

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Fragmentation and Hubris

A Shaky Basis for American Leadership

James Schlesinger

Nations, like men, love that which flatters their passions—even more than that which serves their interests.

—Alexis de Tocqueville

AS THE CENTURY draws toward its close, America's position as the leading, if not the dominant, world power appears to be unchallengeable. Yet its preeminence, and certainly its ability to lead, are being undermined by internal weaknesses rather different from those that have affected great powers in the past—weaknesses that were well controlled in that long period of the Second World War and the Cold War during which America achieved that preeminence. Some of these weaknesses are structural, some merely habitual. They range from the character of the American Constitution (whose defects are the obverse side of its strengths), to the American constitution in a broader sense, that is, the elements and the habits of mind of the American Democracy. Included in the latter is a growing hubris, reflecting the weakening of restraints and the absence of a serious challenge in the post-Cold War world, and a naive belief that assertiveness is now cost-free and does not entail serious consequences. Unless we are able to acknowledge and confront these weaknesses, our ability both to lead and to achieve the international goals we seriously pursue will increasingly be eroded.

One must start with the Constitution. The Founding Fathers did not envision a nation absorbed by foreign policy, let alone one that was the world's leading power. They were as much concerned with avoiding the abuse of executive authority as they were with providing the executive power lacking under the Articles of Confederation.

By contrast to executive authority elsewhere, the American presidency is a constitutionally weak office that ultimately remains dependent upon the celebrated "bully pulpit" to win support for a foreign policy. For over a quarter of a century, essentially starting with Pearl Harbor, the inherent weakness of the presidential office in this respect was obscured by the willingness of Congress regularly to defer to the president on important issues. That habit of deference began to disappear around the time of the Tet Offensive, and has further weakened with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of an ever-present threat.

For many years, the inherent power of the Congress in matters of foreign policy

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was little understood overseas.[1] Foreign governments typically believed that they could rely on the commitments of the executive branch. Only in recent years has awareness of the power of Congress grown, and other nations, as well as national groups, have turned to it increasingly and with zest. And that, as we shall see, detracts from the potential coherence of American policies.

During the Cold War, the United States was ideally suited for its role of international leader. Its purposes were benign. It generally stood ready to protect other states against external assault, and most others were comfortable under the protective wing of the United States. The American public could focus on a central, seemingly permanent military and political threat. Policies could focus on that threat, and thus be shaped by an overarching design. If the government were inattentive or the policies lacked adequate coherence, the public would demand a change.

By contrast, the United States is far less suited to the role of international leader in the more complex and ambiguous environment of the post-Cold War world. It is difficult to build or sustain public support for an overarching structure. The public mood is volatile and given to the pursuit of multiple and changing objectives, frequently in conflict with one another. To the extent that the public pays attention to foreign policy, it can no longer focus as sharply as it could on the clear villainies of an evil empire.

From the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy, the good news is that there is no major challenge out there, and few are in prospect. But the bad news comes from the same source. Without any serious challenge, both our ambitions and our illusions have tended to grow. With no external check, a set of demands, frequently peremptory, is made on others—often without the necessary engagement on our part or understanding of their position. Thus, despite America's preeminence in the post-Cold War period, our relations with other nations, including many friendly ones, have become subject to growing strain. We have increasingly tended to alienate others and seem scarcely cognizant of their growing annoyance.

Legitimizing Ethnic Politics

WHAT UNDERLIES these phenomena? A crucial ingredient has been the sharp decline in the public's concern about foreign policy that has followed the end of the Cold War. In recent polls only 2 percent of the American people indicate that foreign policy is the most important issue facing the country, down from some 30-40 percent in 1984. With the disappearance of the Soviet threat and the fading of public attention, the field has been left open to domestic interest groups that have their own special axes to grind, unhindered by any commonly accepted vision of the national interest. The goals of our foreign policy are said to be the expansion of democracy and market economics. These provide precious little in the way of specific guidance across a range of problems and are subject to easy manipulation. In these circumstances domestic constituencies, most notably ethnic groups, have acquired an excessive influence over our foreign policy. The inevitable consequence is that our policy lacks overall coherence. Rather than reflecting a hammered-out vision of the national interest, America's present policy consists largely of the stapling together of the objectives of these individual constituencies. In terms of traditional standards it can scarcely be said that we have a foreign policy at all.

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[1]George Bernard Shaw once maintained that "The United States has no constitution. It only has a Charter of Anarchism. . . . It is a permanent guarantee to the American people that they never will be governed at all." Things had not improved much a couple of generations later. On his last visit to the United States as secretary-general of NATO, Lord Carrington observed in his usual cheery manner to a small group at the Department of State, "Of course, no one in Europe understands how your government operates."

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Examples abound of how such constituencies have dominated specific policies in recent years. The aggregate list is almost embarrassing. Even though Azerbaijan has been partially occupied by Armenia, now well armed by Russia, U.S. law prohibits any assistance (other than humanitarian) to Azerbaijan.[2] The Armenian community is now girding itself to preserve this anomalous section of U.S. law.[3] Turkey has given critical assistance to the United States throughout the Cold War, into the Gulf War, and beyond. Yet this long-time ally has been unable to obtain delivery of helicopters and frigates that it has purchased, because of pressures from the Greek-American community. Our policies toward Castro's Cuba have been wholly dominated by the Cuban-American community, and by keen attention to the votes in south Florida and New Jersey. It is scarcely possible to overstate the influence of Israel's supporters on our policies in the Middle East.[4] Present policies toward Haiti were initially driven by pressures from the Black Caucus. During President Clinton's first term our relations with our closest ally, Britain, were repeatedly roiled by our interventions in Northern Ireland, ultimately driven with an eye on the Irish-American vote. Whatever its merits, NATO expansion too has been driven by concern over the politics of appealing to voters of East European origin.[5]

One could go on. It should also be noted, of course, that pressures from domestic constituencies may result in appropriate policies. If one sees *national* benefits in NATO expansion, for example, one may well welcome these sorts of pressures. Clearly the influence of the business community prevented the disruption of U.S.-China relations that would have been precipitated by the termination of MFN, i.e., normal trading relations. Yet overall these domestic pressures tend to damage our international position. We have less of a great power's foreign policy in the traditional sense than we have the accumulation of disparate goals put forth by domestic constituencies. Even by our own standards—let alone the standards of the outside world—the result is an American foreign policy viewed as incoherent and capricious. It is scarcely what others expect from the world's leading power.

Changing mores have also altered the behavior of politicians. Pandering to ethnic constituencies has become an accepted norm. Little embarrassment is expressed—or probably felt. Foreign policy in this post-Cold War world is increasingly viewed as simply another way of building domestic political support. Ethnic constituencies are widely viewed as a prime source of political funds at home (and abroad?).[6] The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, which has severely strained relations with our allies, is widely ascribed to the quest of a committee chairman to gain support among Jewish voters in

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[2]The history and anomalies of our treatment of Azerbaijan have been eloquently described in these pages by Thomas Goltz in "Catch-907 in the Caucasus", *The National Interest* (Summer 1997).

[3]See David Ottaway and Dan Morgan, "Former Top U.S. Aides Seek Caspian Gusher", *Washington Post*, July 6, 1997.

[4]It was as instructive as it was unusual for the President to choose as his setting for unveiling his increased sanctions against Iran an address to the World Jewish Congress in New York.

[5]Once again the President chose an untraditional though revealing setting for an important foreign policy announcement: Detroit, Michigan, with a subsequent luncheon at the Polish Village Cafe in Hamtramck. Henry Kissinger has commented that, "The issue was handled in a blatantly political manner more in response to domestic pressure groups than as part of a long-range foreign policy" ("NATO: Make It Stronger, Make It Larger", *Washington Post*, January 14, 1997).

[6]See, for example, Jill Abramson, "Fund-Raisers Tap Their Ethnic Roots for Political Parties", *Wall Street Journal*, October 22, 1996; and Dan Morgan and Kevin Merida, "South Asia Rivals Had Money on South Dakota Senate Race: Ethnic Donors Play Powerful Role in U.S. Politics", *Washington Post*, March 24, 1997.

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his state.[7] A newly elected senator brags to the *Washington Post* that "Nobody does it [ethnic politics] better than me."[8] Historically, such calculations played a central role in urban politics, but they were permitted only tangentially to affect the formulation of foreign policy. One wonders whether any political leader in this era would be prepared to accept the political risk that Roosevelt did in 1940 of alienating a large ethnic group when he denounced Mussolini's assault on France ("The hand that held the dagger has struck itself into the back of its neighbor"). Today, one suspects, such a denunciation could occur only of a country that had no more than a minuscule voting block in this country.

Such political courting has altered the presuppositions and the behavior of the constituencies. In the past those who pushed an ethnic agenda were defensive and somewhat sheepish about it. There were lots of explanations and even a touch of an apology. Now, however, such groups are persuaded that they have the right to demand that the power of the United States back their parochial claims. Demands on behalf of particular ethnic agendas have been legitimized. Too many politicians seek legislation to satisfy those demands. Ethnicity has become the norm. To speak of the national interest in the abstract is to invite rebuke.

The weakening, if not the disappearance, of the time-honored concept of America as a melting pot has reinforced these tendencies. The new fashion among academics of multiculturalism and what is called "ethnic consciousness-raising" serves to legitimize further the demands of ethnic constituencies to have the world's leading power back their special agendas. But in terms of its impact on foreign policy, it is hard to find the benefit of multiculturalism or "ethnic consciousness-raising." To sustain an effective and reasonably consistent foreign policy requires a national consensus, which in turn depends upon a sense of common purpose. The new intellectual fashions weaken and, in a sense, delegitimize the search for that common purpose. They abet the fragmentation of the society. This is not the foundation on which the American democracy can sustain its role as world leader.

Were we not the world's leader such behavior might be tolerable. But a world leader, if it wishes to have others willingly follow its policies, must have a foreign policy that is reasonably predictable and consistent. It cannot be seen as capricious. It is also essential that its leaders be attentive to the attitudes and interests of those other countries that it wishes to attract or retain as followers. It is neither tolerable nor is it just for a U.S. leader to demand that those followers toe the mark even on positions in direct conflict with their own interests. This is particularly the case when the policy in question is clearly seen to be driven not by external requirements and formulated national interests, but simply by a congeries of domestic pressures. Under such circumstances, to insist, either querulously or self-righteously, that others follow our prescriptions inevitably means a loss of credibility. And over time that necessarily means that fewer and fewer will willingly follow us.

The New Assertiveness and Its Consequences

AMERICA'S STATUS as the "sole remaining superpower" has given Americans a heady feeling. The collapse of the Soviet Union has meant that few are prepared seriously to challenge us, and then only with considerable reluctance. China, with its own touchiness about its newly enhanced status, is perhaps the principal exception. A few Asian states, buttressed by "Asian values", breathe a kind of rhetorical defiance, as do France and

[7]See Laurie Lande, "Second Thoughts", *The International Economy* (May/June 1997), especially pp. 46-8.

[8]Guy Gugliotta, "Campaign Primer's First Lesson: Cash Flows from Contacts; This Is How Senator Torricelli Raised $9 Million Last Year", *Washington Post*, May 18, 1997.

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Russia and occasionally others.[9] But the simple reality of the post-Cold War world is that most governments are reluctant even to express criticism directly to our officials, and mainly grouse in private conversations.

The only restraint on a nation in the position of the United States, with all the global power that it has acquired, is ruthless self-criticism. But, to put it plainly, ruthless self-criticism has never been a principal characteristic of the American people. Humility is not our national style. Rather, we are given to the exuberant enjoyment (and praise) of our own exceptionalism. In the absence of a serious external challenge, we are, quite simply, feeling our oats. More decorously put, the United States in this post-Cold War period is marked by a condition of national hubris. To be sure, American hubris is more acceptable than the hubris of other nations in the past, such as Wilhelmine Germany. We have no territorial ambitions; we are reasonably benign. We just want to instruct others on how to behave.

Still, it is an American illusion that other nations are eager to have pointed out to them what the U.S. government regards as their defects. Over time the spokesman for the Department of State intones a veritable litany of such condemnations. The U.S. government likes to ruminate not only on present offenses but past offenses as well.[10] It is not the way either to garner goodwill or to preserve political capital for international leadership. It is our little conceit that once other nations have learned how we feel, they will mend their ways. Experience has yet to disabuse us of this belief. Other nations disregard our chidings and go on doing what they did before. Japan has not at our urging embraced the "Strategic Impediments Initiative" structural reform of its economy. China continues to treat dissidents with scant regard for their human rights—and regularly reminds us that it can manage its internal affairs. The Saudis (and many others) pay little heed to our preachments on democracy or religious toleration. Even Bosnia has been unable to understand, let alone embrace, our insistence on a multiethnic society. Few nations are prepared to follow our urgings with regard to politically motivated trade restrictions, and then only briefly.

The upshot is that the United States has successfully established itself as a nigh-on universal international nag. It makes us feel good, even though our hectoring irritates others. Occasionally there are angry protests. Some Asian states, for example, have argued that "Asian values are superior to Western values." For the most part, however, other nations simply ignore our chastisements.

But chastisement alone is not always sufficient to satisfy us. We regularly feel the urge to express our disapprobation of the behavior of others in a more dramatic form. Only rarely is there an inclination or the stomach to express it through military action, which, of course, involves risks. Hence, the appeal of economic sanctions. Sanctions appear to be politically costless, at least domestically, enabling us to express our displeasure without the risk of casualties.

Sanctions, however, have serious drawbacks. Because they appear to be politically costless, they have tended to be habit-forming. The Congress is "feeling its oats" as much as the executive branch. Congress and the administration vie with one another in seeking to impose sanctions on unpopular nations. And there are always more unpopular nations to be found for the purpose, it seems, with members

[9] I omit those on our list of rogue or terrorist states. Obviously they continue to pose challenges—though weak ones in most cases.

[10] Switzerland appears to be the latest target for *ex post facto* chastisement. The Swiss may even be flattered to learn that tiny Switzerland's limited wartime trade with Germany, which ceased in 1944, had been, according to Stuart Eizenstat in a preliminary State Department study, "prolonging Nazi Germany's capacity to wage war." In an earlier example, the Congress sought to pass a resolution rebuking vital Turkey for its "genocide" of Armenians in 1915. Passage would have precluded Turkish cooperation in the Gulf War just a few months later.

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of Congress eager to burnish their credentials by locating the next victims. Imposing sanctions has come to appear a suitable response to virtually any problem, and their use is quickly becoming indiscriminate to the point of promiscuity. During President Clinton's first term alone, the United States imposed new unilateral economic sanctions, or threatened legislation to do so, 60 times on 35 countries that, taken together, make up about 42 percent of the world's population.[11]

This leads to a second drawback. In the long run the penchant for sanctions undermines the attractiveness of economic dealings with the United States—and thereby the long-run position of American business. Very few nations can measure up to *all* of the standards that we would impose—with respect to human rights, the drug trade, the arms trade, military action, or the openness of their markets. So other nations will become more wary about entering into economic relationships with American companies for fear of suddenly being subjected to sanctions.

Take the case of oil, which happens to be the principal cash export of several "erring" states. At the moment U.S. economic sanctions are in place against Iran, Iraq, and Libya. Earlier, of course, they were also imposed on Kuwait and the neutral zone. Nigeria, Indonesia, and Burma are currently being proposed for sanctions. Other states in the Middle East, such as Syria; other states in Africa if they slip on the question of human rights; and even Russia if it were to become less cooperative—all these are potential candidates for future sanctions. Someone likely will discover that the performance of Colombia or Mexico on the drug trade deserves such punishment too.

I pass over the irony that this country continues to proclaim its energy policy in terms of *sustaining access to secure supplies of oil* (an irony that is sharpened by the memory that in the 1970s the United States inveighed against use of the "oil weapon" as unacceptable). The point is that such past and potential actions tend to undermine the long-run position of the American oil industry. Few oil-producing nations other than Norway, Canada, and—probably—Britain can be assured that they will not ultimately fall afoul of our moral or political standards. Their willingness to grant concessions to American, as opposed to other foreign, firms is diminishing and will likely diminish further. It may be noted that the oil company whose crude oil reserve position has improved most dramatically in the last decade is the French company, Total. Washington's policies toward the Persian Gulf, no doubt, are highly welcomed in the Total boardroom. For a generation the French government has, by hook or crook, attempted to win an enhanced position in the Gulf for French oil firms. That goal has finally been achieved, not through any action by the French government but courtesy of Washington's policies.

A third problem is indicated by the French example. Over time, sanctions can only be effective if they are multilateral. The U.S. attempt to impose sanctions unilaterally has regularly proved ineffective. So we become offended and angry if others do not join us in the sanctions, and then we are tempted to make the sanctions effective through the extraterritorial reach of American law, through the promise of punishments, and through instruments we have long repudiated as inconsistent with international law, such as the secondary boycott. To impose relatively small penalties on the targeted nations, we are likely to incur very substantial political costs. Using an instrument only partially effective in the short run while undermining our position in the long run is hardly a winning strategy for the world's leader.

The attempt to impose our will on others through such measures elicits resistance and anger from other industrial nations, including those who happen to be our allies. As William Drozdiak put it, when the allies argued before

[11]See Steven Lee Myers, "Converting the Dollar into a Bludgeon", *New York Times*, April 20, 1997; and Robert P. O'Quinn, "A User's Guide to Economic Sanctions", *Heritage Backgrounder*, June 25, 1997, p. 1.

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the Madrid Summit over how many countries would be invited to join NATO in the first round:

> The criticism voiced this week by French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin about 'a certain tendency toward hegemony' on the part of the United States is no longer confined to Paris. Even close U.S. friends, such as Germany's Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Britain's new leader, Tony Blair, have started expressing open irritation with what they view as Washington's haughty behavior. A senior German official said speculation about the impact of growing U.S. arrogance was a major theme of private discussions among the delegations of France, Germany, Italy and Britain attending the summit. 'Everybody seemed to agree that if this gets out of hand, it could lead to some serious problems for the alliance', the official said.[12]

Perhaps even more revealing of allied attitudes were Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's private comments at the Madrid summit to Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene on Clinton's motives for pressing NATO expansion, which were picked up on an open microphone: "It's not for reasons of state. It's all done for short-term political reasons."[13]

American pretensions will also be resisted by others who are not our allies, like Russia and China. Moreover, the overreliance on sanctions threatens to trigger a much more significant phenomenon. The study of history reveals an almost reflexive tendency for other states to band together to cut a leading power down to size. Americans tend not to be much interested in history, but they would be wise to pay careful attention to this point. In April, the newly anointed Chinese paramount leader, Jiang Zemin, visited Moscow. He and Boris Yeltsin issued their "Joint Capital Declaration on the Multipolar World and a New World Order." No Russian leader is likely to be more friendly to the United States than Mr. Yeltsin, yet he observed at the news conference: "Somebody is longing for a single-polar world. He wants to decide things himself." The Declaration stated: "No country should seek a hegemony, practice power politics or monopolize international affairs." It clearly represented a joint attempt to limit the global power of the world's sole surviving superpower.

Both Russia and China have been reaching out to Iran, to Iraq, and to others—as have France and, in the case of Iran, others of our European allies, including Turkey. Our European allies have banded together and appealed to the World Trade Organization to restrict what they consider to be the extraterritorial reach of American law. That point of view, incidentally, is also shared by our Canadian and Latin American associates. From all this we should derive one clear conclusion: It is essential for us, if we wish to continue to lead in the way that we have, to avoid gratuitously antagonizing other nations. The tendency for others to band together to cut the leader down to size is, of course, a variable. Clearly, if a leader fails to refrain from exasperating other nations, that process will inevitably be speeded up. Pride goeth before a fall.

The constraints of our Constitution, the fragmentation of our body politic through "ethnic federalism", the playing up to domestic constituencies while the general public's gaze is focused elsewhere, the increasingly indiscriminate use of sanctions, and the preachiness and general willfulness of American foreign policy all raise questions regarding the long-term sustainability of our leadership. Picking needless fights squanders precious political capital. Even the United States must recognize that the tolerance of our allies, and of others whom we would have follow us, is not inexhaustible. Over time the position of preponderance that we have acquired with the close of the Cold War inevitably must weaken. Yet we ought to avoid doing things that speed up that process, for that weakens both our long-term leadership position and our current credibility. □

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[12]William Drozdiak, "Europeans Charge U.S. Arrogance on Issues from NATO to Jobs", *Washington Post*, June 27, 1997.

[13]John F. Harris, "Tape Catches Choice Words About Clinton", *Washington Post*, July 10, 1997.

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Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?

Scholarly Debate and the Realities of Eastern Europe

Anatol Lieven

THE PROBLEM set the West by the Yugoslav wars between 1991 and 1995 was at bottom a simple one: whether to intervene on the ground to defeat the Serb forces in Croatia and Bosnia, and then keep substantial forces there for a long period to hold down the Serbs and maintain a united Bosnia. The answer was an equally simple one: refusal, because it was assumed—probably correctly—that Western electorates would support neither the loss of life among their own troops nor the permanent commitment of men and money required. In the end, the war was terminated (or suspended, we don't know yet) by the victory of one of the warring nations, the Croats, armed by the United States and supported to a limited degree by NATO airpower. In consequence, naturally enough, the Croats have dictated the contours of the peace settlement on the ground. An accident of geography, and the imperatives of political ambition, led to this Croat victory entering the history books under the curious name of the "Dayton Peace Accord"—the culminative example of the misuse of language that has characterized so much of the debate on Bosnia in the West.

Anatol Lieven is a correspondent for the *Financial Times* based in Budapest. He previously covered the wars in Afghanistan, Karabakh, Abkhazia, and Chechnya for *The Times* (London) and other papers. His next book, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power*, is to be published by Yale University Press in the winter.

It is not my purpose in this essay to rehearse this melancholy history and turn over yet again the bones of Bosnia's dead. Instead, I want to focus on one key aspect of the intervention controversy in the West, and on a scholarly debate that provided the intellectual underpinning for some of the positions adopted: the question of the origins and nature of nationalism and national conflicts. The connection between the scholarly debate and contemporary developments is made explicit in the introduction to a recent collection of essays on nationalism, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny:

> As the claims to nationhood metastasize into the evils of ethnic cleansing and genocide, the task of intellectuals to remind us all of the imaginary quality of much of the ideology and history that has gone into the making of nations becomes all the more acute.[1]

When applied to developments in the former Yugoslavia, the lines of dispute were, or seemed to be, relatively clear. On the one hand there were those, like the British columnist Simon Jenkins in the London *Times*, who argued against intervention on the grounds that the wars raging there had been caused by "ancient national hatreds", which the West could not hope to overcome. As a result, they said, intervention would only lead to Western

[1]Eley and Suny, eds., *Becoming National* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 12.

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armies becoming trapped in a permanent quagmire without hope of extrication.[2]

In this way, the policy debate became enmeshed with the academic one. For in answer to this view some advocates of intervention, including Noel Malcolm and Norman Stone, argued that, far from being the result of long-established national hatreds and fears, the Yugoslav wars were essentially the result of artificial and opportunistic manipulation by the Serbian communists or former communists, led by Slobodan Milošević, as part of a campaign to hold on to power in the face of the collapse of communism as an ideology.[3] These ex-communists were portrayed as a kind of Iago, whispering evil lies into the deluded ears of the people until they rush out madly and start strangling their neighbors.

Since then, some of those who have taken this second position—for example, Johnathan Sunley in these pages[4]—have extended their argument to take in other parts of the former communist world, arguing that the danger of nationalism across the region has been grossly exaggerated in the West (by, among others, the influential George Soros), and that the national conflicts in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere in the region have also been the work of the former communists and of Moscow. In this essay I shall take issue with this attempted downgrading of the importance of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe, though I shall do so while fully acknowledging the evil role played by Milošević and his followers in starting the war in Yugoslavia.

AS FAR AS THE public debate on Yugoslavia is concerned, some of it might as well have been conducted by clowns with cream pies, for all the intellectual light it generated. In the background to this grimly-lit harlequinade, however, was an intellectual debate that has generated some of the leading works of history, social science, and cultural theory of recent decades: the question of the origins of modern nationalisms, and of how far these were "constructed", and how far generated by pre-existing and conscious ethnic, cultural, or religious affiliations.

Activated by the war, this debate on nationalism has spread far and fast beyond academic circles to become a central theme of the wider debate on the nature of our age and its future. Thus, for example, one of the most oft-repeated arguments against Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis has been

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[2]It should be said, however, that the opponents of intervention who used such arguments did not include Misha Glenny, Robert Kaplan, or Michael Ignatieff, although all of them have been attacked for pointing to the historical roots and complexity of the Bosnian question. They wrote, on the basis of their experiences in the former Yugoslavia, of the power of old hatreds and historical memories in that region; and they may perhaps be guilty of having somewhat exaggerated the importance of this factor for the rest of Eastern Europe. However, all of them were advocates of early and forceful intervention to protect the Muslims and defeat the Serbs. They just had no illusions about what this would entail. See Glenny, *The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe in the Age of Democracy* (London: Penguin Press, 1990); Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* (New York: Vintage, 1993); and Ignatieff, *Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1994).

[3]For Malcolm's views, see his essay "Bosnia and the West: A Study in Failure", *The National Interest* (Spring 1995).

[4]Sunley, "Post-Communism: An Infantile Disorder", *The National Interest* (Summer 1996). I should make it clear that while I disagree with a good deal of what Dr. Sunley has to say on the subject of the danger of nationalism and the origins of recent national conflicts, I wholeheartedly endorse his analysis of *nomenklatura* privatization, rent-seeking and the creation of monopolies in the former communist countries. I also share his pessimism with regard to the prospects in these circumstances of an "economic miracle" in Russia and elsewhere.

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that, far from the world moving inevitably toward a consummation of history in a liberal capitalist bed of roses, chauvinist and violent nationalism remains a force of immense power, even in Europe.

It may well seem immodest, not to say imprudent, for the likes of me to venture into a field trodden by intellects of the stature of the late Sir Ernest Gellner. However, as a trained historian who has spent much of the past seven years as a journalist covering national and ethnic movements, disputes, and sometimes wars, I would like to enter my pennyworth of personal experience and, I hope, common sense.

The former Soviet Union, where I have spent those years, is perhaps the most fascinating field of study in the world today when it comes to nationalism, for within it can be found an extraordinarily wide range of national, ethnic, and state communities. There you will find a fully formed European nation like the Lithuanians next door to the Belorusians, a people who seem entirely lacking in a separate national consciousness. Again, when it comes to the development of nationalism, the Azeris seem to follow many of the standard patterns for the "construction" of a nation in modern times—while their neighbors the Chechens have some of the characteristics of a "primordial ethnic nation." As to national conflicts, there have been those in which outside manipulation has played an important part, like Abkhazia—and others, like Karabakh, which have indeed been mainly the result of conflicting and deeply felt national claims. If there is one single lesson I have taken away from these past seven years, it is a deep distrust of dogma, of generalizations and universal explanations, whether of the historical origins of nationalism or of contemporary national disputes.

Primordialists versus Constructionists

CRUDELY STATED, one side of the scholarly debate on the origins of nationalism stems ultimately from the belief that the roots of modern nationalisms are primordial. That is to say, humanity is naturally divided into different groups that will tend to exclude and show hostility toward others; and the roots of modern national allegiances lie in old and deeply felt ethnic, linguistic, religious, and cultural differences, albeit transmuted into modern forms.[5] This is the belief of nationalists themselves, and from the early nineteenth century on it was of course the official line of numerous national school systems and schoolteachers, all working with passionate intensity to convince their charges of the primordial existence and identity on the same territory of their particular nation—an approach notoriously summed up in the first words of the old French history primer: "Nos ancêtres les Gaulois" (Our ancestors the Gauls). This is very much the version now once again being taught in many parts of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

In Western academia in recent decades, however, this approach has been not so much dissected as slashed to pieces by a whole range of scholars who have pointed to the ways in which modern nationalisms were in fact generated by new historical circumstances, ideas, social classes, and socio-economic conditions over the past two centuries.[6] These scholars have also sought to expose the numerous ways in which nationalisms and indeed national "traditions" were artificially "created" in modern times, most obviously by states through the aforementioned school systems, but also by less deliberate processes consequent on the great social, economic, and technological transformations of the past 250 years.

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[5]For a classic work by a British historian taking this basically traditionalist approach, see Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States* (London: Methuen, 1977).

[6]This process of "deconstructing" nationalism was in fact begun by Ernest Renan more than one hundred years ago. See Renan, "What is a Nation?" ("Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?"), translated by Martin Thom in Homi Bhabha, ed., *Nation and Narration* (London: Routledge, 1990). Renan's work was first delivered at a lecture in 1882.

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A key underlying reason for the rise of the new approach was that nationalism had been deeply discredited by its role in Europe's twentieth-century catastrophes. In the previous century nationalism had been seen by most liberal intellectuals as a force for liberation and human progress—an attitude that reached its most developed and influential form with Woodrow Wilson's championing of national self-determination at Versailles in 1919, a policy widely seen as perverse after 1945.

Paradoxically, however, the post-1945 discrediting of nationalism among Western intellectual elites came just as the collapse of the European empires made the nation-state for the first time the dominant theoretical model across the globe. This has become even more the case in recent years with the collapse of supra-national Marxism and the Soviet empire.

Ideologically, the range of scholars somewhere on the "constructivist" side of the spectrum has on the surface at least been extraordinarily broad, and their approaches extremely varied. They extend from Marxists like Eric Hobsbawm through liberals like Gellner to conservatives like Elie Kedourie and Kenneth Minogue.[7] The range of their specific explanations of the rise of nationalism is equally great, but all in the end see nationalism as in one way or another a function of modernization and a specific product of modern change: in the case of the Marxists, the development of capitalism *tout court*, or—as Gellner and Tom Nairn would argue—its uneven spread. All would also, and usually rightly, emphasize the role of the educated classes (for the Marxists, the new middle classes) in the construction and spread of the new nationalist ideology, which, originating in Western Europe in the later eighteenth century, spread in ripples across the world.

One tribute to the intellectual power and weight of evidence brought to bear by these new critiques of nationalism—now of course several decades old—has been their effect on those who, broadly speaking, disagree with their basic thrust. In response to them, recent scholars like John Armstrong and Anthony Smith, tending to a view of nationalism as a natural rather than constructed phenomenon, have greatly adapted and refined the old arguments for "primordialism" (indeed to the point that Smith would probably deny that he is a "primordialist" at all). However, at the core of their approach is still the belief that conscious ethnic attachments are of great antiquity, and that it is these which form the true basis of modern national feeling and explain the remarkable success of modern nationalisms, their capacity to mobilize support and generate passion.[8] In Smith's words,

> Not only did many nations and nationalisms spring up on the basis of pre-existing *ethnie* and their ethnocentrisms, but . . . in order to forge a 'nation' today, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components, the lack of which is likely to constitute a serious impediment to 'nation-building.'[9]

And,

> The modernist definition of the nation omits important components. Even today, a nation *qua* nation must possess a common history and culture, that is to say, common myths of descent, common memories and common symbols of culture.

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[7]For varieties of the neo-Marxist approach, see E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). See also Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Kenneth Minogue, *Nationalism* (London: Batsford, 1967); and Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960).

[8]See Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982) and Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

[9]Smith, p. 17.

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> Otherwise, we should be talking only of territorial states. It is the conjunction, and interpenetration, of these cultural or 'ethnic' elements with the political, territorial, educational and economic ones, that we may term 'civic', that produce a modern nation.[10]

Smith also points out that to "invent" an ethnie—as opposed to a "nation"—is difficult to the point of impossibility. It can be shaped and cultivated, but mainly it has to grow.

Between a convinced, old-style nationalist and a Hobsbawm there can obviously be neither compromise nor quarter. But this should not be so between Dr. Smith and most of the "constructivists", since few of these would in the end seek to deny ethnicity a role in nationalism, just as Smith and his supporters would not deny that the ideological form of nationalism—as opposed to its emotional content—is indeed a development of the past two centuries. As so often happens, however, the dispute has been calcified by the adoption of dogmatic positions, ones often in excess of what the work of the authors themselves will support. Even the principals sometimes formulate their positions in extreme terms. Thus Hobsbawm has declared that:

> The 'nation' . . . belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent, period. It is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the 'nation-state', and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both relate to it.[11]

The Mechanistic Fallacy

THE MEMBER OF the constructivist camp who has developed the most brilliant insights concerning the cultural creation of modern nationalisms and national identities in the European empires in Asia is Benedict Anderson in his *Imagined Communities*.[12] One thing that makes his work so valuable is that it shows how new ways of nationalist thinking were generated by numerous creative imaginations, rather than consciously "constructed", in response to new historical and social circumstances. He highlights especially the creation for the first time of "monoglot mass reading publics" as a consequence of capitalism, the printing press, and the new education systems; and of course the creation of new "intelligentsias"—often badly paid and socially marginal, but desperately aspiring to power and glory—to serve these new masters and audiences.

On this score, Anderson has leveled some cogent criticism at Gellner, who once asserted that, "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist."[13] In Anderson's words: "Gellner is so anxious to show us that nationalism masquerades under false pretenses that he assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsity', rather than to 'imagining' and 'creation.'"[14] (It is only fair to say that Gellner's bald formulation in this instance is hardly typical of his immensely deep and subtle mind. Elsewhere, he has written that, while nationalism is a created phenomenon, under the historical circumstances of modern times "nationalism does become a natural phenomenon, one flowing fairly inescapably from the general situation.")

This same criticism could also be leveled at the phrase "the invention of tradition", and the approach represented in the famous collection of essays of that name edited by Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger.[15] I believe that the word "invention" in this context is utterly mistaken, necessarily implying as it does a sudden and radical break with the past, a mechanistic and artificial creation, and an act

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[10]Smith, "The Origins of Nations", *Ethnic and Racial Studies* (July 1989).

[11]Hobsbawm, pp. 9-10.

[12]Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983).

[13]Gellner, *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1964), p. 169.

[14]Anderson, p. 6.

[15]Hobsbawm and Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

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of conscious human will. As some of the essays in Hobsbawm's own collection suggest, the people responsible for "inventing" these new traditions were themselves absolutely convinced that they were in fact rediscovering, adapting, and regenerating old traditions. Prys Morgan, for example, in his essay on the Welsh national revival, writes that "the Eisteddfod [the Welsh national song and culture festival] was not in any way a deliberate invention, the first recorded meeting having been held in Cardigan . . . in 1176", even if the form the revived Eisteddfod took from the eighteenth century on became something very new. Here, as elsewhere, what we have is an organic development, not a mechanistic one; a generation, not an invention. In general, "new" traditions represent genuine, if hopeless and even sometimes comical, strivings to "rediscover" old traditions, on the basis of very real feelings of continuity, identity, and loss.

To take another musical example, this was true of the great Latvian and Estonian song festivals organized from the later nineteenth century to the present day. These were quite new, and played a key part in the generation of the modern Baltic national identities. But it seems clear from the evidence that not merely were the songs themselves the product of a continuous tradition of great antiquity, but so too was a sense of ethnic (though not "national") identification and common hostility toward non-Estonians and non-Latvians.

Where new elites are in fact forced to "invent" traditions and national identities out of whole cloth, as in the colonially created states of Africa, they produce fantasies that are hardly convincing even to themselves, and are incapable of inspiring sincere loyalty and sacrifice. For what can also be said with some confidence is that there is a crucial relationship between the capacity of a new nationalism to mobilize people and retain their allegiance, and the depth of its rootedness in pre-existing loyalties and identities, whether ethnic or religious. These loyalties do not have to be national or proto-national in any strict sense—consider the complex but enormously important role of Hinduism in underpinning Indian unity—but they do have to be there, or the new national plant is likely to prove a weak and sickly one.

The most successful example in history of an "invented" nation was probably that of Great Britain, or rather the Union between Britain and Scotland. Indeed, so successful was it that not only did it overcome for more than two centuries the ancient enmity between England and Scotland, but it almost completely subsumed both Scottish and English nationalisms. Nairn and others have pointed to the way in which the success of the British idea was founded on partnership in the growing British Empire, one that proved immensely profitable not only for the English but for the Scottish upper and middle classes.[16] So overwhelmingly did English nationalism become confused with British imperial patriotism that today it finds tremendous difficulty in even giving itself a name, and survives in public only in strange disguises like "Euroskepticism."[17] With the last major colony, Hong Kong, now gone, it will be very interesting to see how British identities develop from here on.

However, there was more to Britishness than the advantage of empire. A brilliant study by Linda Colley has examined all the ways in which the new British identity was formed in the eighteenth century, on the basis of very powerful existing elements in both England and Scotland—notably Protestantism and hostility to Catholic Europe, especially France—and it was this that gave "Britain" much of its emotional and cultural force. It was by no means therefore simply "invented", even if numerous paid scribes and artists did consciously set out to foster it.[18]

Conversely, of course, the example of Britain is certainly evidence that the classical

[16]Nairn, *The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1977).

[17]Not altogether unlike the way in which Russian nationalism was subsumed by the Soviet Union.

[18]Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

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nationalist argument is also radically flawed, for it shows that there is nothing at all inevitable about the creation of nation-states based on one linguistic and ethnic group. Gellner and others are quite right when they argue for the existence of a multiplicity of loyalties and identities alongside the strictly national one, in the past as in the present. To judge by Colley's work, successful nationalism needs to be seen as a force that has achieved success largely by feeding on as many as possible of those other allegiances.

Academics should therefore keep a check on themselves when writing about the "invention" of traditions and nationalisms; for it does rather tend to flatter their own vanity as intellectuals, both because they present themselves as seeing through the ideas that have deluded simpler folk, and also because the idea of intellectuals sitting down and inventing nations and traditions is inherently gratifying if you are yourself an intellectual.

Once again, though, it is dangerous to over-generalize. The essay from which the phrase "the invention of tradition" is taken is Hugh Trevor-Roper's famous study of the creation of the "ancient Highland dress", the kilt, by an enterprising eighteenth-century Quaker industrialist;[19] but the whole point of the real Highland Scottish tradition and society is that they were irrevocably smashed, first at Culloden and then by the Highland Clearances and the progressive destruction of the Gaelic language. This left the British free to impose on the Highlanders whatever twee and artificial version of Highland tradition they chose.

Next door in Ireland, the British found the human material a bit more recalcitrant. To engage in a little counterfactual history, if the Scottish Highlanders had won at Culloden, they might very well have ended up adopting the kilt anyway, and coming to believe in its antiquity—but this would have been part of the organic development of their own living, fighting tradition, as with Irish nationalist songs sung in the language of the conqueror. Similarly, the most popular Chechen national song during the latest war with the Russians was sung in Russian, to an essentially Russian pop tune with vaguely "oriental" flourishes, and with lyrics allegedly borrowed from "Patria o Muerte." That may seem strangely artificial and inauthentic to us—but it clearly had no ill effect on the fighting spirit of the Chechens who sung it.

From a practical, non-academic point of view, therefore, it is of secondary importance where nationalist ideas and national passions came from, how "genuine" or "artificial" they may be, or how recently they were generated. The test is: Do they work? Do they succeed in mobilizing and holding together the community to which they appeal? In the past, and in all too many parts of the world today, there is an even simpler test: Do they make people willing to fight and die? If they do, then however inconvenient for intellectuals and scholars, their origins are moot as far as the policymaker and working journalist are concerned.

A crude, popularized version of Gellner's approach runs certain risks traditionally associated with Marxist analysis. It attributes conscious—and even hypocritical—will and strategy to actions that are often more likely (as Gellner himself would have recognized) to be the result either of unconscious changes of attitude, or feelings that the authors of change themselves share to the full. It rather recalls the old Marxist belief that the bourgeoisie (or, in Germany before 1914, the old landowning elites) consciously "manipulated" and exploited nationalism so as to distract the workers and peasants and maintain their grip on power. Of course there is an element of truth in this, just as the important role of Milošević and the Serbian (and some Croat) communists in inflaming nationalism is also not to be denied. But it is far from the whole truth. These people would not have been so

[19]Trevor-Roper, "The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland", in Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition.*

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successful in their manipulations if they had not had a mass of suitably conditioned human material to work on, and if they had not at least partly ascribed to their own version of nationalist "truths."

As far as the manipulated masses themselves were concerned, in the traditional Marxist schema they were at risk of "false consciousness." Notoriously, the Marxist belief that national, religious, and other allegiances among the proletariat were a symptom of this "false consciousness" (as opposed to the "true" and correct consciousness, which they should have possessed as proletarians) led communists in the past to dismiss these loyalties and ideologies as unworthy of serious study. Rather than seeking to understand and analyze them as the product of old and genuinely held traditions, the cruder version of the old communist approach was to denounce their holders as misguided dupes, and hunt around for the wicked manipulators who had gulled them. The parallels with Johnathan Sunley's tendency to blame all national conflicts on the hand of Moscow or the old communists could hardly be clearer.[20]

Conservatives, Marxists, and Positivists

WHICH BRINGS US back to the debate on contemporary national conflicts in Europe: That an arch cold warrior like Sunley should now find himself on the same side of the fence as a Marxist is only superficially paradoxical. For many of today's "conservatives", especially in America, are not conservatives in the traditional sense, but essentially nineteenth-century free-market liberals. They differ from true conservatives on one absolutely critical point: their basically optimistic view of humanity, and their belief that in virtually all conditions human society can be greatly improved by the introduction of a relatively simple, pre-ordained, fixed set of laws based on universally applicable rules of reason. They have tremendous difficulty with the idea that in some circumstances these guidelines simply will not work, that traditions and emotions and indeed facts may prove stronger. In this respect, contemporary liberals, Marxists, and *Wall Street Journal* editorialists all show their ultimate descent from the same positivist stable.

For people with this mindset, the idea that some national conflicts are insoluble by any means short of war or outside intervention and suppression (that, in Lord Salisbury's words about Ireland, "the free institutions which sustain the life of a free and united people, sustain also the hatreds of a divided people") is intolerable.[21] Take, for example, Nagorno-Karabakh. I have seen some journalistic colleagues and academic observers jib like frightened horses at a ten-foot fence when confronted with the blindingly obvious truth that once you have introduced the idea of full national self-determination and unqualified independence to the Transcaucasus—and removed outside military power—then, given the history and the ethnic divisions of the area, there will inevitably be national-territorial disputes that cannot be solved by any means short of war and the victory of one side or the other. Rather than face this particular fence, I have seen otherwise honest, intelligent people

[20]This crude and patronizing approach to nationalism is not characteristic of many more recent Marxist students of national mobilization, for example, the "Subaltern Studies" school in India.

[21]The currently fashionable term for arrangements to secure peace by institutionalizing ethnic proportions and balances in government and parliament is "consociational democracy", as expounded for example by Yael Tamir in her *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). However, whether in British India, the Soviet North Caucasus, or indeed Northern Ireland today, such arrangements have usually only worked—on the rare occasions when they have worked at all—when backed and guaranteed by an outside power possessing control of the armed forces. There are exceptions—Finland being perhaps the most distinguished—but very few.

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plunge into veritable jungles of intellectual evasion, and swallow nationalist lies and excuses in quantity.

It is particularly sad that some British analysts should have so far forgotten their own history as to take this line; for, after all, we have had some bitter experiences of our own in this regard. National self-determination in the Transcaucasus could no more have been effected without war than could separate self-determination for British Indian Muslims and Hindu/Sikhs in Punjab in 1947. Once separation for Pakistan and the partition of Punjab were agreed, then it was inevitable that, in Sir Sikander Hayat Khan's prophetic words, "Everyone on the wrong side of the line will get his balls cut off."[22] As in the Transcaucasus, both Indians and Pakistanis have bitterly denounced the former colonial authorities (in this case, the Ratcliffe Commission) for having "created conflict" by the way they drew the national border—but when asked what kind of border would have prevented conflict, they either fall silent or say that everything should have been given to their side.

Likewise in a conversation I had with an Armenian nationalist, a former Soviet political prisoner. In December 1990 I asked him, "If, as you say, the Karabakh conflict has been created by Moscow, what do you think will happen if Soviet rule collapses?" To which he replied, "Well, as soon as the Azeris are no longer being deceived by Moscow's propaganda, of course they will recognize of their own free will that Karabakh is ours." This may well seem grotesque—but it is not much more so than the explanations of the war in Karabakh offered by some Western analysts, in their anxiety to avoid at all costs pinning the blame on Armenian and Azeri nationalism.

Character Counts

JOHNATHAN SUNLEY is quite right to ask "why some inflammable trouble spots spontaneously combust while others do not." He just gives the wrong answer. Or rather, he mechanically, dogmatically gives the same answer—communist and Soviet/Russian manipulation and destabilization—in each and every case. Sometimes it is, partially at least, the right answer. There certainly have been cases where both Moscow and other former colonial powers have manipulated ethnic conflicts, and still more where they have tried to do so without success. Thus while Soviet and Russian manipulation played a very secondary role in the Karabakh conflict, it played an undeniably important one in Abkhazia—though even there only on the basis of previously existing and deeply felt conflicting claims. In no case did Moscow or the communists "create" or "invent" a dispute out of nothing.

While it is reasonable, therefore, to see similar elements at work across much of the former Soviet bloc, there is no reason whatsoever to assume that these will combine in similar mixtures irrespective of location and local history. While some Western journalists and policymakers deserve criticism for seeing nationalists as always and everywhere chauvinist and aggressive, so do those who try to pin the blame for every single one of the ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union on the former communists and the Russian government. While both communist and nationalist manipulators have indeed been at work in many countries, the readiness of different nations to respond to their provocations has differed enormously according to local circumstance, local history, local culture, and, yes, to "national character." To continue the analogy with Othello: If the Moor of Venice had been a more secure individual psychologically, if he had had a happier childhood, if he had not been made to feel his color so painfully by his Venetian masters, if for that matter he had not been a Moor at all but a Florentine or an Aragonese—then instead of believing Iago he would have kicked him downstairs.

As a journalist in the former Soviet Union between 1990 and 1996 (for much of the peri-

[22]As recorded by his British secretary, Sir Penderel Moon, in his memoir *Divide and Quit.*

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od stationed in the Baltic States and the Transcaucasus), I observed half a dozen different ethnic disputes and conflicts, and while manipulation was present in all of them, in each one its importance, and the local response, were different.

The Baltic States, for example, present interesting examples of determined attempts at the creation of ethnic conflict that failed to work, despite all the necessary flammable material apparently being at hand. In 1990-91 I witnessed Soviet loyalists and communist hardliners going round the great factories of Tallinn and Riga, trying to convince the Russian-speaking workers that the Baltic national movements were making preparations to massacre them, and that they should take up arms in self-defense. In Riga, I saw how a crowd made up overwhelmingly of Soviet military aviation cadets masquerading as local Russian civilians tried to start a riot with the Latvian police. None of these efforts succeeded, because the mass of local Russians stayed aloof and the local authorities and Baltic nationalists did not overreact. They could have succeeded—but only if many more local Russians had joined in, and if the police had reacted by opening fire, which was what happened at the beginning of the nationalist demonstrations and counter-demonstrations in Karabakh in 1988.[23]

In Lithuania, I saw attempts by both Soviet loyalists and Lithuanian nationalists to stir up renewed hostility between Lithuanians and Poles. The Soviet loyalists tried to get the Polish minority to demand its own autonomous region, with a view to separating from Lithuania if Lithuania achieved independence. Vytautas Landsbergis and some of his supporters for their part convinced themselves of a continued Polish threat to Lithuania and tried to persuade Lithuanian voters that they too should fear this and vote for the nationalist parties. Once again, this failed to work.

The reasons why in each particular case national conflict took fire or failed to do so are immensely varied. The nationalism of a contemporary Estonian or Hungarian is simply not the same thing as that of a Kazakh or a Chechen. All have their own specific features, and these are not peripheral and decorative but of central importance.

First of all, one must consider that disputed but indispensable factor, national character. Beginning at two opposite ends of the spectrum, take the Estonians and the Azeris. It is impossible to spend any length of time among the former without being impressed by their extreme emotional coolness and self-restraint, coupled with a great aversion to physical contact. My own strongest arguments with Estonians have been conducted on their side with icy politeness. On the other hand, it is impossible to stay for long in Azerbaijan without being struck by the excitability of many Azeris, the tendency to fly off the handle and for arguments to become hysterical and end with kicks and punches being thrown. Similarly, the Georgians, with strong cultural traditions of individualism, machismo, and the cult of weapons, differ a great deal from the peaceable, gloomy, and obedient inhabitants of the cities of eastern and southern Ukraine. National character is not a concept much liked by contemporary political scientists, but it is necessary to explain why, all other things being equal, an ethnic dispute in Azerbaijan or Georgia would be much more likely to turn extreme and violent than would be one in Estonia or Ukraine. Of critical importance in the Baltic states—and something that does the very greatest credit to the Baltic peoples and their national movements—has been the fact that the Russian minorities know that they do not have to fear physical attack. The minority peoples in the Transcaucasus would have been very foolish indeed to make such an assumption.

Second, history really does bear on present circumstances. In the Transcaucasus, to approach contemporary Armenian nationalism without reference to the historical

[23]For a fuller description, see my book *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 188-201.

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Armenian experience and the genocide of 1915 would be as bizarre as trying to understand Zionism and contemporary Israeli behavior without learning anything of the experience of the Jewish diaspora, the Holocaust, and past Arab-Israeli conflicts.

In the Baltic states and other areas of the former Soviet Union containing large Russian-speaking minorities, a knowledge of the historical background is essential to understanding why, with the exception of Moldova, these populations have remained so politically passive and why the feared "*pied noir*"-style uprisings have failed to materialize. The main reason is that a Russian sense of ethnic nationalism has always been weak compared to that of many other countries, because Russian political identification has always been with imperial or ideological states that, though Russian in origin, were far from being simply Russian. Also, and crucially, this "Russian diaspora" is not really ethnic Russian at all, but rather an ethnically mixed Russian-speaking Soviet population of relatively recent migrants who have not yet had time to develop a real sense of rootedness, community, or local identity.

In the case of Lithuania and some other countries, including Greece and Poland, to understand the present you also have to know a bit of twentieth-century history that, between 1939 and 1945, involved the murder or removal of the greater part of the countries' traditional ethnic minorities; something that, brutal and cynical as it was, has inadvertently contributed in the long run to strengthening the stability and independence of these states. If, as was the case before 1945, Poles and Jews still made up the overwhelming majority of the population of Vilnius, Lithuania's capital, then it is hardly likely that ethnic relations would have proceeded so smoothly. As it was, Lithuanians knew that they had nothing to fear from the Poles. This is not by any means to say that, had the previous ethnic balance continued, conflict would have been inevitable—but avoiding it would have taken even greater effort by people of goodwill on both sides.

SO EVEN WHERE very real national hatreds and grievances have existed in the past, there is nothing to say that these cannot be changed, modified, and soothed by new political and international circumstances. Hungary and Romania, where I am currently stationed, provide a very encouraging example of how disputes that at one stage seemed very menacing now appear manageable. In the past, it would have seemed that Hungarian bitterness over the loss of more than two-thirds of Hungarian territory after the First World War was an immutable issue, one that lay at the heart of its politics and was bound to flare up again as soon as the restraining bonds of communism were removed. In 1990, and to a lesser extent the following two years, there were on the other side blatant attempts by the new Romanian regime of President Iliescu, made up of former communists who had jumped ship from the Ceausescu dictatorship, to inflame Romanian fear and hatred of Hungary and the Hungarian minority so as to consolidate their own hold on power.

However, as it has turned out, while the Hungarians undoubtedly still feel bitter over their loss, the character of the Hungarian nation has changed over the years. Above all, and if only because of the disastrous example of Yugoslavia on their doorstep, they have not been willing to risk war over this issue—not even to recover Hungarian land from Serbia, which they could have attacked between 1992 and 1994 to the applause of much of the West. Instead, Budapest has acted with great restraint, and as a result of this and changes in Romanian attitudes, in 1996 Romania and Hungary signed a state treaty, and the new, anti-communist Romanian administration elected in November of that year made ethnic harmony a central part of its program. When I interviewed him earlier this year, President

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Emil Constantinescu spoke of this "historic reconciliation" as his administration's proudest and most important achievement to date.

This happy outcome is not simply due to the fact that much of the heat has gone out of Hungarian and to a lesser extent Romanian nationalism. It also owes a good deal to contingent factors. For example, unlike the various national groups in Yugoslavia or the Transcaucasus, the Hungarian minority in Romania no longer possessed its own autonomous area (as it had in the 1950s), in which it might have established a base for secession and resistance. This, in turn, meant that the Romanians had less to fear than did the Serbs, the Georgians, or the Azeris.

Also of great importance have been international circumstances. The Hungarians had good reason to think that, given their record of economic reform and democracy, they stood a very real chance of entering NATO and, much more importantly, the European Union. They were left in no doubt that if they were to subvert or attack Romania it would have dealt a fatal blow to their hopes in this regard. Meanwhile, the sight of the Hungarians accelerating past them in the race to join these institutions also motivated the Romanians to act with restraint and responsibility in ethnic relations.

But for such Western moral pressure to work, the hopes of inclusion in Europe had to be well founded. No one is going to persuade the Abkhaz to compromise with the Georgians by arguing that if they do, they will one day be admitted to the European Union. Similarly, the Balts have been influenced in the direction of peaceful and legal methods by their own traditions, but also by those of their Scandinavian neighbors. No one is going to influence the Georgians in the direction of peaceful and legal methods by pointing to the example of the Turks, the Russians, or the Armenians. Once again, the success or failure of outside manipulation, whether benign or malignant, is wholly contingent on local circumstances.

IF ALL THIS has any general lesson to convey, it would be precisely to avoid laying down general rules and what social scientists would describe as "definitive, context-independent propositions." Neither in historical studies nor still more in description and analysis of contemporary developments in the field of nationalism is there any substitute for close personal knowledge of the situation on the ground. (While this proposition should hardly be open to serious question, it is unlikely to be followed in practice, since that would mean either the dismissal of, or a radical change of approach by, a great many inhabitants of the academic, think tank, and foreign policy worlds.)

Although my harshest words in this essay have been reserved for those who would seek to deny the truth, depth, and antiquity of national feelings and national hostilities, I should like to repeat that there is also no call to demonize nationalism, let alone "history", as universally evil and menacing (and it is true that both Misha Glenny and Robert Kaplan do run the risk of using history in this light, as the titles of their books indicate).

I must confess that on occasion, and especially when exasperated by nationalist interlocutors in the former Soviet Union, I too have had a tendency to see things in this light. In 1993 I wrote that some of the themes of the Baltic national revivals suggested the story of Sleeping Beauty, as re-written by the Wicked Witch: "Certain aspects of the Baltic national cultures, frozen by Soviet rule in the form that they held in 1940, have so to speak been kissed by the breeze of freedom, and have re-awakened—as frogs."[24] That was not untrue—if unkind—but I might have laid more emphasis on the fact that the Estonians in particular also derived immense benefits and virtues from their history, and that these historically derived virtues have proved of tremendous benefit to the Russian minority in Estonia, providing a high civic culture, a commitment to legality, a profound and unaggressive nationalism, and a

[24]Lieven, p. xiv.

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strong sense of Scandinavian identity. So while history and nationalism in Eastern Europe over the past eight years have indeed given birth to frogs and snakes, they have also produced a few swans.

During the Second World War, British and American commanders in Burma observed their troops' fear of the jungle and their (completely mistaken) belief that the Japanese had a natural, instinctive advantage in jungle fighting. In response, some bright staff officer came up with the slogan, "The Jungle is Neutral"; that is to say, given proper knowledge, training, equipment, and tactics, the Allies could fight in the jungle as well as the Japanese, and even make it serve their purposes, as did the Chindit units of the British army.

History and nationalism too are a kind of jungle, but are also in themselves neutral, and can be turned to the account of peace, order, and civilization. But in order to travel safely in them you need a proper local map, with a small scale and detailed contours. Trying to navigate your way around using a large-scale map covered with neat straight lines is liable to land you in a swamp up to your armpits—or rather it may land NATO soldiers in that position, if their masters have been foolish enough to take your advice. For while the Allied commanders said that the jungle did not necessarily favor the enemy, they never pretended that it was not indeed a dangerous place in its own right, full of very real and poisonous snakes. □

EXPANDING NATO

As a senior NATO official in Brussels said last week, the Polish, Czech and Hungarian armed forces are respectively, 'a mess, a bigger mess and a total mess.'

Ageing Russian equipment, public mistrust, professional incompetence and a dire shortage of experienced NCOs have left the central European military floundering and NATO wondering how to cope.

Budget cuts by impoverished governments have also taken a toll on the three armies. Some Polish officers have been reduced to buying ammunition with their own money, while troops in Hungary exercise with tin cans rather than practice grenades. Czech conscripts have complained they only fired a rifle once during their 12-month service.

Central European military organisation dates from Warsaw Pact days. The Czechs have 15 commissioned officers for every NCO and 500 pilots for just 30 combat aircraft. Only 7 per cent of Poland's soldiers are NCOs, compared with 20 per cent in Britain. . . .

Czech press reports that the army was busy refurbishing Maginot-style defences built 60 years ago were later denied. Nonetheless, a Czech officer confided that the military was considering sowing minefields along the Slovak border, apparently unaware that NATO plans for a war of movement. . . .

The British Army now holds large-scale manoeuvres in Poland. Asked why the Poles were not invited to join in, the NATO official said: 'Because the Brits are scared of friendly fire. I don't think they're willing to risk the casualties. . . .'

In the meantime, the region's armies are struggling to make themselves understood. No one in the Czech army press office speaks English and even the head of a Czech military language school had yet to pass NATO's English language test.

Fortunately, the new central European members face no foreseeable external threat.

—Francis Harris, *Sunday Telegraph* (London), July 6, 1997

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Four Faces of Global Culture

Peter L. Berger

THE TERM "globalization" has become somewhat of a cliché. It serves to explain everything from the woes of the German coal industry to the sexual habits of Japanese teenagers. Most clichés have a degree of factual validity; so does this one. There can be no doubt about the fact of an ever more interconnected global economy, with vast social and political implications, and there is no shortage of thoughtful, if inconclusive, reflection about this great transformation. It has also been noted that there is a cultural dimension, the obvious result of an immense increase in worldwide communication. If there is economic globalization, there is also cultural globalization. To say this, however, is only to raise the question of what such a phenomenon amounts to.

Again, there can be no doubt about some of the facts. One can watch CNN in an African safari lodge. German investors converse in English with Chinese apparatchiks. Peruvian social workers spout the rhetoric of American feminism. Protestant preachers are active in India, while missionaries of the Hare Krishna movement return the compliment in Middle America. Both hope and fear attach to these facts.

The hope is that a putative global culture will help to create a more peaceful world. If a global culture is in the making, then perhaps a global civil society might come into being. Ever since John Locke re-emerged from Eastern Europe speaking with a Polish accent, a great amount of hope has been invested in the notion of civil society, that agglomerate of intermediate institutions that Tocqueville saw as the foundation of a vital democracy. Civil society depends on a consensus on civic virtues, and that, after all, is what a culture is supposed to supply. The French sociologist Danièle Hervieu-Léger (in her contribution to the forthcoming volume *The Limits of Social Cohesion*, edited by me) speaks of an "ecumenism of human rights." The same idea is conveyed in a much cruder form by the advertisements of the Benetton company. Whether the idea is couched in sophisticated or crude terms, it too has an evident factual basis. It is also reasonable to hope that a world in which there would be a greater consensus on human rights would also be a more peaceful world.

But there is also fear attached to the prospect of cultural globalization, fear of a worldwide "airport culture" in which the rich diversity of human civilizations will be homogenized and vulgarized. This fear has been vocalized in the rhetoric of "Asian values" that has attained a certain political significance in recent years, as well as in the rhetoric of the various movements of Islamic resurgence. Similar fear, in less virulent form, can be observed elsewhere, for example in the worries about cultural homogenization among Euroskeptics. One of the arguments made by

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those who opposed Austria's joining the European Union was that Austrians would no longer be able to refer to potatoes as *Erdäpfel*, a homey word that was suddenly imbued with the genius of Austrian identity, but would have to use the High German word *Kartoffeln*. Of course this was silly. But the desire to preserve distinct cultural traditions and a distinct cultural identity in the intense economic and political pressure cooker of the new Europe is not silly at all. The fear, like the hope, is not without foundation.

A more nuanced understanding of cultural globalization will have to take account of both the homogenizing forces and the resistances to them. Benjamin Barber made a move toward such an understanding in his book *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1995). Most recently, and in a more subtle way, Samuel Huntington has discussed the same issues in his *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), a book to which the present observations are greatly indebted. Huntington, whose view of the contemporary world cannot be accused of being overly optimistic, ends his book with a call to search for commonalities between the contending civilizations, a dialogue of cultures. One need not agree with every aspect of his analysis to agree with his conclusion. A dialogue between cultures, however, presupposes a clearer understanding of all the processes at work, both those of cultural globalization and of resistance to it. It is proposed here that there are at least four distinct processes of cultural globalization going on simultaneously, relating in complex ways both to each other and to the many indigenous cultures on which they impinge.

Davos: From Boardroom to Bedroom

FIRST IS WHAT Huntington nicely calls the "Davos culture" (after the annual World Economic Summit that meets in that Swiss luxury resort). This culture is globalized as a direct accompaniment of global economic processes. Its carrier is international business. It has obvious behavioral aspects that are directly functional in economic terms, behavior dictated by the accoutrements of contemporary business. Participants in this culture know how to deal with computers, cellular phones, airline schedules, currency exchange, and the like. But they also dress alike, exhibit the same amicable informality, relieve tensions by similar attempts at humor, and of course most of them interact in English. Since most of these cultural traits are of Western (and mostly American) provenance, individuals coming from different backgrounds must go through a process of socialization that will allow them to engage in this behavior with seemingly effortless spontaneity. This is not always easy. A growing number of consultants in "diversity management" are making a good living advising corporations on how to affect this sort of socialization as smoothly as possible.

But it would be a mistake to think that the "Davos culture" operates only in the offices, boardrooms, and hotel suites in which international business is transacted. It carries over into the lifestyles and presumably also the values of those who participate in it. Thus, for example, the frenetic pace of contemporary business is carried over into the leisure activities and the family life of business people. There is a yuppie style in the corporation, but also in the bodybuilding studio and in the bedroom. And notions of costs, benefits, and maximization spill over from work into private life.

The "Davos culture" is a culture of the elite and (by way of what sociologists call "anticipatory socialization") of those aspiring to join the elite. Its principal social location is in the business world, but since elites intermingle, it also affects at least the political elites. There is, as it were, a yuppie *internationale*. Some years ago, while the apartheid regime was still in power in South Africa, a friend of mine had lunch with a representative of the African National Congress at the United Nations. To my friend's surprise, this individual spent most of the lunch talking about apartment costs in Manhattan. While this yuppification of a representative of what then still understood itself as an anti-capitalist revolu-

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tionary movement might have had an ironic aspect, it was a cultural trait that turned out to be very useful a few years later. A number of people from both sides have reported how, when they first met, young ANC exiles and young Afrikaners were surprised by their similar lifestyle preferences and personal values. These were certainly not derived from their respective historical traditions; rather, they were, precisely, commonalities rooted in the "Davos culture." There have been similar reports about the first meetings between young Israelis and Palestinians leading up to the Oslo agreements. Whether one is edified by this spectacle or not, it may be that commonalities in taste make it easier to find common ground politically.

While cultural globalization facilitates interaction between elites, it creates difficulties between these elites and the non-elite populations with whom they must deal. Many moral and ideological conflicts in contemporary societies pit an elite culture against a resentful mass of culturally accredited and economically underprivileged people. As Huntington points out, these resentments may lead to the emergence of a nationalist or religious counter-elite. Also, individuals who participate in the "Davos culture" with reasonable success vary in their ability to balance this participation with other parts of their lives. While some, as previously pointed out, may allow yuppie behavior and values to inundate their private lives, others seek more complicated compromises. On my last visit to Hong Kong I happened to stray into a Buddhist temple and came upon a truly graphic vignette: In front of an altar, facing a large statue of the Buddha, stood a middle-aged man wearing a dark business suit over stocking feet. He was burning incense and at the same time talking on his cellular phone.

Faculty Club International

BOTH CRITICS AND advocates of contemporary global capitalism mainly think in terms of the "Davos culture" and its ramifications in popular culture ("Davos" in interaction with "McWorld"). Yet there are at least two other quite different types of cultural globalization going on. One of these is what one might call the "faculty club culture." Essentially, this is the internationalization of the Western intelligentsia, its values and ideologies. To put it graphically, if the "Davos culture" tries to sell computer systems in India, the "faculty club culture" tries to promote feminism or environmentalism there—a rather different agenda.

While this culture has also penetrated the business world (and in turn has been penetrated by it), its principal carrier is not business. Rather, it is carried by foundations, academic networks, non-governmental organizations, and some governmental and multinational agencies (such as development agencies with social and cultural missions). It too is primarily an elite culture, though here again there are those who aspire to it from the lower echelons of cultural enterprises (say, schoolteachers or social workers who read the books and periodicals that reflect the views emanating from the great cultural centers).

More importantly, the "faculty club culture" spreads its beliefs and values through the educational system, the legal system, various therapeutic institutions, think tanks, and at least some of the media of mass communication. If this culture internationalizes the Western intelligentsia, it also internationalizes the conflicts in which this intelligentsia has been engaged on its home territories. James Hunter has written very insightfully about the American "culture wars" (first in his 1991 book with that title). These conflicts can now be observed worldwide, though always of course subject to local modifications.

A good example of this second process of cultural globalization is the anti-smoking movement, arguably one of the most successful movements in developed societies over the last twenty years or so. Before then it was a small, marginal sect, hardly noticed in public discourse; today, especially in North America and Western Europe, it has largely achieved the goal proclaimed early on by one of its spokesmen—to make smoking an activity

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engaged in privately by consenting adults. The reasons for this stunning success need not concern us here. The point is that this movement, clearly a product of Western intellectuals, was disseminated worldwide by an alliance of governmental and non-governmental organizations. In a series of conferences, the World Health Organization propagated the anti-smoking cause internationally. At one of the early conferences the travel expenses of all participants from developing societies were paid by the Scandinavian development agencies (the conference was held in Stockholm). These participants, mostly from health and education ministries, came from countries with horrendous health problems and the campaign against smoking was not high on their list of priorities. As was to be expected, they re-ordered their priorities given the incentives to do so. Ironically, the concepts of neo-Marxist dependency theory, which have not been very good at interpreting the transformations of advanced capitalism, fit rather well in the globalization of the "faculty club culture." Here there is overwhelming "dependency", with an indigenous "comprador class" carrying out the agendas devised in the cultural centers of the "metropolis."

There are obvious tensions between the first and second processes of cultural globalization. Clearly, the anti-smoking movement collides with the interests of the tobacco industry. More generally, both feminism and environmentalism collide with notions of economic efficiency held by the international economic elite. At this time, the most visible conflict is between the "ecumenism of human rights", carried out by a multitude of non-governmental organizations, and the belief of the "Davos culture" that all good things, including human rights, will eventually result from the global establishment of successful market economies. And of course there are also tensions between the "faculty club culture" and various indigenous movements of cultural revitalization. The recent women's conference in Beijing pitted mostly Western feminists against an odd alliance of Islamists and the Vatican. Most significant politically, the Western-centered human rights community is meeting with strong opposition in a sizable number of non-Western countries.

The McWorld Culture

THIRD, OF COURSE, is popular culture. Here Barber's term "McWorld" fits best. And it is this culture that is most credibly subsumed under the category of Westernization, since virtually all of it is of Western, and more specifically American, provenance. Young people throughout the world dance to American music, wiggling their behinds in American jeans and wearing T-shirts with messages (often misspelled) about American universities and other consumer items. Older people watch American sitcoms on television and go to American movies. Everyone, young and old, grows taller and fatter on American fast foods. Here indeed is a case of cultural hegemony, and it is not surprising that others, such as French ministers of culture and Iranian mullahs (not to mention the now defunct Soviet Komsomol functionaries), greatly resent the fact.

These critics of "cultural imperialism" also understand that the diffusion of popular culture is not just a matter of outward behavior. It carries a significant freight of beliefs and values. Take the case of rock music. Its attraction is not just due to a particular preference for loud, rhythmic sound and dangerously athletic dancing. Rock music also symbolizes a whole cluster of cultural values—concerning self-expression, spontaneity, released sexuality, and, perhaps most importantly, defiance of the alleged stodginess of tradition. The consumption of American popular culture has, as it were, sacramental character. Paraphrasing the Book of Common Prayer, these items of consumption are visible signs of an invisible grace—or curse. The hegemony becomes clear by the asymmetry of consumption. Mexicans eat *hamburguesas*, Americans eat tacos. But the Mexicans are

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consuming whole chunks of American values "in, with, and under" the American hamburgers; the Americans are certainly *not* absorbing non-culinary aspects of Mexican culture by eating tacos.

A couple of years ago, I met a representative of Hallmark greeting cards for the Chinese province of Guandong (a market of some sixty million people). He was happy to report that his product was selling very well. When asked which greeting cards were most popular, he said Valentine cards. "You see, young Chinese men are quite shy with members of the opposite sex. It is difficult for them to express their feelings. It is much easier to send a Valentine card." I did not know what to say to this and mumbled something about how there must be a lot of work translating the texts into Chinese. "Oh no", he said, "they want the cards to be in English."

The people in charge of the globalization of popular culture are, of course, members or aspiring members of the "Davos" elite. The aforementioned Hallmark representative evinced all the characteristics of a successful, with-it yuppie. But the consumers of these cultural exports are a vastly broader population. The indigenous reactions once again vary from complete acceptance to complete rejection, with many degrees of compromise in between. Complete acceptance generally leads to a conflict between the generations, and presumably an important motive for such acceptance among young people is to outrage one's parents. Complete rejection is difficult, even under repressive regimes (the Komsomol functionaries, after trying repression, finally had to compromise by inventing something they would call "Soviet rock"). There are many and complex degrees of compromise, some of them puzzling to the outsider.

A few years ago I visited the Meiji Grand Shrine in Tokyo. I was in the company of my hosts, who were pious adherents of Shinto. When inviting me to go to the Shrine with them, they asked me solicitously whether my religious feelings would be offended by their venerating the Meiji Emperor; I replied courteously (and perhaps rashly) that this would be quite all right. I then stood with them, holding incense sticks in my hands and bowing to the deafening accompaniment of drums being beaten by a row of Shinto priests lined up behind us. I re-emerged from the Shrine somewhat dazed, reflecting that I had just been praying to a dead Japanese potentate. Outside the Shrine was a large park filled with hundreds of young people, fervently dancing to rock music blaring from numerous portable radios. I had noticed some young people inside the Shrine and wondered whether they were now joining the crowd in the park. I asked my hosts whether they saw any contradiction between what was going on inside and outside the Shrine. They were actually puzzled by my question. Certainly not, they replied after a moment of reflection, "Japanese culture has always been successful in integrating elements coming from abroad." One of the most interesting questions about contemporary Japan is whether my hosts were correct in their sanguine view about the absorptive capacity of Japanese culture.

Evangelical Protestantism

FOURTHLY (though perhaps not finally), a distinctive process of globalization is provided by Evangelical Protestantism, especially in its Pentecostal version (which accounts for something like 80 percent of its worldwide growth). Its globalizing force is best seen by comparing it with the other dynamic religious phenomenon of our time, that of the Islamic resurgence. While the latter has been limited to countries that have always been Muslim and to Muslim diaspora communities, Evangelical Protestantism has been exploding in parts of the world to which this religious tradition has always been alien, indeed, mostly unknown. The most dramatic explosion has occurred in Latin America (it was magisterially described in David Martin's 1990 book, *Tongues of Fire*). But the same variety of Protestantism has been rapidly growing in East Asia (with the

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notable exception of Japan), in all the Chinese societies (including, despite repression, the People's Republic), in the Philippines, the South Pacific, and throughout sub-Saharan Africa. There are recent, as yet vague, accounts of an incipient growth in Eastern Europe. And while the origins of this religion are in the United States (the "metropolis"), its new incarnations are thoroughly indigenized and independent of foreign missionaries or financial support.

Evangelical Protestantism brings about a cultural revolution in its new territories (in that respect it is very different from its social function on its American homeground). It brings about radical changes in the relations between men and women, in the upbringing and education of children, in the attitudes toward traditional hierarchies. Most importantly, it inculcates precisely that "Protestant ethic" that Max Weber analyzed as an important ingredient in the genesis of modern capitalism—a disciplined, frugal, and rationally oriented approach to work. Thus, despite its indigenization (converts in Mexico and Guatemala sing American gospel songs in Mayan translation), Evangelical Protestantism is the carrier of a pluralistic and modernizing culture whose original location is in the North Atlantic societies.

It is not clear at this point how this startlingly new phenomenon relates to the previously enumerated processes of cultural globalization. It certainly enters into conflicts with indigenous cultures. Most of the persecution of Christians recently publicized by human rights organizations—notably in China, in the Islamic world, and (sporadically) in Latin America—has been directed against Evangelical Protestants. What is clear is that this type of Protestantism is creating a new international culture, increasingly self-conscious as such (here the relation to American Evangelicals *is* relevant), with vast social, economic, and political ramifications. While the new Protestantism should not be misunderstood as a movement of social protest or reform (its motives are overwhelmingly personal and religious), it has large and unintended consequences. These are decidedly favorable to pluralism, to the market economy, and to democracy. It should be observed here that there may be other globalizing popular movements, but Evangelicalism is clearly the most dynamic.

FOUR FACES OF globalization: each is distinctive, each relates to the other three in complex ways. Yet they have important common features. The two perhaps most important features have already been mentioned—their Western, principally American, provenance, and related to this, their relation to the English language.

The Western provenance of these processes has given credibility to the frequent charge that they are part and parcel of Western imperialism, with the United States being the core of this malevolent phenomenon. The charge will not hold up. The "Davos culture" is today fully internationalized. It is centered as much in Tokyo and Singapore as it is in New York and London. One could more plausibly speak of an imperialism of the global capitalist system, but that is simply to attach a pejorative term to the fact of an immensely powerful global reality. The concepts of neo-Marxist theory simply do not fit it. As already mentioned, those concepts are somewhat more apt in describing the globalization of the "faculty club culture." Feminist or environmentalist agitators in Bangladesh can indeed be described as agents of a Western-based "cultural imperialism", but it is difficult to see how their activity benefits global capitalism. Multinational corporations do indeed make large profits from the distribution of popular culture, but there is no coercion involved in their success. No one is forcing Japanese teenagers to enjoy rock music or young men in China to express their emotions in terms derived from American romanticism.

Claudio Véliz (in his 1994 book *The New World of the Gothic Fox*) has made this point very tellingly in his description of the collapse

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of Latin American tradition before the onslaught of "Anglo-Saxon" values and lifestyles, notably those connected with a pluralistic society. He has used a good metaphor to denote this process, proposing that "Anglo-Saxon" culture is now in its "Hellenistic" phase. That is, it is no longer diffused by means of imperial power, British or American; rather, it has become a cultural force in itself, with large numbers of people clamoring to share it. As to Evangelical Protestantism, both leftist intellectuals and Roman Catholic bishops have portrayed it as a gigantic CIA plot, especially in Latin America, but a look at the empirical evidence presents a very different picture, one of a vital, autonomous movement no longer dependent on support from the outside.

If cultural globalization today represents the "Hellenistic" phase of a civilization originating in the northern parts of Europe and America, the English language is its *koiné* (the "basic Greek" that served as the lingua franca of late classical antiquity and that, among other things, became the language of the New Testament). We live, as Véliz puts it, in "a world made in English", and he points out that no other language appears to be a viable successor to English in the foreseeable future. By now there are very straightforward practical reasons for this hegemony of the English language. However much this may enrage intellectuals in certain places (France, for example, or Quebec), English has become *the* medium of international economic, technological, and scientific communication. The millions of people learning English all over the world do so in order to participate in this global communication, not (with few exceptions) because they want to read Shakespeare or Melville in the original. However, one does not use a language innocently. Every language carries a freight of values, of sensibilities, of approaches to reality, all of which insinuate themselves into the consciousness of those who speak it. It makes sense to assume that the attractiveness of English, especially in its American form, is due at least in part to its capacity to express the sensibilities of a dynamic, pluralistic, and rationally innovative world. This is even true of Evangelical Protestantism, which mostly expresses itself in languages other than English, but whose leaders and young people learn English in order to be in touch with the Evangelical centers in the United States. In doing so, they may get more than they bargained for. The road from the Christian Broadcasting Network to Oprah Winfrey is disturbingly straight.

The picture I have sketched is huge and exceedingly complex. There are many aspects of it that are not yet fully understood. There is a very large research agenda here. But one conclusion can be ventured: If one is to heed Huntington's call for a dialogue between cultures, one must pay as much attention to the manner in which the different processes of cultural globalization relate to each other as to their relation with many indigenous cultures. This then will not just be a dialogue between "the West and the rest", but a considerably more complicated enterprise. □

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Yeltsin: the Problem, Not the Solution

Peter Rutland

The dead man grasps the living. The corpse of the old world is decomposing among us, poisoning everything alive. That corpse stinks!

—V.I. Lenin

IT MAY BE AUTUMN, but metaphorically it seems to be springtime in Russia once again. Boris Yeltsin is back, in fighting form, after an eight month absence due to heart surgery and subsequent pneumonia. He has given a free hand to Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, who were installed in March as first deputy prime ministers with a mandate to revive market reform. These two men are the sort of politicians Western observers like to see at the helm in Moscow—young, forty-something technocrats who are healthy, telegenic, and fluent both in English and in the language of IMF stabilization programs. It is 1992 all over again: what some Russian commentators are calling "the second liberal revolution."[1] International markets are enthusiastic, and money is pouring into Russian shares and bonds at the rate of $1.5 billion a month. The Moscow stock exchange has risen 150 percent since the beginning of the year.

It may, however, be a little premature to sink one's life savings into Novgorod municipal bonds. Western attitudes toward Russia over the past decade have oscillated between brief interludes of elation and dire predictions of chaos and doom. The heady optimism of 1992 was followed by the anxiety of 1993 (the shelling of the parliament) and the fears of 1994 (the war over Chechnya). The market transition in Russia has also been accompanied by increased poverty, rising death rates, and an explosion of violent crime. Contract killings in Moscow alone are running at three hundred a year. Anyone lulled into a state of euphoria by reading an IMF or World Bank report on Russia's imminent economic boom would be well advised to see the recent movie, *The Saint*, in which Val Kilmer is chased across Moscow by a menagerie of gangsters who have bought off the city's police and army units and whose boss is running for president. Which is the real Russia—the Russia of sleek bankers, oil millionaires, and Weimar-style cabarets; or the Russia of starving babushkas, reeling drunks, and suicidal soldiers? For once, Hollywood may have stumbled upon a more accurate rendition of Russia's highly contradictory social reality than that reflected in the bullish projections of financial markets.

Hollywood aside, there are some trends in contemporary Russia that should be applauded. There is no sign that the average Russian—even one suffering from wage or pension arrears—thinks that a return to the authoritarian Soviet past is either feasible or

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[1]Aleksei Kiva, "Liberals to the Left, Generals to the Right", *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, May 23, 1997.

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desirable. A basic acceptance of the institutions of democracy and a market economy has taken root both among the ruling elite and the population at large.[2] For all its problems, Russia does not currently feel like a society on the brink of social catastrophe. Market democracy is weak, but the forces that would topple it are weaker still. Radical communists find it hard to mobilize more than a few thousand people on the streets, and for all the talk of "Weimar Russia", the neo-fascist movements only have a few hundred serious followers. The historical record suggests that the major threat to developing democracies is a military coup, but Russian generals seem more interested in building dachas (and subsequently keeping themselves out of jail) than repeating the sorry experiences of August 1991 and October 1993—when the army was dragged into politics by ambitious or fearful civilian leaders. As one commentator put it, "The army is as defenseless in the face of democracy as it was in the face of the totalitarian state. When the hard times came the people with weapons accepted their poverty more meekly than the teachers with their chalk or the miners with their picks."[3]

BOTH POSITIVE AND negative trends in Russia are much obscured by the West's fixation on the personality and power of Boris Yeltsin. Too much of Western energy, resources, and political capital has been sunk into schemes whose primary goal is propping up Yeltsin's regime, while far too little attention has been devoted to listening to what Russians themselves want and need. Trends in Russia since 1991 have been highly contradictory. In some respects the country has changed faster than one would have expected, in other respects more slowly. Unfortunately, journalists dislike ambiguity, and in the public mind the fate of Russia seems to have been irrevocably tied to the rise and fall of Yeltsin's fortunes.

This means, in turn, that some important trends of the past six years, such as the ebbing of power away from Moscow to the provinces, are seen as negative rather than positive developments, since they undermine Yeltsin's power and authority. But the federalization of Russia is arguably a healthy political development, since it lessens the likelihood of unpredictable and potentially disruptive policy switches at the national level. Moscow now has to look over its shoulder at how the leaders of Russia's eighty-nine regions will react. The autonomy of regional governors was strengthened by the round of elections that took place last fall (before which most of them had been appointed directly by President Yeltsin). The enhanced power of regional leaders compensates to some degree for the pusillanimity of the legislative and judicial branches of government at the national level. For many Western commentators, however, these regional governors are seen as obstacles to the reformist drive that has been launched by Yeltsin's rejuvenated government.

The optimism of Russia-watchers about the reformist zeal of the Chubais-Nemtsov team is all the more surprising given that just a year earlier, in the spring of 1996, the West was staring bleakly at the prospect of a Red Restoration. The Communist Party was the biggest winner in the December 1995 State Duma elections, and Yeltsin's personal popularity rating was "lower than grass", as Chubais put it. The Russian state was mired in a bloody, senseless war in Chechnya, while its workers and pensioners went unpaid. (It is often forgotten that Chubais was fired from his post as first deputy prime minister in January 1996 in part because of his inability to

[2]See the New Russia Barometer polls published by Richard Rose at Strathclyde University's Center for the Study of Public Policy (on the web at www.strath.ac.uk/departments/CSPP/). Or see Richard Rose, "Where Are Post-Communist Countries Going?", *Journal of Democracy* (July 1997), especially pp. 100-3.

[3]Leonid Radzikhovsky, "A Wolf of War or a Fox of Politics?", *Ogonek*, July 14-20, 1997.

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pay off wage and pension arrears.) And now? The war in Chechnya is over, Russia has brokered its problems with NATO expansion, and the sinister "party of war" (Yeltsin's clique of hardline advisers) has been pushed out of office. Economic reform is back on track, and the Dynamic Duo of Chubais and Nemtsov are preparing to do battle with the dinosaurs of the old Soviet economy—the energy monopolies—and to bring the bracing winds of reform to housing and social welfare.

So the story goes. The reality, however, does not fit this glossy image of reformist Russia, which has been artfully buffed by Western financiers keen to sell bonds to emerging market investors. The new government is unlikely to do anything that will reverse Russia's steady decline into a minor regional power with Third World living standards (and 20,000 nuclear weapons). The Deng Xiaoping model of a passive, near-dead leader presiding over a delicate balance of political forces may have worked well in China, but it is not working in Russia, whose socialist economy was more developed than China's, and so requires more radical surgery to repair. Six years into the transition, that economy remains woefully anemic. The formulas that have succeeded in most of Eastern Europe have fallen on stony ground in the former Soviet Union—the Baltic countries excepted. Elsewhere, economic growth kicked in six months after inflation was brought below 5 percent per month. It has now been two years since this was accomplished in Russia, yet the economy continues to decline for its seventh consecutive year.

Russia's economic problems lie not so much in the economic formulas as in the political failure to implement them. And implementation has faltered not because of strong social opposition, but because of a failure of political leadership. That failure is encapsulated in the person of Yeltsin and his on-off approach to economic reform, in which policy is subordinated to the President's moods and his oscillating calculations of political expediency. Yeltsin is not the solution, he is the problem. And he is the problem because he is the state.

Ends and Means

THE RUSSIAN STATE that emerged after 1991 was built around the figure of Boris Yeltsin, an ex-Communist apparatchik who understood the old system well enough to keep power out of the hands of the Communist Party. He played an important balancing role, promoting democracy and cautious economic reform in a country where the social bases for such politics were slim to nonexistent. Yeltsin did this by surrounding himself with officials of differing views and backgrounds, who were united only by their dependence on him. This balancing of rival forces in the interest of preserving power is the essence of Yeltsin's political style.[4] Former U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock has described how Yeltsin drew him a diagram of a circle with spokes radiating from its center and said, "That way I can use them when I wish, but they don't control me or speak for me."[5]

There is no doubt that Yeltsin's political skills saved Russia from catastrophe in 1991. He saw that the old system was finished, and quickly set about concentrating power in his own hands in order to provide a credible alternative leadership and thereby stave off civil war. However, having steered Russia through the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin was reluctant to leave the helm, or to share power with his former allies in the Russian legislature. In a dramatic about-face, Yeltsin unleashed the army on the Supreme Soviet in October 1993—the very parliament from which he had faced down the August 1991 coup. December 1993 saw the adoption of a new constitution that stripped the legisla-

[4]See the memoirs of Yeltsin's former press secretary, Vyacheslav Kostikov, *Roman s Prezidentom* (Moscow: Vagrius Publishers, 1997).

[5]Jack F. Matlock, *Autopsy Of An Empire* (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 74.

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ture of most of its power and concentrated authority in the hands of the president. Raising the specter of civil war proved handy again in 1996, since it provided Yeltsin with a campaign theme that proved sufficient to beat off the lackluster challenge from Communist Gennady Zyuganov in the presidential election. Yeltsin's political style is clearly effective when it comes to concentrating power in his own hands, but it is incapable of generating effective policies to tackle the acute domestic and international problems facing Russia.

The principle underlying Yeltsin's style of government is simple and familiar: "L'état, c'est moi." Boris Nemtsov, the current trailblazer for democracy in Russia, habitually refers to Yeltsin as the "Czar-father", apparently without irony. Western leaders went along with Yeltsin's consolidation of power for lack of an obvious alternative, showing the same political foresight that brought us such outstanding leaders as Shah Mohammed Reza and Mobutu Sese Seko. Such "strong" leaders may be able to sustain political stability for decades—but when they are toppled, they leave a society in ruins.

Western advisers who have been paid to promote democracy and the rule of law have been strangely silent about the weak powers granted to the Russian parliament. Their rationale seems to be the following: If the Russian voters throw up a legislature full of communists, nationalists, and other ne'er-do-wells, as they did in 1993 and 1995, that is all the more reason to stick with Yeltsin. This attitude is wrong on three counts. First, Russia will never develop an effective parliament unless it becomes a source of real power, and is held accountable to electors for its decisions. At the moment, the parliamentary deputies have no incentive to behave responsibly, but can sit back and blame Yeltsin for the country's ills. Second, although the Russian legislature is indeed a sorry and fractious institution, nobody ever said that parliamentarians are saints. On the contrary, democracy is built on the assumption that one's rulers are not perfect. (Is there any legislature on earth that generates warm, protective feelings among the people who observe its antics?) That is why there must be institutional checks and balances, and a maximum of public visibility and accountability in the decision making process. Third, the doomsayers exaggerate the grip of the Red-Brown coalition on the parliament. Through both the 1993 and 1995 elections, the bloc of voters supporting broadly pro-reform candidates stayed about the same—around 40 percent of the electorate.[6] Due to the vagaries of the proportional representation system and the fractiousness of the democratic parties, the reformers failed to capitalize on their solid base of public support. But there was a moderate presence in the parliament, one that could have grown over time had it been given a chance. Yeltsin himself did nothing to promote the development of an effective democratic party, instead refusing to join any party and pretending that the president should be "above politics."

Many Russians initially went along with the concentration of power in Yeltsin's hands, partly because they believed it more suited to Russia's political culture, and partly because they misunderstood the role of the president in the U.S. political system. Many Russians (and East Europeans, too) believe that the president of the United States is an all-powerful figure, and would be shocked to learn of the important role played by Congress in domestic and foreign policy.

Above all, the reformers themselves justified their allegiance to Yeltsin by arguing that the end justifies the means. They had no illusions about the undemocratic nature of Yeltsin's regime, but maintained that Russia was at a crucial crossroads. Someone had to take responsibility for dismantling the remaining institutions of the Soviet era, and for laying the foundations for a market

[6]Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister, *How Russia Votes* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1997).

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economy and civil society. Yeltsin at least understood the need for fundamental change. He was willing to give his young reformers sufficient autonomy to pursue radical policies that would be costly in the short term but essential to Russia's long-term well-being. The implicit bargain made by such reformers was subjected to an acid test by the Chechen war. Only the most hardened pragmatists were willing to continue supporting an administration that caused the death of some 40,000 civilians.

The problem with the reasoning of these pragmatists—a problem that should be more clearly understood by survivors of the Soviet regime than by anyone else—is that ends can never be separated from means. Market reform imposed from above is likely to alienate the social groups and bureaucratic agencies whose cooperation is essential to the creation of effective social institutions. Democracy is precisely about the priority of means over ends, since it rests on the belief that agreement cannot be reached over ends unless a sound deliberative process is in place. Yeltsin does not seek a dialogue with society: he seeks to browbeat it into compliance with his populist rhetoric.

The pragmatist approach also makes heroic assumptions about the integrity and ability of the governing elite, and asks us to suspend Lord Acton's dictum about the tendency of power to corrupt. Corruption may be rife among top government officials, but even so it is not the crucial problem. Ordinary Russians expect their leaders to steal—it helps them rationalize their own efforts to cheat the authorities. What matters, to paraphrase Deng Xiaoping, is not whether the cat will go to heaven, but whether it can catch mice. Unfortunately, the Russian state, even with the young reformers at the helm, is doing a lousy job at catching mice.

Much of the government's economic policy is now being formulated by a team of two dozen men in their thirties and forties, a team that Gennady Zyuganov refers to as the "pedocrats" (meaning those representing "rule by children").[7] The new vice president of the national electricity company, for example, is twenty-nine year old Boris Brevnov, who set up his own bank at age twenty-three. The pedocrats' accession to power in March of this year represents a miniature "cultural revolution"—a revolution that took place without an election, without any pretense of asking the society if it wanted another dose of liberal reforms.[8] A lot of the new team's policy seems to be based on IMF and World Bank briefing papers and occasional readings of *The Economist*. Even assuming they are honest and capable, the capacity of these young revolutionaries to design and implement effective policies, in the face of the indifference or hostility of other civil servants and key political and economic elites, must be in grave doubt. Only the promotion of Nemtsov from the provinces represents an exceptional development; for most of the past six years, Yeltsin has been "endlessly reshuffling the same stale pack of cards" in selecting his ministers, and as such the Nemtsov-Chubais team remains an embattled minority.[9]

There are of course plenty of critics prepared to argue that the young reformers are not driven by altruism, but are trying to "become the sole wielders, the monopoly-holders, of economic, financial, informational, and political power in Russia."[10] Either way, and whether they succeed in the main or not, it suits Yeltsin to draft in a fresh new governmental team every year or so: It is a

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[7] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, June 17, 1997, p. 1.

[8] See Andrei Fadin, "Young Executives Are Calling the Tune", *Obshchaya gazeta*, May 29-June 4, 1997; Boris Krotkov, "Gaidar Is Not in Power, But His Ideas Are", *Delovoi mir*, June 17, 1997; and Olga Kryshtanovskaya, "The Real Masters of Russia", *Argumenty i fakty* (May 1997).

[9] Albert Plutnik, "Narrow Is the Circle of These Revolutionaries", *Izvestiya*, July 4, 1997.

[10] Aleksei Yelymanov and Valery Solovei, "We Have Grown Too Accustomed to Democracy to Allow It to be Crushed in the Power Struggle", *Obshchaya gazeta*, June 5-11, 1997.

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straw for optimists to cling to, and it ensures a supply of scapegoats when things go wrong.

But "L'état, c'est moi" is an idea whose time has passed—about two hundred years ago. There is only one political institution that has proved itself capable of aggregating social interests in such a way as to provide social peace and guarantee individual liberty while promoting economic prosperity, and that is an elected legislature. It is instructive to note that all the Central and East European countries that have pursued successful reforms have strong, effective parliaments. In contrast, it is hard to find a single country in transition with an overly powerful presidency that has achieved lasting economic recovery.

Yeltsin would have best served Russia by stepping down from power in 1993 or 1994 and passing on the baton of leadership to a new generation. Instead, in the tradition of previous Russian rulers, he doggedly clings to power. He even opted to run for a second term in 1996 despite the fact that his public support stood at a mere 8 percent in January of that year. Thanks to the massive and one-sided media campaign waged on his behalf, and with Zyuganov as his principal opponent, Yeltsin was able to turn the election into a referendum on the communist past, knocking most of his would-be rivals out of the race and defeating Zyuganov in the second round by a comfortable 14 percent margin. One should not forget the effects of the lavish distribution of pork from federal coffers in the run-up to the election. As the joke goes, "How is a presidential election organized? In three stages: first the campaign; then the voting; then the rebuilding of the national economy." The President's media manipulators were even able to hide from the public the fact that Yeltsin suffered a heart attack just days before the second round of the election. But Yeltsin's victory came at a price: the clock of political change was turned back five years.[11]

If Yeltsin had resigned in 1993, a new democratic leader such as Grigory Yavlinsky might well have emerged triumphant—or perhaps a Communist would have regained the presidency. Either way, the new president would have had to adapt to the fundamental changes that had already occurred in Russian society—or he would have been voted out of office at the next election. Real institution-building, as opposed to political posturing and clan warfare, would have proceeded apace. Instead, here we are in 1997, facing three more years of Boris Yeltsin, and with no clear picture of what will follow him. At least a decade will have passed since the fall of communism before Russian voters get to experience a "normal" election, in which voters choose between competing governments, rather than take part in ritualistic referendums on their past.

Political Style and Culture

SIX YEARS after his accession to power, Yeltsin's monocratic approach to politics has clearly exhausted its usefulness. The features of Yeltsinocracy are plain: He has devised, willy-nilly, an ingenious and robust system of rule that enables the current political elite to stay in power despite the abject failure of their policies on nearly all fronts.

The country is ruled by decree, of which the President signs about 1,500 a year. Most of the major government programs of the past five years have been carried out by presidential fiat, such as the 1995 cash privatization, which saw half a dozen leading oil companies auctioned off at bargain prices to favored banks. Federal budget spending is essentially carried out by decree. Last year, for the first time, the budget was passed into law—but the government ignored it, slashing certain spending categories at will because of a shortfall in tax receipts. This year, having failed to get the Duma to approve a revised budget plan in mid-year, the government

[11] "Why Do We Need This Lenin?", *Rossiiskie vesti*, June 17, 1997.

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announced that it would cut spending by 20 percent even without Duma authorization. In June Chubais expressed his displeasure with the Duma's performance, which sounded rather strange, since in most democracies it is the legislature that passes judgment on the executive, not the other way around.

The problem with ruling a country by decree as opposed to law is that there is no publicly accountable procedure governing their adoption—all that matters is getting Yeltsin's signature at the bottom. No one knows when a decree may be revoked, or replaced by another decree. There is no requirement of an open debate on the merits and defects of a decree, or oversight as to how it is carried out. As a result many half-baked measures are hastily passed, only to be withdrawn or abandoned after public outcry. (A striking example is the tax reform introduced in August 1996 that proposed draconian new controls on bank deposits and was quickly withdrawn after a hail of criticism.) One is reminded of a saying from the last century: The strictness of Russia's laws is exceeded only by the laxity of their implementation.

Even Yeltsin's administration cannot get around the fact that some issues have to be encapsulated in law. Foreign investors, after all, do not want to see their rights subject to the vagaries of decrees. The Duma, painted into a corner as an "irreconcilable opposition", retaliates in kind by failing to pass much-needed laws, such as a new land code, a new tax code, and a law on production sharing in mineral projects.

Many decrees are ignored, but some are implemented with great vigor. Only those having close personal contact with the President can know which are which. As in the court of Louis XIV, physical access to the ruler is the key—hence the increasing personalization of Russian politics, with access as the prize. Over the years access to Boris Nikolaevich has been controlled by such diverse figures as his tennis partners, his chief bodyguard, and most recently his youngest daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko, who became a member of his campaign team last spring. In June of this year, just after the Duma recessed for the summer, Yeltsin formally appointed Dyachenko as his official adviser. She explained that her role is "to tell the truth to Papa"—which, of course, begs the question of what his other advisers have been telling him over the last few years.[12]

Rule by decree produces badly conceived and badly implemented policies. Yeltsin's way of dealing with that consequence is to fire people. He is most at home banging his fist on the table and berating his subordinates. Such a fate befell General Igor Rodionov, appointed defense minister in August 1996 and ignominiously dismissed ten months later after a humiliating dressing-down in front of television cameras. Rodionov later explained that while in office he had found it impossible to get a personal audience with Yeltsin, and that even a secretly coded letter he wrote to the President was apparently not delivered.[13] Yeltsin's penchant for firing ministers means that it has now become very difficult to persuade competent people to take on the job. (Admittedly, the fact that a minister earns only about $1,000 a month is not a great incentive either.) It is surreal to watch Yeltsin surface every few months and profess surprise and outrage at the incompetence of a government chosen and appointed by none other than B.N. Yeltsin.

Another distinctive feature of Yeltsin's political style is the careful manipulation of promotions and demotions to balance rival cliques and prevent subordinates from accumulating too much power. Yeltsin has used old-guard bureaucrats like Victor Chernomyrdin and Oleg Soskovets to balance pro-reform radicals like Yegor Gaidar and Anatoly Chubais. In a dramatic June 1996 showdown he ejected the Soskovets

[12]Tatyana Dyachenko, interviewed on NTV, June 30, 1997.

[13]Interview with Igor Rodionov, *Obshchaya gazeta*, May 29-June 4, 1997.

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clan, which controlled the metallurgy and defense industries and backed the Chechen war. Yet at the same time he bolstered the role of another hawk over Chechnya, the "strong man" interior minister, General Anatoly Kulikov. Over the past six years Yeltsin has strengthened the police and interior troops in order to spread his bets and avoid dependence on the army, whose passivity in 1991 ensured his accession to power. While the army has been starved of cash, the police have been well funded; there are now 50 percent more police and interior troops than in Soviet days. Currently, General Kulikov, a bitter opponent of market reform, is being held in reserve to be deployed when necessary against ex-General Alexander Lebed, or similar "patriotic" challengers.

Another common Yeltsin practice is to bring in figures from outside who have some popular appeal, and then abandon them when the need has passed. Ruslan Khasbulatov (former Duma chairman), Aleksander Rutskoi (Yeltsin's vice president), and Lebed (briefly appointed to the Security Council last year) each in turn played this role. Nemtsov is the latest occupant of the crown prince's throne, and Yeltsin seems to have genuine affection for the young ex-governor of Nizhny Novgorod. But no one should be surprised to pick up the newspaper tomorrow and find out that Nemtsov has been dismissed because he was "too headstrong", or because he did not take care to pay the babushkas' pensions. It is important to remember that with Yeltsin in the Kremlin, as Andrei Traub has put it, "any government in Russia is a temporary one."[14]

Beneath the reformist bluster, Yeltsin has resurrected at the national level a political system that mimics in several respects the stagnated Soviet Union under Leonid Brezhnev. An incapacitated leader is surrounded by all-powerful bureaucrats, regional leaders press for more independence, and an apathetic public looks on in disgust. The intelligentsia knows that something is badly wrong, but cannot see a way out. In some ways, as former Yeltsin aide Pavel Voshchanov has noted, the current situation is even worse than the Brezhnev era, in that the countervailing structures of party committees have now gone, and "administrative tyranny has almost become a way of life."[15] And unlike Brezhnev, Yeltsin frequently abdicates responsibility for policy, tolerating violations (by regional leaders, by corrupt officials) so long as they flatter him with professions of loyalty.

During the late Soviet era, citizens enjoyed a certain degree of security and predictability in their lives. Now that too has gone, with living standards shrinking and income differentials growing. As the popular joke has it, "At least there was something to steal when Brezhnev was in control." Yeltsin himself drew a parallel with the past when he referred to the actions of his administration during the months that he was sick as a "government of stagnation"—stagnation (*zastoi*) being a code word for the Brezhnev era.[16]

A Potemkin President

IN SOVIET TIMES the West took for granted that political power was concentrated in the Kremlin, and it was logical that Western policy should then focus on sustaining the reformist aspirations of Mikhail Gorbachev. That policy turned out to be good for the West, since it led—serendipitously, perhaps—to the collapse of the Soviet Union. U.S. policy toward Russia has once again become inextricably entwined with the political fate of one man—Boris Yeltsin—but it no longer makes sense to focus on one man, nor are the consequences likely to be as benign.

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[14]Andrei Traub, "Who Will Stab the Prime Minister in the Back?", *Ogonek* (May 1997).

[15]Pavel Voshchanov, "Whose Locomotive is Speeding into Nomenklatura Capitalism?", *Komsomolskaya pravda*, April 22, 1997.

[16]Cited in Vladimir Todres, "One Hundred Days After the Edict", *Itogi*, June 17, 1997, pp. 14-16.

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Modern Russia is a chaotic and confusing place, full of contradictory trends and unexpected twists and turns. Like a spaceship landing on an alien planet, the immediate—and natural—response of Western politicians on arrival in Moscow is to cry, "Take me to your leader." And there, sitting in the dazzlingly refurbished Kremlin, is a man well suited to the part. However, far from leading his country to the tranquil pastures of "market democracy", Yeltsin has launched Russia on a permanent revolution. Paradoxically, he has become an immovable fixture by casting himself as the leader of the transition, the only man who can save Russia from its communist past. He is the ultimate interim leader—a Potemkin president propped up in office by rival cliques who cannot agree on where to take the country, but who use Yeltsin's authority to wield power while they can, for ends fair or foul. Yeltsin is now hoist with his own petard: He initially consolidated his power by playing off one clique against another, but now he is the virtual prisoner of warring clans, shuttled from one sanitarium to another as they vie for the spoils of the ongoing privatization of state assets. At times, as when Yeltsin denounces his own government, or disco dances for the cameras, it resembles a comic opera, but the potential for tragedy is never far away.

Yeltsin's peccadilloes (being drunk during a state visit, or conducting an orchestra) may be amusing to Westerners, reassured to see a thigh-slapping, hard-drinking, bear-hugging Russian in the Kremlin. But they are less reassuring to Russians, who recall that this is the man who sent the army into Chechnya and presides over a government unable to pay its pensioners and teachers. And Yeltsin is still the person in charge of the country's nuclear arsenal, a fact of which we were reminded by his spontaneous comment at the signing of the NATO treaty in Paris this May, to the effect that all Russian warheads would be "removed." (Spokesmen struggled to explain that what he really meant was that they would be retargeted—but they had *already* been retargeted.)

The only thing that will remove Yeltsin from office is his mortality. By May 1997 his public support had fallen back to where it was eighteen months earlier—8 percent.[17] But as in the Brezhnev era, it is not public opinion that matters but the President's medical reports. International financial markets are even more Yeltsinocentric than Western political leaders: The merest hint of medical trouble causes the markets to panic. Yeltsin was out of action ("working on documents", as his press releases put it) for eight of the twelve months following his re-election, due to quintuple heart by-pass surgery and subsequent bouts with pneumonia. On July 7, 1997, he again left the Kremlin, this time for a two month vacation. When he is out of town Victor Chernomyrdin minds the shop, and the Russian government effectively goes into hibernation until the Boss resurfaces and starts firing off decrees.

Assuming that Yeltsin stays alive, he will have to leave office in the year 2000, since the constitution limits him to two terms. There was talk of finding a way to enable him to serve a third term, but his announcement of September 1 that he would step down when his present term ends has put an end to such talk, at least for now. In any event, Yeltsin is mortal, and sooner or later he must be replaced. Contemplation of that eventuality underscores the fragility of the political order that Yeltsin has built. It is unclear who could step into Yeltsin's shoes; indeed, it is hard to imagine any other individual being able to fill the role he has created for himself. Yeltsin has achieved a feat of political levitation—sustaining himself in power despite the lack of visible support from any organized social groups or even business

[17]Interview with Alexander Oslon, director of the Public Opinion Foundation, "The End of the Little Stagnation", *Novoe vremya*, July 6, 1997.

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elites.[18] No other Russian political leader could pull off such a performance, since Yeltsin and Yeltsin alone can claim to have delivered Russia from communism. One potential crown prince after another has been picked up, used, discredited, and discarded.[19] The current chosen son, Boris Nemtsov, will likely suffer a similar fate. And then we will be back exactly to where we were in 1996, staring at the possible victory of a Communist candidate, even though this candidate is supported by only one-quarter of the population, because the divide-and-decree methodology of Yeltsinocracy has prevented the formation of a healthy political party representing the forces of Russia's centrist majority.

WHERE DOES THIS leave Russia? Despite the gloomy morass that Russian politics has become, the prospect of a messy political crisis following Yeltsin's demise should not be cause for excessive alarm. If the center of gravity in Russia's political and economic system has indeed shifted decisively to the regions, then the feuding inside the Moscow beltway should not spill over into a social cataclysm, and Russian democracy may emerge from such a crisis stronger than before. This guarded optimism is based on the absence of significant, organized challenges to market democracy. The military is in no condition to mount a coup, the communist opposition is not able to organize a revolution, and the regional bosses, who mostly rule with a tight hand, do not want to disrupt the status quo. Scary scenarios of violent social conflict, civil war, and military coups are implausible.

It is not an abrupt collapse that threatens Russia, but the steady sapping of its human resources as poverty and despair take their toll, while much of its elite flees oversees. It is not only hard cash that is leaving Russia (at the rate of about $15 billion a year); the country is also losing its human capital. It is striking, for example, that not only Yeltsin's grandson, but also the son of Chubais and the daughter of Yeltsin's top aide Valentin Yumashev are attending the exclusive British public school Millfield (fees $25,000 a year). What signal does this send to the Russian people about the leaders' confidence in their country's future (let alone its education system)? Russia urgently needs visionary—but effective—national leadership to put its economic and political institutions on a sound footing, something that Yeltsin's reformers have tried, but thus far failed, to achieve.

Russians like to point out that they are a patient and tough people, who have seen their society disintegrate more than once during this century (in 1905, 1917, 1932, 1937, and 1941). Each time, Russia recovered. Russians are now waiting, some calmly, some desperately, for such a renaissance to occur once more—and eventually it will. This time around, however, it is highly unlikely that Russia will re-emerge as a military superpower. For once, it may well be a normal country. □

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[18]Alexander Bykovsky, "Burial Plans of the Reformers", *Selskaya zhizn*, June 17, 1997.

[19]Dmitry Pinsker and Vladimir Todres, "In Search of a Crown Prince", *Itogi*, June 24, 1997.

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

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The China Question

China, and America's policy toward it, have been the subject of vigorous controversy over the last year.

This is entirely appropriate—both because China is more likely than any other country to become America's main rival in coming decades, and because there are well-grounded differences of opinion concerning how best to respond to the challenge it poses.

To advance the debate we present four essays: Robert Ross on why it is wrong to treat China as an adversary and threat; A.D. McLennan on why balancing is better than containing; Bruce Dickson on the problem of dealing with the succession issue in the midst of sweeping change; and Diane Wolff on the dilemma of reconciling the economy's demand for information with the political imperative of control.

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Why Our Hardliners Are Wrong

Robert S. Ross

CRITICS OF U.S. China policy have been enjoying unprecedented attention lately. Between those who want to get tough with China and those who want to be more accommodating, the Clinton administration's second-term project to consolidate and expand cooperative Sino-U.S. relations has been vastly complicated. Advocates of nearly every stripe have had a hand in distorting China's impact on American interests and Washington's policy record since the late 1980s, which, despite its bad press, has had important successes. Character assassination has been so rampant and policy critiques so politicized that the normal rules of evidence used to evaluate a serious, complicated set of policy choices have been among the first casualties. Lost, too, in many cases, has been any sense of the geopolitics of the problem—that cool-headed assessment of capabilities and motives that ought to be our first task, not an emotionally exhausted afterthought.

Particularly egregious have been many of the claims of those neo-cold warriors in their efforts to persuade Americans to abandon engagement and follow a policy of "containing" the "China threat." As an example of the hostile hyperbole that has become quite common, consider this statement of June 9 from the Washington-based William J. Casey Institute of the Center for Security Policy: "The nature of the threat posed by China is in key respects of a greater magnitude and vastly greater complexity than that mounted by the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War." It is a rousing statement, to be sure, but by no reasonable or objective measure is it even remotely true.

If we step back and evaluate the issues fairly, two truths come clear: China is not a "rogue state", and U.S. policy has made important gains in affecting Chinese behavior over a wide range of issues bearing on important American interests. Both points may be demonstrated by looking at military and economic dimensions of the bilateral relationship, as well as at the heated debate over China's human rights practices.

Security Conflicts and Accommodations

THE MOST SERIOUS Chinese challenge to the United States is its potential military power. The Chinese economy is growing and Beijing's ability to increase defense spending is growing with it. But advocates of containing China vastly overestimate Chinese power and underestimate our own.

A larger Chinese economy will not necessarily lead to greater military power. China can import weaponry, but sustained improvement in military capabilities will require

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indigenous defense modernization. China still cannot manufacture a reliable 1970s-generation fighter plane, much less anything like a U.S. F-16. The need of the People's Liberation Army to import Russian equipment is telling. Buying from Russia is a quick and relatively inexpensive way for China to equip its forces with materiel far superior to indigenous products. But this should not be particularly upsetting to U.S. planners, whose forte is the destruction of Soviet equipment with remarkable speed and skill. Moreover, China lacks the basic ability to maintain Russian equipment. It now requires extensive Russian assistance to repair many of its recently acquired SU-27s and its Kilo submarines.

China has developed a limited number of more modern destroyers, but it is decades away from being able to manufacture and deploy a first-generation, limited capability aircraft carrier. The PLA lacks the ability to conduct sustained military operations more than 100 miles from the Chinese shoreline. China is a formidable land power, but in maritime Southeast Asia, where U.S. interests are most at stake, China is militarily inferior even to such countries as Singapore and Malaysia.

In the end, China may succeed in modernizing its military. But it may fail, too—economic and technological modernization is a precarious enterprise. As an export processing zone for the advanced industrial countries, China has succeeded in raising living standards and its GNP, but this is a far cry from developing the economic and technological capabilities to field a twenty-first century military force.

U.S. military supremacy is so overwhelming that Washington has the luxury of being able to observe Chinese technology development and weapons production before adopting countervailing policies. As Secretary of Defense William Cohen recently observed, Washington has global superiority in every phase of warfare, and while China is trying to catch up, the United States is not standing still. Not only is the U.S. defense budget greater than the combined defense budgets of the next six largest competitors, but U.S. technology and weapons modernization are advancing so rapidly that, in all probability, with each passing day and despite its strenuous efforts, China's technological and military capabilities are losing ground rather than catching up with those of the United States.

Politically, too, the American alliance system in Asia is superior to anything the Chinese can hope to have. Logistically, the U.S. alliance with Japan and its access to basing facilities throughout the region give the United States an enormous advantage. Diplomatically, China is increasingly viewed in the region as a problem to be managed, while the United States is seen as a relatively disinterested power-broker whose aims are compatible with regional peace and prosperity for all. A potential Chinese alliance with Burma can hardly offset the U.S. relationship with Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the maritime states of Southeast Asia (including, still, the Philippines). With such logistical and diplomatic superiority to bring to bear, current U.S. defense spending and weapons acquisitions are already more than sufficient to hedge against China's potential development of advanced military capabilities.

It is true, nevertheless, that despite China's limited military capabilities the PLA can use force effectively and is not shy to do so. The PLA has been part of every major crisis in East Asia since 1949. It has the ability to disrupt regional stability and inflict considerable costs on U.S. interests. Clearly, the most serious security conflict in U.S.-China relations remains the Taiwan issue, and it is in principle unresolvable. Beijing wants unification under PRC rule and reserves the right to use force to bring it about. The United States insists on Taiwan's right to make its choices free from military pressure.

Even if the Taiwan issue is intractable in principle, it can be managed so that U.S.-China conflicts of interest do not disrupt cooperative relations; this has clearly been the U.S. experience from the early 1970s to the early 1990s. U.S. policy has guaranteed Taiwan's security and, as important, has provided an

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environment in which Taiwan developed a prosperous economy and a flourishing democracy. These successes form the bedrock of Taiwan's diplomatic autonomy, and the only concession Washington had to make to help Taiwan achieve them was to refrain from actions that could be interpreted as support for formal Taiwanese independence.

Equally important, Washington's multifaceted assistance to Taiwan did not make improved relations with China impossible. Diplomatically, what seemed a zero-sum game between Taiwan and the mainland turned out not to be zero-sum at all for American policy. The main reason for this was China's strong desire to cooperate with the United States against the Soviet Union, but it was not the only reason. Mutually beneficial economic relations and cooperation in maintaining regional stability on a wide range of issues were also important, and they remain so despite the fact that the Soviet Union is no longer there as a common enemy. Indeed, a good deal less has changed than is often assumed. China today no less than before wants to avoid heightened U.S.-China adversarial relations, much less a literal fight with the United States over Taiwan. That being so, Washington can continue to protect Taiwan's most vital interests—security from mainland power and continued economic and political development—and avoid great power conflict and escalation of regional tension by employing more or less the same Taiwan policy that has worked well over the past twenty-five years. The United States can fulfill its moral obligations to Taiwan and assure its "realist" objectives toward both Taiwan and the mainland without having to do either more against the mainland or less in favor of Taiwan.

CHINESE WEAPONS exports have drawn much attention from critics of U.S. China policy. It has now become common knowledge that, as Gary Bauer pronounced recently in the *Wall Street Journal* (June 26), "The Chinese have treated pariah states such as Iran and Iraq as their 'most favored nation' trading partners. They have been doing a land-office business in chemical weapons, including poison gas, and nuclear materials." It is true that Chinese commercial enterprises have exported chemical weapons materiel. But it is also true that its weapons proliferation policy is in substantive compliance with all international arms control agreements.

Since the end of the Cold War, and with the partial exception of its strategic relationship with Pakistan, China has not exported a single missile, transferred any nuclear technology, or engaged in proliferation of chemical weapons raw materials in violation of any international arms control regime. Contrary to several reports, China has not exported the M-9 missile to Syria. Its missile exports to the Middle East have consisted solely of short-range missiles that are not covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Its cooperation with Algeria in nuclear energy, which dates back to the mid-1980s, has been under the continuous inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In 1995 Beijing canceled its nuclear energy project with Iran. Its 1996 ring magnet transfer to Pakistan did not violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China's policy on chemical weapons proliferation has been equally compliant. Although in May 1997 Congress imposed sanctions on Chinese firms for exporting chemical weapons materiel to Iran, these exports did not violate the Chemical Weapons Convention.

China's most serious proliferation activities have been its nuclear assistance to Pakistan in the 1980s and its missile transfers to Pakistan in the 1990s. But just as post-Cold War U.S. weapons and technology transfers to Britain and Japan reveal that Washington engages in nuclear and missile proliferation when it suits its interests, Chinese transfers to Pakistan reflect its security interests. In some respects China's Pakistan policy may fairly be compared to American indulgence toward Israel's nuclear weapons. While the United States was never the principal supplier of Israeli nuclear technology or know-how, Washington and Beijing both prefer that their

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respective allies be able to deter attacks from more powerful adversaries on their own. It is safer that way, and avoids complicating their own relations with other countries. Just as Washington does not want its support for Israel needlessly to jeopardize its relations with Arab countries, Beijing does not want its support for Pakistan to derail its efforts to improve relations with India.

This is not to equate Pakistan with Israel, Japan, and Britain, which have well deserved reputations for prudence. No moral equivalency is intended or required. But the United States should avoid the conceit that a given mode of behavior can be wrong for every country in the world but still right for the United States because of the purity of its motives. Obviously, when other countries develop similar policies to pursue similar objectives, interest rather than morality is the appropriate standard of judgment. Washington does not turn an occasional deaf ear toward proliferation because it believes that proliferation is morally good, but because there are occasions when it is a necessary and a lesser evil. There is no reason to assume that China's motives in its relations with Pakistan turn on a different sort of reasoning—and every reason to think, by the way, that had the United States acted as a truer ally to Pakistan, much of what China provides that country would have been rendered unnecessary.

Overall, Chinese policy has supported the development of the global non-proliferation order. China has progressively joined international arms control agreements. In 1992 it formally joined the NPT. In 1996, despite the implications for its unreliable nuclear deterrent and grumbling from the PLA, Beijing signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Over PLA objections, it has also signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention, and agreed to the Land Mine Protocol to the Convention on Inhumane Weaponry. Recently, Chinese leaders have expressed interest in joining the Zangger Group, the export control arm of the NPT. Chinese participation in these regimes reflects American success at pressuring Beijing to accept global responsibility for controlling proliferation, even at a cost to China's own interests.

There are important arms control regimes from which China is shut out, including the MTCR and the Wassenaar Group, which oversees conventional weapons exports. It is America that has blocked Chinese participation. Chinese absence from the MTCR is most troubling. Washington can have but limited confidence that Beijing will refrain from missile proliferation when it was party neither to the original negotiations nor to subsequent adjustments to the MTCR. Even in these circumstances, Chinese exports to Pakistan stand as its only violation of the MTCR, and these—particularly the 1992 transfer of M-11 missiles—were only made in direct retaliation for the U.S. sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan, itself an unambiguous violation of the August 1982 U.S.-China communiqué. As in any bilateral relationship, contemporary or historical, China is inclined to retaliate when American violations of U.S.-China agreements undermine its interests. This is not roguish but realist.

In the non-nuclear realm, the United States does not oppose proliferation of missiles because they are "weapons of mass destruction", but because they are the only delivery system against which the United States has no defense. But for most countries, U.S. F-16s, which Washington sells freely, are more threatening and more destructive than a Chinese M-11 missile. It is not at all clear that U.S. arms exports are any less "destabilizing" than Chinese exports.

Obviously, Chinese exports of weapons not covered by arms control regimes could undermine U.S. interests. But thus far the impact has been minimal. Exports of low technology short-range cruise missiles and chemical weapons precursors to Iran do not enhance Iran's ability to contend with the U.S. Navy or Air Force as much as they undermine American diplomatic efforts to enforce dual containment. But here China's record is not much different from that of many other countries, including several U.S. allies. The most

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flagrant challenge to Washington's dual containment policy with respect to Iraq comes not from China but from France, Turkey, and Russia, all of whom have strained to lighten the sanctions regime for financial reasons. Meanwhile, Japan and the members of the European Union trade with Iran as they do with any other country, and greatly resent U.S. efforts to stop them from doing so. German dual-use technology exports to Iran continue unchecked. This commerce is more important to Tehran than anything that China provides.

China's record is far from perfect when it comes to arms dealing, but it is not the flagrant violator it is often represented as being. Its more controversial exports reflect legitimate security interests rather than predatory political or opportunistic commercial interests. Moreover, some Chinese violations reflect not central government policy but rather Beijing's limited control over economic enterprises and its inability to establish an effective export control regime. Political and economic decentralization best explain the 1996 Chinese export to Pakistan of ring magnets and the export to Iran of chemical weapons materiel. In these circumstances, the appropriate response is not to carry out "feel-good diplomacy" and sanction Beijing for policies it does not control, thus increasing tension without hope of practical benefit, but to assist its effort to develop a more effective regulatory system. Indeed, Washington's restrained response to the export of ring magnets to Pakistan reflected such a sober analysis; this did not, of course, prevent it from being savaged in much op-ed commentary.

With specific reference to the Middle East, the most sensitive area in which Chinese behavior has been criticized, China has for the most part respected U.S. interests, and it has not done so without cost to itself. China has no inherent reason to refrain from proliferation to regions outside East Asia; since such countries cannot harm China directly, it might simply have allowed economic interests to drive its export policy. Instead, China has accommodated U.S. policy because both the Bush and Clinton administrations have effectively combined coercive threats with constructive diplomacy. Since China's first missile exports to the Middle East in 1988, the systematic application of limited and well targeted sanctions has persuaded Chinese leaders that Washington pays close attention to these PRC exports, and that exports that violate international regimes or harm U.S. interests risk disrupting U.S.-China cooperation. At the same time, the continuation of engagement in other areas has worked to convince Chinese leaders that cooperation with the United States is still feasible and worthwhile. The net result is that U.S. policy has compelled Beijing to comply with international arms control regimes and cooperate with U.S. interests more generally than might have been expected.

Economic Conflicts and Costs

THE MOST IMPORTANT economic conflicts between the United States and China concern Chinese piracy of intellectual property rights (IPR), the large and growing U.S. trade deficit with China, the terms for Chinese admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and prison-labor exports. But as is the case concerning security conflicts, the attention given to Chinese economic policy is disproportionate to its impact on U.S. interests. Similarly, criticism of U.S. trade policy fails to acknowledge American success in bringing China's behavior into greater compliance with those interests.

Chinese IPR piracy has been the focus of periodic U.S.-China tensions. Seeking Chinese cooperation in reducing financial losses to U.S. entertainment and software industries, Washington has threatened economic sanctions if China does not change its domestic policies. But while Chinese piracy of IPR is certainly a problem, the extent of losses both in absolute and comparative terms is much exaggerated. The widely used figure of $2 billion is an industry estimate premised on an inelastic demand curve. That is, estimates of losses are

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calculated on the basis of the profits that would have been earned if the hypothetical quantity of licensed sales were to equal actual pirated sales. Obviously, this is very unrealistic; no one expects fully above-board retailers to sell the same number of products at seven or ten times the black market price. The actual profits from licensed sales would have been but a small fraction of $2 billion. U.S. financial losses are not irrelevant, and it is true that a matter of principle is involved, but these losses are negligible given the scale on which Hollywood and the American computer software industry operate.

Equally important, critics fail to apply a comparative perspective on Chinese IPR piracy. Piracy is a worldwide phenomenon and no country is fully effective at stopping it. Indeed, industry groups have targeted not China but Greece, Paraguay, and Russia as priority countries for U.S. IPR policy. Nor is China among the eleven countries that these groups have recommended be placed on the special 301 "priority watch list." According to industry estimates, losses to U.S. firms from piracy in Japan are nearly double those from piracy in China. In absolute terms, the greatest losses to American industries occur in the United States itself. Further, if industry estimates used assumptions based on more realistic elastic demand curves, then estimates of relative losses to Chinese IPR piracy would be even smaller.

Moreover, in contrast to losses from other markets, Chinese enforcement abilities are relatively weak; indeed, IPR piracy in China affects domestic manufacturers on a wide range of name-brand consumer goods, including computer software products, more than it affects U.S. industries. It also harms the legitimacy of the Chinese government. Its inability to prevent the manufacture and sale of inferior imitations of popular name-brand consumer goods has earned it a reputation among its own people for ineffective protection of consumer interests. To a large extent, lax PRC enforcement of intellectual property rights is not by design, but reflects the government's general inability to develop effective regulatory and legal systems.

But despite the chaos in Chinese society, American policy has succeeded in encouraging reforms that meet the interests of U.S. manufacturers. Beijing has fundamentally fulfilled its 1992 agreement with the United States to enact domestic legislation protecting the intellectual property rights of foreign companies. The 1995 U.S.-China agreement on the implementation of Chinese domestic legislation has also scored important successes. Between May 1996 and March 1997, due in part to Chinese government offers of rewards for information, Beijing shut down thirty-seven illegal compact disc factories, and Chinese courts have begun to sentence IPR violators to significant prison terms.

THE AMERICAN trade deficit with China is large and growing, but the relevant policy issue is the impact of the deficit on the U.S. domestic economy. It is, in fact, very small, largely because Chinese exports to the United States primarily consist of goods that American workers no longer make, such as low-cost textiles, shoes, toys, and inexpensive low technology electronic goods. The United States stopped making such things over twenty years ago when Japanese products captured the American market. Subsequently, as Japanese labor costs increased, products from Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong dominated the U.S. market. Now, as labor costs in Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong have increased, Chinese consumer goods are in turn taking their places. Chinese export success has primarily affected the overall trade deficits and labor conditions of Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong, not those of the United States. The proof is in the data: The cumulative U.S. trade deficit with China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan *has not appreciably grown since 1988*; only the distribution of the U.S. deficit among these markets has changed.

America's response to a trade imbalance should reflect the extent to which that imbalance is the result of a trading partner's conscious policy choices as opposed to other fac-

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tors. In the case of Japan, Washington confronted this issue in the 1980s and the lesson of that experience should be clear: The U.S. deficit with Japan declined not in response to changing Japanese trade policy, but in response to changes in exchange rates and in the Japanese economy itself. The trade deficit with China also reflects economic conditions. China's national savings rate is far higher than that of the United States, and the Chinese are much poorer per capita than Americans. Thus, the United States can readily import inexpensive Chinese consumer goods, while there is a limited market in China for America's expensive high technology goods. Contrasting economic conditions guarantee that the United States will have a large trade deficit with China regardless of how much pressure the United States applies and how much Chinese trade policy changes. As Henry S. Rowen put the matter in these pages, "The Sino-American bilateral trade balance reflects market behavior far more than official manipulation."[1]

Regardless of the economic causes of trade deficits, it is generally in the American interest to minimize the obstacles to doing business in China, so long as doing so does not obviously prejudice American strategic interests. But American businesses widely agree that despite the corruption that exists there and the fact that its laws and regulations are largely unenforceable, it is already far easier to do business in China than in Japan or South Korea. Thus, in sectors in which the United States has a global comparative advantage—including civilian aircraft, grain export, computers, high technology electronic goods such as cellular telephones, and industrial machinery—it does well in the Chinese market. As in the case of IPR piracy, American attention to the trade deficit is disproportionate to the impact of that deficit on U.S. interests and to the role that U.S. and Chinese government policies can play in affecting it.

Nevertheless, U.S. trade policy has achieved some important successes in improving access to China's market. In response to the threat of punitive tariffs advanced by the Bush administration in 1992, Beijing agreed to make transparent its trade regulations. By 1995 Beijing had substantively complied with this agreement, making it easier for foreign businesses to operate in China. In response to pressure from the Clinton administration, Beijing agreed this year for the first time to liberalize foreign access to its textile market. While these developments will not fundamentally affect the trade balance, they do promote America's objective in expanding market access and promoting fairer U.S.-China trade. They also show that, contrary to established opinion on American op-ed pages, the Chinese are not intrinsically duplicitous; they will implement negotiated agreements to maintain U.S.-China cooperation.

Another important issue concerns China's admission to the WTO. This problem is frequently portrayed as having been made difficult by China's refusal to accept the norms of the international liberal trade order. The Chinese have indeed resisted U.S. proposals, but the conflict is one of interest, not principle. Admission to the WTO is based on individually negotiated agreements reflecting the economic interests of both the applicant and the existing WTO membership. As was the case with Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore at earlier stages of their development, China's leaders seek an agreement that will protect its infant industries from international competition. This is Hamiltonian in character, not Stalinist. But the size of China's market and its potential economic influence require Washington to adopt a more demanding posture toward Chinese protectionism than that which it had earlier adopted toward the protectionism of the smaller Asian economies.

The solution to this conflict is not Chinese isolation from the WTO. At present, China protects its domestic industries and

[1]"Off-Center on the Middle Kingdom", *The National Interest* (Summer 1997), p. 104.

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still enjoys many WTO benefits indirectly from the MFN status it receives from the advanced industrial economies. Without U.S. concessions to Chinese interests, China will remain outside the WTO, its protectionist policies will continue to influence the global economy, and it will bear no obligation whatsoever to liberalize those policies. It is in the U.S. interest to create Chinese obligations to liberalize its trade by bringing China into the WTO. This may require a prolonged liberalization schedule as well as granting the PRC permanent MFN status. Such concessions would be politically controversial, but they promote our interests. Not only would they commit China to eventual trade liberalization, but Chinese membership in the WTO would replace often counterproductive unilateral American pressure with more politically acceptable multilateral pressure that could, additionally, reinforce the efforts of pro-reform Chinese politicians.

Toward the end of 1996 the Clinton administration adopted a more flexible policy on China's admission to the WTO. But the flap over campaign finance irregularities and sensitivities over the return of Hong Kong to China raised domestic political temperatures to the point that the risks of compromising with China fell before the less costly path of deferral. It may well be that Beijing will refuse to compromise and seek an agreement that will allow China to "free-ride" indefinitely on the WTO regime, in which case the United States should block Chinese membership. But until the United States is willing to consider serious changes in current policy and negotiate an agreement that takes into account both Chinese and U.S. interests, we will never find out if a mutually acceptable agreement is possible.

The final trade issue concerns Chinese export of goods made by so-called slave labor in Chinese prisons. On this issue, American hypocrisy and obfuscation frame the debate. The issue is not whether there are political prisoners in China. Of course there are. Nor is the issue whether the Chinese government compels its prisoners to work and then exports the goods to gain an unfair trade advantage. It does. But so does the United States. American prisoners are frequently compelled to work, making license plates or clothing, or in chain-gangs doing road construction, and there is no American law prohibiting export of prison-made goods. By U.S. standards, too, the conditions in Chinese prisons are horrendous, but they have to be if Beijing is not to make prisons more comfortable than villages in the impoverished Chinese countryside. Finally, there is no evidence that China has exported to the United States goods made by human rights prisoners.

Human Rights: Not Whether But How

CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS violations are numerous and grave. The United States has a moral imperative and a mandate from its people to include human rights diplomacy in its China policy. The issue is not whether to try to change China for the better, but how most effectively to go about it.

The focus of American debate these days is over the wisdom of having normal trade relations with China and conducting regular high level U.S.-China diplomatic exchanges while Chinese leaders imprison political dissidents. Congressional pressure on the White House has tried to hold U.S.-China cooperation hostage to the fate of Chinese dissidents and has thus turned these dissidents into bargaining chips. Chinese leaders care little if a dissident remains in jail or is released to the constant supervision of a hoard of security police. Our making clear to China that the release of dissidents is the quid pro quo for improved U.S.-China relations gives Beijing a vested interest in keeping dissidents in jail until it can secure a payoff for releasing them.

In the past, China released dissidents prior to the congressional MFN vote, and then cracked down on them immediately afterwards. China seemed prepared to release

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a prominent dissident, Wang Dan, prior to Vice President Gore's 1997 visit to Beijing, but changed its plans when it became clear that releasing dissidents would not at that time achieve any relaxation of America's China policy, which had become hostage to the then-raging campaign finance scandal. It is unseemly and self-indulgent for the United States to reduce China's democracy activists to political pawns in U.S.-China relations and increase their jail time by so doing. Yet that is exactly the effect of current U.S. policy in this sphere.

It is difficult to see how punishing Beijing's imprisonment of dissidents by downgrading political and economic relations will promote political liberalization in China. Should the United States stigmatize China by sanctioning its human rights violations, it will most likely encourage the Chinese leadership to adopt more repressive domestic policies; hostile U.S.-China relations, after all, can only intensify Beijing's concern with subversion and domestic instability. Overt American diplomatic pressure has not encouraged China to loosen its restraints on political speech; and sanctions, while they may make their American sponsors feel better, will only make the situation in China worse.

The harsh criticism of U.S. human rights policies by congressional critics and human rights groups fails—or refuses—to recognize American successes. Part of the problem is one of definition. By limiting the definition of human rights to the freedom of public dissent, human rights activists obscure a wide range of activity that should also be free from government interference. A broader, and better, benchmark is the extent to which people can live their lives free from government harassment and intimidation. By this standard, China has made considerable and rapid progress, for which the United States and its democratic allies can rightly claim significant credit.

As is the case with all one-party authoritarian systems, the Chinese government monitors a wide range of public activity. Within the constraints of one-party rule, however, the Chinese people increasingly enjoy unprecedented access to Western entertainment programs on television, in cinemas, and on stage. The Chinese consumer market is flourishing, with production determined by consumer demand for Western-style clothing, make-up, entertainment magazines, and fast food. The most popular movies are produced in Hollywood, and the most popular pop music comes from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the United States. American basketball players are superstars in China, too.

These developments are not trivial. Through them Chinese society has developed values antithetical to those of its leadership. Increasing interaction has meant that Western cultures are penetrating China's society and have started to create the conditions for political cleavages between government and society, and ultimately for political change. The weakening of government authority is already apparent in Chinese universities. In the sciences, engineering, and humanities, and even in many of the social sciences, government interference has significantly diminished. Scholars with doctorates from the United States and other countries are teaching in Chinese universities and are transforming courses across the curriculum. Domestic and international migration is practically unrestricted. Most significant, in recent years there has been an expansion of multiple-candidate competitive free elections in rural China.

Chinese leaders continue to direct abhorrent human rights abuses, including torture of Tibetan independence activists and imprisonment of leaders of unapproved religious activities. But compared to many countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia—in which the sale and lifetime servitude of child brides is commonplace, religious tolerance is nearly nonexistent, women suffer intolerable abuse, and Western popular culture is barred—and to the one-party dicta-

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torships of sub-Saharan Africa, where even slavery is tolerated and degrading and harmful tribal customs brook no challenge, China's performance, and particularly its recent record of positive change, does not cry out for special censure. South Asian countries, even including democratic India, tolerate slavery, and the horrid abuse of women in India is especially disturbing. The point is not that China's human rights record is good, but that abhorrent violations occur throughout the Third World and that, as in both security and economic issues, U.S. attention to China's human rights situation is disproportionate to China's violations when viewed comparatively and in the context of its improving situation.

Much of the impetus behind recent positive changes comes from the collapse of Communist Party control and the continuing decentralization of economic power in China. But Western involvement with China's economy and society has also been influential. Mere interaction with Americans, whether through educational exchanges, travel, or business, has exposed the Chinese people to Western values and to what is for them the novel notion that people can be free from the fear of their own government. It has clearly stimulated demands for similar freedoms in China; there would never have been a democracy movement in the spring of 1989 without Western interaction with the Chinese economy.

Economic interaction has also impressed the Chinese with the superiority of capitalism, which has already contributed not only to higher standards of living but also to the economic independence required for genuine social autonomy. Such interaction has underscored the value—increasingly, the necessity—of an institutionalized legal system to protect both enterprises and individuals from arbitrary authority. The determined independent development of the Chinese legal profession and the widespread demand for impartial law enforcement clearly reflect a highly positive Chinese exposure to Western ways.

Both the Western success at contributing to change in China through broad-based personal ties, and the Western failure to change appreciably the lot of Chinese dissidents by threatening to limit those ties, underscore the importance of resisting demands that the United States reduce its level of engagement with China. Some of the most successful foreign activities in China, including programs in legal training and for the promotion of democracy, have been funded by the U.S. government and American philanthropic organizations. The record of Western interaction with post-Mao China is overwhelmingly positive. It suggests that we should put an end to the detrimental politicization of human rights policy, and expand U.S.-China cooperation wherever practicable.

THERE ARE NO unmanageable U.S.-China conflicts. The Taiwan problem raises the most sensitive and dangerous issues, yet even here Beijing and Washington have established a way to satisfy their respective interests without undermining cooperative relations. In both economic and security relations, conflicting interests are amenable to negotiation and mutually satisfactory outcomes. As in any negotiation between great powers, solutions will require mutual compromise. But through negotiations with China, the United States can further a wide range of bilateral and regional interests and maintain regional and global stability, while simultaneously promoting change in China that reflects American values.

It is fashionable to argue that the end of the Cold War has undermined the strategic foundation for U.S.-China cooperation. This is true, but the removal of one support is not a reason to go about destroying all the rest. Cooperation is still important, and an adversarial relationship between the United States and China will only become inevitable if one of the two sides insists on it. Given the consequences that would flow for all of East Asia, it would be disastrous if it were Americans who so insisted. □

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Balance, Not Containment

A Geopolitical Take from Canberra

A.D. McLennan

THE PAGES OF *The National Interest* have abounded in recent months with analyses, prognostications, predictions, and arguments over what to do with and about China. Robert Zoellick argued persuasively for the need to rebuild a bipartisan consensus on U.S. policy toward China, and both he and Paul Wolfowitz have urged that such a consensus take as its touchstone the recognition that the problem is one of accommodating the rise of a new power (the Wilhelmine Germany analogy), and not that of containing an implacably hostile imperialism (the Stalinist postwar Soviet Union analogy). It is hard to deny, too, the good sense of recognizing the essential tension between China's rush toward economic development and its ossified political system, a tension that Henry S. Rowen and others maintain will be resolved in the end in a relatively benign way, in favor of democracy. And it also makes sense, as Bruce Cumings has suggested, for Americans to understand the historical—and, in some cases, the very subjective—origins of their own images of China before setting off to propound U.S. interests in Beijing.[1]

Less persuasive, however, are some of the means advanced to achieve these goals. Zoellick's argument, for example, that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) could effectively engage China on regional security issues takes insufficient account of China's zero-sum view of international relations—a view generic to East Asia. It also underestimates the damaging collateral effects that might attend such an "engagement" policy line, especially on the U.S.-Japanese alliance, and especially bearing in mind the skill that China has demonstrated in manipulating multilateral security diplomacy to its strategic advantage.

That said, it does not follow that if a policy of "engagement" has its problems, a policy of "containment" must be flawless. The language that has arisen to discuss U.S. China policy is itself seminally misleading; both "engagement" and "containment" arguments usually assume that the Sino-American bilateral relationship is so central that it will, in future, control all major regional outcomes. This is not so. The Sino-American relationship will be the main factor in the game, no doubt; but U.S. policy toward China, as with policy toward any major power, must fit into a larger picture in which Japan, Korea, Russia, Vietnam, Indonesia,

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[1]See, respectively, Robert Zoellick, "China: What Engagement Should Mean" (Winter 1996/97); Paul Wolfowitz, "Bridging Centuries: Fin de Siècle All Over Again" (Spring 1997); Henry S. Rowen, "The Short March: China's Road to Democracy" (Fall 1996); and Bruce Cumings, "The World Shakes China" (Spring 1996).

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and other states will inevitably play a part. In this essay I shall examine this dynamic and consider what such a fit involves, for even the advocates of a containment strategy, simple in principle though it may be, are obliged to begin with a realistic awareness of Asian complexities.

China's Strategic Opportunity

TO UNDERSTAND where China is going we might start by remembering where it has been. Several stages distinguish the development of China's foreign policy since 1949. First there was Beijing's alliance with Moscow. Then came the Sino-Soviet split, which led China to pursue a revolutionary foreign policy directed against both superpowers. Then followed the Cultural Revolution, during which China had barely any foreign policy at all. By 1969, Beijing was on the brink of a war with the Soviet Union that it could only have lost. As the chaos of the Cultural Revolution gave way to a new internal balance, China redefined its relationship with America to oppose a formidable expansion of Soviet power. In the Cold War's final two decades, China played a major part in defeating Soviet designs. It tied down Soviet forces in the Far East and outmaneuvered Hanoi and Moscow by countering Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, where the Soviet Union had sought to outflank China and to challenge America's position at the junction of the straits linking the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

With the collapse of the Soviet empire, China entered a new stage in its foreign policy, one as yet without a name. But named or not, it is clear that China is a major beneficiary of the Cold War's outcome. The collapse of the Soviet Union has removed its main strategic threat, and in doing so has also removed its strategic dependence on America. At the same time, Beijing has embraced the transition to capitalism under party control, unleashing the economic energy of its people and far outpacing the social dynamism of its Russian neighbor. Largely as a consequence of all this, China is feeling its oats. Already identifying itself as one of the world's two most powerful nations, China foresees its economy soon overtaking that of the United States in sheer size. It is obviously eyeing a larger place in the sun, and its rise has captured the imagination of political cognoscenti all over the world—an achievement that, by itself, contributes much to the élan of Chinese assertiveness.

Not all is smooth sailing, of course. Domestically, China's economy is spread unevenly between south and north, coast and interior. Agriculture, having once led the way, now lags, and this, together with the increasing withdrawal of the state from the industrial sector of the economy, is generating unprecedented labor dislocation and internal migration. These phenomena, in turn, are deepening the strains on China's national unity, strains that reflect problems of size, regional and ethnic differences, and a historical propensity to fragment. Finally, with Deng Xiaoping's death, contests for power may test the political system to the utmost.

Already that political system, still led by the Communist Party, lacks legitimacy—as must be the case when economic success is achieved by embracing capitalism, and when, until recently, foreign policy success was achieved by siding with the premier capitalist state against the premier communist one. As has been widely observed, this void makes nationalist appeals and demonstrative firmness in foreign policy important in sustaining the party's hold on power. It also tends to raise the stature of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which, unlike the Soviet army, has always been more the partner than the servant of the party.[2] The PLA is a logical instrument of national assertion. While China does not harbor any vast territorial

[2]The title PLA comprises all of China's armed forces, not just its ground forces. The point is significant because of the priority that the navy and air force command in terms of military modernization.

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ambitions, it does entertain some, mostly expressed in irredentist terms linked to historical claims and past "unequal" treatment. Other nations, indeed, did take advantage of China's weakness, none more brutally than Japan. In doing so, they hurt Han pride and sense of superior civilization. Now, with the tables partly turned, China expects redress of historic grievances and demands "respect."

Context matters. The end of the Cold War and the political successes of NATO during it resolved long-standing issues of international security in Europe—contests over hegemony and the balance of power that underlay both world wars and the Cold War. But this happy outcome has no parallel in East Asia, where the glue of common strategic interests no longer binds the United States and China. Relations among major European countries today are more predictably non-violent than they were before the Second—or indeed the First—World War; the same can simply not be said about Asia. Rather, an uneasy equilibrium persists among China, Japan, and the United States. Weakened Russia is an interested onlooker and would-be player. Tensions focus especially on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea.

The larger question in all this is whether the resolution of one set of problems critical to international order must give rise to another set of problems, just as the strategic consequences of the Second World War produced the Cold War. As far as Europe is concerned, the short answer is no, it need not. But in East Asia it might—and if Beijing uses force to achieve its aims at home and abroad, it will. If it again brutally puts down any domestic challenges to the party's power, and if abroad the leadership should decide to resort to force, and to sacrifice Chinese lives in huge number in an effort to achieve strategic goals and causes driven by *raison d'état*, a direct link will again have been made manifest between absolute power and a ruthless foreign policy. Then we will have a real problem on our hands, one all too familiar from the experiences of the last sixty years.

Is there any evidence for fearing such an outcome? Yes, there is some.

Muscle Building

THE COLLAPSE OF the Soviet Union freed China from immense strategic pressure on its northern border. It also liberated the PLA from the Maoist "people's war" doctrine—defense by depth and density of population in lieu of firepower. China is developing smaller, more professional forces with greater mobility and striking power, both typical goals of force modernization generally. Its improvements in military capability have not come at the expense of economic development—a common trade-off in many circumstances. Rather, they have been a dividend from the PLA's own very extensive commercial activities.

China no longer looks north strategically, but south and east to its maritime boundaries and land borders. It accords high priority to modernizing its maritime capability, to moving from a "brown-water" coastal defense to a "blue-water" ocean-going navy. A continental power's decision to go to sea signals strategic warning. China's efforts are not on the scale of the Kaiser's naval building program or Soviet naval expansion under Admiral Gorshkov, but they do represent a shift in gear that is hard to ignore. They reflect a change in strategic mentality consonant with other indicators of growing regional strategic ambition.[3]

China does not need maritime strength comparable to America's to dominate its immediate east and south, where it can exploit the chain of offshore islands and straits to strategic advantage. That chain, which stretches south from Japan to the Philippines, separates China's coast from the

[3]Felix K. Chang's "Beijing's Reach in the South China Sea", *Orbis* (Summer 1996), provides an illuminating analysis of the development in China's maritime power policy.

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broad Pacific. The Philippines plus Kalimantan (Borneo) turn the South China Sea into a funnel that leads to the critical junction of straits in and around Singapore, waterways that connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans. This island barrier continues eastward through Indonesia and down the east coast of Australia—which explains the intensity of fighting during the Pacific War to control New Guinea and Guadalcanal.



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For China, the offshore island chain is strategically double-edged. In the hands of others it could bottle up China's navy, but in Chinese hands it offers a screen for exercising power. China has developed capabilities to force and defend the straits separating the islands off its coast, including combined-arms skills coordinating action by ships at sea with air cover by modern Su-27 aircraft acquired from Russia. China has practiced surge deployment of warships through the straits into the wider Pacific, and it is acquiring Soviet-design Kilo-class attack submarines that will give it a reach sufficient to create a strategic buffer at sea several hundred kilometers broader than what it has at present. This represents a major technological jump, pointing to future advances that should concern the U.S. Navy.

As well, China aims to build aircraft carriers that can accommodate nuclear-capable aircraft, and it has long sought to perfect a nuclear missile-armed submarine that would bring it closer to effective strategic parity with the United States. This potential problem, however, should not be exaggerated; it would take until around 2015 for China to acquire an aircraft carrier battle group, and only after spending billions of dollars. At present, the U.S. Navy can get close enough to China, without much peril to itself, to do whatever it need do. Such a circumstance will not change soon, notwithstanding China's probable desire to increase American costs and risks, and to thereby devalue the assurance and deterrence functions of the U.S. Navy with respect to its Pacific allies.

NOWHERE IS China's strategic design feared more acutely than in Taiwan. China's maritime power capabilities much reduce Taiwan's capacity to defend itself unaided, and have encouraged the United States to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons, including Stinger missiles. Of China's external claims, Taiwan also has the sharpest political edge. It is an issue in which the PLA has a major stake and that easily arouses national chauvinism; going soft on Taiwan would undermine any contender's claim to power in Beijing. China represents Taiwan as an internal affair in which no outsider has a legitimate voice. Its ambassador for disarmament, no less, announced that its pledge against first use of nuclear weapons did not apply to the recalcitrant province.[4] China's claimed right, in effect, to nuke itself underlines its realpolitik approach to the world, as did its military intimidation of Taiwan's 1996 elections, aimed at discouraging aspirations to independence. Beijing also warns others not to accord Taiwan de facto recognition or access to arms, thus seeking to isolate Taiwan and force it to negotiate from weakness. China's approach to Taiwan resembles a sort of Asian Munich option: It aims at recovering its own "Sudetenland" by threat of force to which others acquiesce through fear of war. To Beijing, of course, Taiwan represents a potential U.S. bridgehead on China's coast.

China also claims most of the offshore islands and reefs in the South China Sea on historical grounds that others find dubious and that littoral-state claimants contest. Were China unilaterally to enforce these claims successfully, it would gain control of the food and hydrocarbon resources of the South China Sea, and achieve a strategic dominance that would affect the security of all littoral countries and the critical junction of straits near Singapore. Not least among the interests that would be put at risk would be the flow of oil from the Middle East on which Japan and Korea depend.

This threat is not merely theoretical. China has twice used force against Vietnam over the Paracel Islands. Its seizure of Mischief Reef in 1995 reflected a southward advance into the Spratly Islands. The terms of China's formal ratification of the UN Convention on Law of the Sea and the map of baselines it issued aroused much apprehension. Jakarta, for example, feared that these Chinese claims threatened Indonesia's sovereignty with

[4]As reported in *The Straits Times*, August 6, 1996.

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respect to the Natuna Islands, its northernmost territory in the area. While China's claims predate Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia, the Soviet collapse and the surrender of its bases at Cam Ranh Bay, and the closing of U.S. bases in the Philippines, those events undoubtedly encouraged Beijing to see a strategic vacuum in the South China Sea and exploit it.

China's assertiveness is not limited to strictly Asian neighbors, but extends as well to its Pacific ones. In the lead up to the Australian prime minister's visit to China in March 1997, Beijing brought pressure to bear against strengthened U.S.-Australian security cooperation on grounds that bilateral security links are now both passé and inappropriate—a song the Chinese sing, as well, in multilateral security forums. The point registered none too subtly was that Australia would pay a price in its relations with China. Beijing's target was the U.S.-Australian alliance.

ASEAN's Response

THE ASEAN COUNTRIES—until recently comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and Brunei—have been at sixes and sevens in responding to Chinese pressure. Some are disposed to be accommodating, others more resistant. For reasons of history, propinquity, and bulk, China looms over Southeast Asia. The regional countries know that, unlike Western states, China will never go away. Each has economically significant Chinese minorities, except for Singapore, where Chinese form the majority. ASEAN's progress has moderated fears of conflict among its member states, but it has not abolished them, and it certainly has not provided the kind of cohesion capable of balancing China. The organization's recent expansion to include Laos and Burma will dilute further its cohesiveness in this respect, as will the inclusion of Cambodia, if in the extended aftermath of the July 1997 Hun Sen coup that country is eventually brought in.

Fast growing economically, the ASEAN countries are modernizing their forces and becoming better equipped to counter maritime threats. At this stage of the game, their difficulty in relation to China is not military but psychological imbalance. Though they may not welcome it, several Southeast Asian countries seem disposed to accept the inevitability of dominant Chinese influence. Burma's friendless military regime needs China's support, as does a Thailand that fears Vietnam. Cambodia's leaders appreciate that China's backing is essential to preserving independence. Lee Kuan Yew displays an acquiescent attitude toward China, and he and the Singapore government seem vulnerable to Beijing's clever flattery. Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir, militantly anti-Western, declares that China has invaded no country and that Southeast Asia has no need of U.S. military protection.

Indonesia and Vietnam are less pliable. The aforementioned terms of China's ratification of the UN Convention on Law of the Sea prompted Indonesia to stage a military exercise of unprecedented character in defense of the Natuna Islands. (Malaysia's forces helped with preliminaries.) Indonesia's conclusion of an out-of-character security agreement with Australia in 1995 also reflected its concern, as well as its skepticism concerning the security benefits conferred by ASEAN. Last June, in a remarkable policy reversal, an official Indonesian defense review proposed that ASEAN should assume a security dimension. The context in which it did so related the proposal to China's claims and activities in the South China Sea. It reflects Indonesia's sense of isolation, brought about by tensions with the U.S. over human rights and with the EC over economic issues (instigated by Portugal and Japan), as well as rising internal political problems bearing on the presidential succession. Such U.S. pressure on Indonesia contradicts America's strategic interests and plays into China's hands.

To a degree unique among the ASEAN countries, Indonesia is well disposed toward

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Vietnam, whose will to resist Chinese pressure is undoubted. But abandoned by the Soviet Union, and with suspicious neighbors that dislike its communist regime, for the time being Vietnam is otherwise pretty much isolated.

Despite Indonesia's efforts, ASEAN itself is manifestly incapable of coordinated military action at present, and it will be awhile before that can change, even if there should develop a will to do so. Even its success at coordinated security diplomacy over Cambodia required cooperation with China, legitimizing Beijing's voice in regional security affairs. Further, the ASEAN countries seek to manage their security relations with external powers through the ASEAN Regional Forum, which includes China. In doing so, they run the risk of China's taking advantage of the ARF to divide and rule, as well as to foster anti-Western sentiment. While China is generally suspicious of multilateral organizations, it seeks whenever possible to exploit them for diplomatic advantage.[5] In this case China coyly denies that the ARF is a mere "talk shop", even as it urges the virtues of "common security", a term recalling the sort of model Soviet diplomacy designed to dilute and render ineffectual all possible opposing coalitions.

The ASEAN countries are clearly not strong enough by themselves in any case to call the tune with the great powers. This was evident in their handling of China's seizure of Mischief Reef. Doubtless a test by China, it is unlikely that it would have occurred were U.S. bases still operating in the Philippines. With difficulty, ASEAN developed a coordinated approach that was put to China in a limp "official dialogue." China toyed with this approach as it sought to pick off the ASEAN countries one by one with offers to settle differences bilaterally. The Philippines, meanwhile, has tried to draw in the United States to support its claims in the area, so far to no avail. ASEAN's Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone is yet another dabble at collective security aimed at China, but it is one that could rebound to its great disadvantage if its realization had the effect of restraining the United States rather than China. The ASEAN countries need U.S. power to counter that of China, and, for geostrategic reasons, Washington depends on nuclear weapons far more than does Beijing. Indeed, this dependence would increase should the mobility of American maritime forces and their capacity to deploy forward in the Western Pacific be curtailed for budgetary or other reasons.

China, in contrast, practices minimum deterrence. It has just sufficient forces to deter nuclear attack and, as noted, it is modernizing those forces. Because of its mass and weight, China can afford to give assurances against first use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, in light of current imbalances favoring Russia and the United States, complete nuclear disarmament would suit China well given its large numbers and readiness to accept heavy casualties in conventional conflicts. So China enjoys the best of both worlds: Its nuclear weapons reinforce its regional power and influence, but it does not need to say so. ASEAN's regional Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, therefore, plays to Chinese strengths.

Strategic Disjunction

IF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA nowadays presents opportunities to drive a Chinese knife through butter, in the case of the Koreans and Japanese the Chinese are dealing with East Asian hardheads much like themselves. Moreover, the U.S.-Japanese treaty remains the cornerstone of security in East Asia, both affording the United States a reliable base and cocooning Japanese power in ways that limit regional sensitivities. Japan's considerable naval strength contributes to regional security, and Japan facilitates the large U.S. military presence in East Asia, at sea and on land, a presence that is vital to sustaining a stable balance there. In

[5]See Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik", *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1996), pp. 38-9.

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times of peace, U.S. power does not compel, but it deters and reassures, reassurance being a function of military power that is often neglected but never insignificant. Its effectiveness depends on strategic mobility and nuclear weapons.

America's alliance with Japan and its military presence in the Western Pacific strengthen U.S. security. Historically, the ocean buffers that have afforded America its ultimate physical security have impelled U.S. interest in events on the distant shores of both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. America is a Pacific power today not just from habit, but also from need—a need, it is worth emphasizing, that has far more to do with bedrock security issues than with commerce. Increased trade consequent to East Asian economic growth both reinforces and complicates U.S. interests in the Pacific, the complications arising mainly from the domestic political influences touched off by the vested interests of business and labor lobbies. But for Washington, China's assertiveness and the perennial dangers of the Korean Peninsula are still the most likely immediate causes of tension and threat in East Asia.

Changing circumstances present new opportunities for U.S. policy—and new risks. Central to both is the post-Cold War strategic order in the Western Pacific. China and the United States now represent the defining poles of power there. Geostrategically natural adversaries, opposition to the Soviet threat made them allies of convenience. That adhesive having dissolved, clashing political values and opposed security interests underlie their differences today. Mutual economic interests alone are unlikely to override those differences. Indeed, bilateral economic tensions could make things worse.

China resents America's global reach. China would likely be content were the United States to concede its dominant influence in East Asia in return for China's accepting U.S. hegemony over the Americas and leading influence in Europe. But U.S. interests could not admit such a bargain. This bloody century has cast America in the role of "off-shore balancer", the only power capable of intervening decisively in conflicts over the balance of power in Europe and Asia that jeopardize both U.S. security and the stability of these regions. Displacing Britain as the leading maritime power, America also succeeded to Britannia's role, and its capacity to add (or withhold) its weight remains the determining factor with respect to the global balance on which America's own security depends. This plain fact—that America is the balancer, and that it is nowadays only China that may need to be balanced against—defines the geostrategic disjunction that underlies U.S.-Sino tensions over Pacific security. This core strategic reality has nothing to do with human rights, balance of trade deficits, espionage, fundraising improprieties, or the suppression of Christian missionary work—*absolutely nothing.*

HOW HAS THE United States managed the Sino-American strategic disjunction so far? At the outset, the Clinton administration floundered over foreign policy generally and, with Warren Christopher at State and Anthony Lake at NSC, it looked dangerously like a Carter administration re-run. But its foreign policy performance did improve. Specifically with respect to policy in the Pacific area, one can note the following milestones:

•Defense Secretary William Perry's February 1995 recommendations on Pacific security policy, issued in the authoritative "U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region";

•Secretary of State Christopher's reminder at the ARF meeting following the Mischief Reef incident (and since repeated) that the Philippines is a "core ally" to which the United States has continuing security treaty obligations;

•America's display of overwhelming naval power in reaction to China's missile drills directed at Taiwan's 1996 elections;

•The U.S.-Japanese joint declaration

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during President Clinton's April 1996 visit to Tokyo, which committed the parties to collaborate in promoting regional and international security on the basis of their bilateral treaty, and the U.S. commitment to continue deployment of about 100,000 troops in the Pacific;

•President Clinton's November 1996 statement in Canberra, en route to the APEC leaders' meeting in the Philippines, which emphasized China's critical importance to future regional security; the centrality of America's "core alliances" with Japan, the ROK, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand; and the need to build new regional security architecture through ASEAN in order to reduce further tensions in the South China Sea. The President's language was carefully hewn, and warrants close attention. He said: "The direction that China takes in the years to come, the way it defines its greatness in the future, will help to decide whether the next century is one of conflict or cooperation. The emergence of a stable, an open, a prosperous China, a strong China confident of its place in the world and willing to assume its responsibilities as a great nation is in our deepest interest." Though widely interpreted as an olive branch, these remarks effectively cast on China the onus of choice.

In short, and despite many early stumbles, by the end of its first term the Clinton administration had re-established a sense of responsible continuity in Asian security policy. Its earlier emphases on human rights on one side and trade issues on the other had given way to a focus on more traditional, and more fundamental, political and security concerns. That is all to the good, for serious difficulties remain in fashioning future policy toward East Asia.

One difficulty has to do with resolving conflicting pressures on U.S. policy and overcoming contradictions among the White House, Capitol Hill, and the professional bureaucracy, including the military. While this problem is not unique to democracy, it is harder to manage because political processes and bargaining are more or less unconcealed. But a second difficulty is balancing the competing claims of Korean and especially Japanese security interests against each other and against those of the United States with respect to China.

The North East

THREE SECURITY concerns trouble Japan: China's use of force in pursuit of its interests; Japan's strategic priority for partnership with the United States as opposed to China, even though China will always be "there" while the United States might not; and the reliability of Japanese domestic political support for its U.S.-tilted security policy.

For much of this century, Japan has sought security through alliance with distant maritime powers, first Britain and, since the Second World War, the United States. Japan did so in the former case to cover its tail in pursuit of its own expansionist designs on the mainland; in the latter case, it has done so in apprehension of threats to its security posed by great powers on the Asian mainland. Reliance on U.S. strategic protection since the Second World War has served Japan's interests well. Its own limited defense efforts have muffled regional and domestic concern about revived militarism, while enabling Japan to get on with economic development. Still, Japan has not been supine; its naval power, in particular, contributed much to containing the Soviet threat in the Far East and usefully complicated Soviet strategic planning writ large.

The Cold War's end has disturbed Japan's strategic certitude. It is having to pay more for American strategic protection. The declining domestic acceptability of the U.S. force presence is causing discord. And Japan's responsiveness to pressure to become more active in international security affairs, such as UN peacekeeping missions, remains domestically sensitive. But a Japan that aspires to membership in the UN Security

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Council is obliged to accept wider international responsibilities. More centrally, any serious loss of confidence in U.S. strategic protection would pose an awful dilemma for Japan—essentially, whether to knuckle under to China and so lose control of its destiny, or to develop the military clout required to secure its international interests, which would inflame regional tensions and arouse domestic resistance.

China is adept at making the Japanese squirm about the Second World War and at extracting what are in effect reparations for it—though those reparations assist Japanese economic penetration of China. China is ambivalent toward the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Ideally, Beijing would like to see Japan reduced to dependence on China; but at the same time a Japan dependent on U.S. strategic protection is preferable to a well armed loose cannon. Beijing's problem with the security treaty is that it denies China paramount influence over Japan and affords the U.S. standing in regional security affairs. Since no one knows exactly what Japan would do on its own—whether it would remain militarily weak and diplomatically pliant, or grow strong and assertive—it may well be that China's counsels on the issue are divided. Or China may see the security treaty as reassuring in the short term while hoping for the recision of U.S. military power from the Western Pacific in the longer run.

As for now, the United States has sought to reassure Tokyo of the certainty of its security commitment while encouraging Japan to play a greater part in regional security. China has criticized Japan for planning to use its forces in a regional role instead of, as in the past, for "inward-looking" self-defense. Meanwhile, having dropped Russia from its list of primary threats, Japan continues pointedly to develop its naval, air defense, and intelligence capabilities, and is undertaking a wider range of international security consultations. Such actions reflect hedging on Japan's part, not just against China's growing capabilities and ambitions, but also against the possibility that its importance to U.S. security might slip relative to China's claims, requiring more self-reliance in defense matters on its part. For without reliable U.S. support, Japan would face a worrisome range of strategic uncertainties. Reflecting history, Korean feelings toward Japan are visceral and a unified Korea could prove hostile, while worst-case proliferation could see both Koreas join Russia and China as nuclear-armed neighbors of Japan. As well, Japan depends on oil supplies that mostly transit sea lanes that could become vulnerable to Chinese maritime power.

WHILE JAPANESE interests and power force Sino-American relations into a triangle, Korea forces them into a quadrangle. The Korean problem is particularly good at exposing the limitations of thinking about strategic matters in bilateral compartments. For should the United States wish to "engage" China, then it should seek to give China entrée to and influence over a Korean settlement. Should it wish to "contain" China, then both Japanese and even Russian participation in Korea should take pride of place. But could Korea be "settled" diplomatically without China? Could China and Japan ever agree to terms for a Korean settlement? These are important basic questions for U.S. policy, and yet they seem rarely asked or discussed. This is a measure of how poorly the true geopolitical shape of the region is reckoned in Washington these days.

In the long run—or not-so-long run—economic decline or political changes to accommodate reform might "solve" the North Korean problem before much serious thought is brought to bear on consequences and policy options. Economic difficulties have reduced North Korean military readiness and, to that extent, the level of threat it poses. Unwillingness to follow China's example and accept the political risks of economic change have increased North Korea's isolation. Seoul holds most of the cards in the reunification game and, practicing democra-

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cy with Korean characteristics, it more or less lurches from success to success. Desperate circumstances are forcing the North into dealing with its enemies, most reluctantly even with the South, while also engaging in a version of nuclear blackmail. Although starvation looms for as many as five million people, the Pyongyang regime seems determined to maintain its monopoly of political power.

China's diplomatic recognition of the ROK underlines how far it has abandoned North Korea, where its influence is limited in any event. Seoul, although increasingly able to defend itself, still relies on U.S. military support, including nuclear deterrence, greatly complicating any aggressive calculations that Pyongyang may entertain. For its part, North Korea has long sought to deal directly with the United States on a basis that excludes the South. That Seoul's interests in managing the North Korean nuclear issue are not identical with Washington's could cause bilateral strain. Indeed, this is already the case.

The larger issue, however, comes back to the United States and China. The idea of bordering on a Korea unified on Seoul's terms is anathema to China. China demands a major say in any Korean settlement, including withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from the peninsula. A unified Korea without U.S. troops could still maintain strategic connections with the United States, but they would be more distant and less convincing.

Russia, too, would like a say in the terms of a Korean settlement, given the vulnerability of its Far Eastern territories. Russia seeks to preserve what influence it can, including its role as an arms supplier, but it would wish to do so only to the extent that it could without adversely affecting its relations with China and the United States. Perhaps feeling that U.S. dealings with the North over the nuclear issue have been insensitive to ROK interests, Seoul has made gestures toward Russia even as it has begun to coordinate intelligence with China in the event of a sudden collapse of the North Korean regime.

Japan, because of its strategic vulnerability and considerable economic stake in Korea, has great interest but not much influence there—mostly the legacy of a caustic history. Strategic cooperation between Japan and the ROK is minimal, though both are American allies that host large U.S. forces.

Influenced by the German experience, Seoul fears hasty reunification. Probably none of the actors wishes it except North Korea, and then only on its own (unattainable) terms. As in years past, containing tensions is the sensible priority and that means maintaining a balance of forces sufficient to check North Korea. The historical record suggests that allowance should be made for unpredictability in Korean affairs, not least the North's penchant for bizarre violence.

Creating a New Equilibrium

CHINA EXPECTS to become the dominant power in East Asia. It probably aspires as well to replace the United States at the top of the world hierarchy of power. It is already the second most powerful country and believes that in due course it will surpass the U.S. economy in absolute size. This will feed Han chauvinism and self-regard, which are liable to be particularly hungry for sustenance after more than a century of abuse and humiliation.

Such ambition is misconceived. Despite its recent economic progress, backwardness and overpopulation are huge obstacles to modernity that will weigh China down for decades—probably for generations—to come. Potential conflicts in the Western Pacific are not of Cold War dimension. They are not global in their range as those with the Soviet Union were, and they do not threaten world war. But they do point to competition for power and influence, and so too to strategic tensions. How should those worried by China's actions and ambitions respond?

On both sides, "containment" naturally comes to mind. Containment was a desperate policy adopted by the United States and its

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allies in the face of Stalin's trying to reap the strategic rewards of victory in 1945 in ways that risked world war. China's manifest ambitions pose no such threat. Because the scale of threat is insufficient, a policy of containing China would be disproportionate and would fail to garner support. But China accuses all who urge a firm response to its challenging behavior of planning containment. This is a clever defense, apt to muddle the thinking of adversaries and observers alike—just as accusations of "isolationism" against those who would be more selective of overseas commitments is clever but inaccurate. That said, the Chinese are abetted by many commentators in the United States, and China's leadership may well genuinely believe that the United States is developing a containment option. While it would risk antagonizing China, such a conclusion would help if its effects were dissuasive. Policy needs to ensure China's appreciation that unilateral action that fails to respect the legitimate interests of others will incur uncomfortable penalties and risk self-defeat.

This principle is easily stated but difficult to implement. No two countries will agree precisely on the nature of the problem. All have interests to prosecute and foreign policy is often hostage to domestic imperatives. Notably, what burden is U.S. opinion prepared to accept in support of foreign policy goals that, in the absence of a clear and present danger, can appear both abstract and lacking in urgency? Will Japan pull its weight? Should it do so, or would that scare others? Given their history, can Tokyo and Seoul collaborate for mutual security ends, even minimally? Do the alliances of both with the United States provide enough cement between them? Policy coordination is difficult to achieve and sustain. Striking the right balance between incentives and penalties, force and persuasion, and maintaining effort over time are all great challenges. China will take advantage of any weakness and disunity on the part of those opposed to its ambitions.

And yet, though long experienced at playing from weakness, China too has exploitable problems. Some are dangerous, especially those involving internal political tensions and Taiwan. While presenting opportunities, they need careful handling. Socialist ideology is dead in East Asia, and capitalism triumphant—though not yet democracy. As even the optimists on this point freely admit, capitalism affords no guarantee that democracy will flourish and autocracy abate; and even if it does, a wave of Asian democracy in itself is no guarantor of regional peace. Establishing and sustaining a stable power equilibrium remains the key to peace and security, and removes any need to think in terms of containment. But unless a stable balance is attained, there is no prospect of China and the United States working cooperatively and successfully to assure Asia's peaceful future. □

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Unsettled Succession

China's Critical Moment

Bruce J. Dickson

WHO WILL BE the next leader of China? This question has been a perpetual preoccupation of scholars and journalists for decades, and the reason is clear: In one form or another, the succession issue has been the central drama of Chinese politics almost since the beginning of the People's Republic in 1949. The absence of institutionalized procedures for selecting China's top leader led to the most serious political conflicts of the Maoist era: the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi episode of 1954, resulting in the "suicide" of one and the disappearance of another of two leading figures; the Cultural Revolution and its attack on Mao's supposed successor Liu Shaoqi; the Lin Biao affair, culminating in deadly plane crash of another of Mao's designated successors; and the arrest of the "Gang of Four" a month after Mao's death.

The Deng Xiaoping era has also seen its share of political intrigue as succession arrangements unraveled: first when Hua Guofeng and other Cultural Revolution beneficiaries were outmaneuvered by reformers in the early 1980s; later when Hu Yaobang lost Deng's favor and was forced into retirement in 1987; and most recently when Zhao Ziyang similarly lost Deng's confidence and was removed from his posts in the wake of the pro-democracy movement of 1989. Reports of infighting and jockeying for power among the five or six likely successors to Deng continued thereafter, fueling the perception that the succession issue was among the most—if not *the* most—serious problems of Chinese politics.

And then, finally, on February 19, 1997, Deng died—and nothing happened. Mourners did not march on Tiananmen Square, turning the death of a leader into a protest against remaining leaders, as occurred after the deaths of Zhou Enlai in 1976 and Hu Yaobang in 1989. Nor did one faction of leaders arrest its opponents, as happened after Mao died in 1976. There was no massive public grieving or disruption of everyday life. And to date there have been no significant shifts in Chinese policies, foreign or domestic.

Was the importance of leadership succession in China, then, simply overrated? Not entirely. China's leaders were aware that the death of a prominent leader could be taken as an unspoken signal initiating spontaneous protests and they took steps to preempt any hint of unrest. Additional plainclothes and uniformed police were dispatched to likely trouble spots, such as college campuses and Tiananmen Square. Those few citizens who tried to bring flowers to Tiananmen were deflected, detained, and

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then ushered away in police cars. Foreign dignitaries and media were barred from Deng's funeral, denying potential protesters a sympathetic audience. If Deng's death was anti-climactic, it was partly because great care was taken to make it so.

Still, while succession is not an insignificant issue, it is easily oversold. The absence of formal procedures for selecting a new leader, the infrequency of such events, and the tendency of Chinese elites to struggle against each other for political power combine to give the problem of leadership succession its persistent fascination for China-watchers. But the potential for political crisis at times of transition should not obscure the fundamental truth that no communist government has ever collapsed as the direct result of leadership succession. When a leader dies in office, his survivors have always been able to reach a consensus around a new standard bearer in short order. Not all such leaders were inspired choices (Hua Guofeng and, in the case of the Soviet Union, Konstantin Chernenko come quickly to mind), and not all remained in their new posts for very long. But in all cases the normal operations of state continued with little disruption *at the time of succession*.

Succession remains a serious issue, however, because so much is at stake in the longer run. In China's case, the succession to Deng, once it plays out, may determine whether the policies of *gaige* and *kaifang* (reform and opening to the outside world) are continued and perhaps deepened, or abandoned. It may rearrange significantly the relative power of the current constellation of leaders and influence the degree of political order in China. If intra-elite strife were to ensue, political instability would likely follow. If, as a consequence, China's leaders were to lose control over society, and over the many thousands of local officials who run China on a daily basis, the survival of the regime itself could be at stake.

SUCH APOCALYPTIC consequences are unlikely, however, for at least three reasons. First, there was no power vacuum when Deng died because he held no formal posts. Remembering the havoc wreaked by the succession issue during and immediately after Mao's tenure, Deng took the trouble to work out his own succession far in advance. His status as China's paramount leader was not undermined by having more junior officials formally fill the top posts in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and government. Like Mao, however, Deng lost confidence in his initially designated successors (Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang), pushed them out of office, and replaced them with new heirs apparent, the last being Jiang Zemin. When Deng died, the top leadership positions—general secretary of the CCP, prime minister, president, and chairman of the Military Affairs Commission—were all filled.[1] Few outside observers believe that the current ranking of leaders will remain fixed beyond the next few years, but the fact that the primary contenders already hold formal positions at least postpones the problem. The real shape of the post-Deng era will therefore take time to clarify.

A second reason for expecting scant policy discontinuity in the near term is that there is little dispute among current leaders concerning policy preferences. As was not the case during the Mao succession period, all the potential competitors hold positions relatively close together on the policy spectrum, exemplified by a general consensus on *gaige* and *kaifang*. Despite occasional shifts in the direction and pace of reforms, none of China's front-line leaders is calling for a return to a centrally planned, heavy-industry based econ-

[1]The Military Affairs Commission is the CCP's body for setting military policy and maintaining civilian control over the military. Its chairman is generally seen as China's paramount leader. Past chairmen have been Mao Tse-tung, Hua Guofeng, and Deng Xiaoping; the current chairman is Jiang Zemin.

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omy. Any attempt to recentralize power, especially over the economy, would be resisted by local leaders, the main beneficiaries of market-oriented reforms during the Deng era. Indeed, already in the early 1990s resistance by several provincial governors forced Prime Minister Li Peng to abandon his attempt to recentralize control over financial and investment matters. Nor is anyone calling for an immediate transition to a full market economy, or putting political reform back on the agenda. All Politburo proponents of political liberalization were replaced in the summer of 1989.

There are undercurrents favoring political reform in China, but they are not strong enough by themselves to break the surface. Some of those who were demoted for their support of reform have subsequently returned to political life in less prominent positions (e.g., Hu Qili as minister of electronics and Yan Mingfu as vice minister of civil affairs). They may still privately favor political reform and may still have extensive networks of supporters. In 1995, there were rumors that Jiang Zemin had reached out to Hu Qili and Yan Mingfu to solicit their support, but was rebuffed; Hu, Yan, and other proponents of political reform have little reason to support Jiang, whom they see as an opportunistic and mediocre leader. Perhaps, too, they were waiting for the post-Deng succession to reassert themselves, but their marginal posts make such a reassertion difficult.

There may be other closet supporters of political reform as well. Qiao Shi, for instance, has often been portrayed as a potential Yuri Andropov—a former spy chief transformed into a symbol of political reform. While there is little in the public record to lend credence to such speculation, Qiao has been active in invigorating the National People's Congress (NPC), China's nominal parliament, as an important political institution. No longer a mere rubber-stamp body under the absolute domination of the CCP, the NPC now has permanent committees and permanent staff to review and in some cases revise laws drafted by the CCP. Larger numbers of NPC delegates are now willing to

Dramatis Personae

JIANG ZEMIN—the "core" of China's collective leadership, he is head of the party, military, and state, but not seen as a strong or visionary leader.

LI PENG—currently serving his second term as prime minister, he must resign next year according to the constitution; a key ally of Jiang Zemin, he is seeking a formal post.

QIAO SHI—as head of the National People's Congress, he has strengthened this former rubber-stamp legislature; generally seen as an advocate of political reform, he is Jiang Zemin's main challenger.

ZHU RONGJI—China's economic czar, in charge of reforming state-owned enterprises and creating central tax and banking systems; likely to become prime minister next year.

ZHAO ZIYANG—former prime minister and CCP general secretary who was removed from office and from the Politburo after the 1989 democracy demonstrations; rumored to want a comeback, but other leaders, especially Jiang Zemin (who replaced Zhao as party leader), remain opposed.

WAN LI—initiated the move toward private farming in the late 1970s; he is seen as a strong proponent of political reform but at 82 is now too old to be appointed to a front-line post.

HU QILI—a former Politburo member also demoted after 1989 democracy demonstrations; now a government minister who may be waiting for new opportunities to press for political reform.

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oppose party initiatives, such as the Three Gorges Dam project or Jiang's nomination of one of his Politburo allies for the post of vice premier. In the March meeting of the NPC, the first after Deng's death, an unprecedented 40 percent of delegates refused to approve the government's work report on crime and corruption, criticizing the effectiveness of the efforts to fight crime. The CCP has still never lost a vote in the NPC, but the Congress can now force the postponement of a vote on controversial matters or the revision of pending legislation.

A former president of the NPC, Wan Li, is also seen as sympathetic toward political reform. He is generally credited with initiating the move toward private farming in the late 1970s, and he also has contributed to institutionalizing the NPC's role in the policy process. During the 1989 pro-democracy demonstrations, he cut short a foreign trip to convene a meeting of the NPC's Standing Committee to consider the legality of imposing martial law. Rumors that he was placed under house arrest upon his return to China appear to be unfounded. Moreover, his continued presence on the Politburo until the 14th Party Congress in 1992 indicates that he made his peace with other leaders, regardless of his position on the student movement. At 82, he is too old to be appointed to a front-line post, but he could remain an influential supporter of reform behind the scenes.

In short, while Qiao Shi and Wan Li have strengthened the NPC as a forum for monitoring party decisions, they have not yet opposed a party initiative. The NPC may further strengthen its role as a safety check on party decisions, but it is unlikely to directly challenge the CCP's authority from below.

The third reason for doubting the imminence of a regime crisis is a consequence of the first two: Since there was no power vacuum when Deng died, and since all potential successors espouse similar policy positions, societal interests will not be aroused by the outcome of this succession, as was the case at the time of Mao's death. One main consequence of the post-Mao reforms has been the depoliticization of everyday life in China, meaning that the party/state is less intrusive, and therefore less important, in the daily lives of most Chinese. Although there is still immense interest in the elite's jockeying for power, most Chinese will not be much affected by which technocrat comes out on top. Moreover, Chinese citizens have no direct say in how their national leaders are chosen. When considering the main problems facing China, the political prospects of half a dozen elderly men matter far less to most than the economic, social, and environmental problems facing the country.

Crisis = Dangers + Opportunities

THE CHINESE WORD for crisis, *weiji*, is a combination of the words for danger and opportunity, and this is indeed the best way to see the current succession "crisis." From the perspective of China's leaders, there is the ever present danger of elite conflict and the loss of power by one group or another. This inherent uncertainty makes a period of protracted succession struggles particularly worrisome. But there is also opportunity at hand for policy innovation and consolidation.

A divided leadership is especially dangerous if one leader or group of leaders reaches out to society for support against his opponents, real or imagined. This was a favorite tactic of Mao's, and it was also used successfully by Deng during the Democracy Wall movement in late 1978. Zhao Ziyang tried a similar tack in 1989, when, after losing the support of Deng and other party elders, he sided with the student demonstrators. Zhao's public statements of sympathy for the goals and methods of the protesters (combined with private communications between political reformers within the party and student leaders) signaled a split within the leadership, emboldening some protesters to press their demands, confident that at least some party leaders would support them. In a perhaps

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apocryphal but nevertheless telling exchange between Deng and Zhao during this struggle, Deng boasted that he had the support of three million soldiers, and Zhao replied he had the support of one billion Chinese. Deng then answered, "You have nothing"—and of course Deng was right. Amorphous popular support is no match for political organization and live ammunition.

Nevertheless, despite Deng's early support for an immediate crackdown, and despite his high prestige and network of supporters in the party, government, and military, the student movement continued for over a month before its tragic dénouement. Much of Deng's political capital among his colleagues, within Chinese society, and in the international community was spent imposing martial law. In Deng's absence, elite consensus on behalf of such severe measures will be even harder to achieve. With political dissatisfaction running high in society, populist appeals will be that much more threatening to party leaders against whom they are directed, and that much more tempting to party leaders who can rally popular support for their cause.

Periods of succession are also rare opportunities for policy innovation. The opacity of top-level policymaking in China makes it difficult to predict what form any innovation may take, but Chinese leaders, as well as those in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, have often used succession as an opportunity to embark on sudden and unanticipated reforms.

For the past several years, Deng was too weak physically to have much direct involvement in the policy process, but his political influence remained strong. Hence, while he no longer initiated change, his presence blocked others who might have done so for fear of exposing themselves to charges of disloyalty and factionalism. Now such constraints are removed. Leaders are free to promote their own agendas, and to garner support for further advancement they will need to distinguish themselves from Deng's old line. Thus, policy innovation becomes not only a possibility but a necessity for the ambitious. Previous leadership successions, in China as well as in other communist countries, have led to populist-minded reforms that improved standards of living and eased political restrictions.[2] The succession to Deng may be an occasion for similar liberalizations.

There were hints this past summer that China's leaders are considering a resumption of political reform.[3] One possibility is the extension of direct elections of local leaders from the village up to the county level. Reformers confront the dilemma of how to initiate even the discussion of political change without raising expectations, which can lead to instability when those expectations are not met. Frustration over the slow pace of political reform resulted in student-led demonstrations in the winter of 1986-87 and spring of 1989. Will China's next generation of leaders be able to balance their desire for political reform with the general preference for social stability any better than the previous generation?

We will soon have an opportunity to assess the prospects for such changes. Attention has now turned from the death of Deng to the 15th Party Congress, scheduled for late October 1997. Party Congresses typically approve leaders for top posts and issue programmatic statements outlining the party's agenda for the next several years. During the run-up to the Congress, behind-the-scenes jockeying for power and positions on the CCP's Politburo and Central Committee has intensified. Deng's death has aided those who wish to depart from his poli-

[2]See Joseph W. Esherick and Elizabeth J. Perry, "Leadership Succession in the PRC: 'Crisis' or Opportunity?", *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Autumn 1983); and Valerie Bunce, *Do New Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

[3]See Steven Mufson, "China Tolerates Talk of Reform", *Washington Post*, August 10, 1997.

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cy combination of economic dynamism and political stasis, but straying too far from his line might appear unseemly so soon after his death. The roster of party leaders and the Congress' programmatic statement will be scrutinized carefully for indications of whether the current leadership is prepared to innovate in either the economic or the political sphere.

Present circumstances in China entail dangers and opportunities for society as well as for elites, and for similar reasons. The alternative possibilities of political stalemate and disunity both could increase anxieties about the future. Worse, there is some small chance that new leaders will roll back recent reforms, limiting economic opportunities within China and reducing access to the outside world. Recent efforts to restrict access to the Internet and the closing of computer bulletin boards are dismaying reminders that not all of China's leaders welcome the free exchange of ideas.[4]

Just as periods of succession are rare opportunities for policy innovation by elites, so are they rare opportunities for mass-mobilized political protest. In political systems where organizing collective action is extremely difficult, the death of a leader can trigger bandwagoning behavior—as occurred in 1976 after the death of Zhou Enlai and again in 1989 after the death of Hu Yaobang. In 1991, China's leaders were so worried about the potential for mass protest following the suicide of Jiang Qing, Mao's widow, that they delayed announcing it for three weeks. The prospect of mass protest could increase significantly if a potential leader or group of leaders were to reach out to society for popular support against intra-party rivals. Despite the 1989 crackdown, there was clear evidence that many party leaders at the time supported the popular movement, and political activists may be waiting for an opportunity to try again. For those who have concluded that the current regime is beyond hope, and that the only possibility for political change lies not in reform but revolution—a conclusion that many East European activists had come to long before the revolutions of 1989—the succession period may be seen as a window of opportunity. Indeed, if a crisis does arise, it is most likely to involve an explosive combination of divided elites and mobilized masses that could lead China abruptly away from the fragile order upon which Deng insisted, and toward a ferocious turbulence he and others feared deeply.

Alternative Futures

CONTEMPLATING the years ahead, four scenarios are worth considering. They are ranked here in ascending order of their potential for producing political instability.

First, there could be a smooth though protracted process of leadership succession, with the policy status quo essentially preserved. In the immediate future—say, the next three or four years—this is the most likely course of events. If it comes to pass, Jiang Zemin will remain in his posts atop the party, military, and state, not least because he has succeeded in recent years in bringing cronies from Shanghai to central party and government posts, and in building bridges with key PLA leaders. But Jiang will find it difficult to be an autonomous or decisive leader. Aside from his own limitations, he will be constrained by a collective leadership wary of letting him accumulate the power to match his posts. Qiao Shi, Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, and others may not covet the job of paramount leader, but they have a common interest in checking the expansion of Jiang's power. Power may continue to reside in individuals more than institutions, but increasingly China's leaders are institutionalizing political authority, both to rationalize the political system and to limit the potential for personal aggrandizement.

[4]See "china.com?" by Diane Wolff in this issue for details on the Internet in China.

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A second scenario is a future marked by growing regionalism. Economic decentralization in the post-Mao era has led some to envision a return to the warlord-style of Chinese politics that existed during the early twentieth century, and with it a return to political instability, regional rivalry, and perhaps civil war.[5] Others draw a different conclusion from the same trends: an emerging federalism, with economic development decisions in the hands of local government. One consequence of such a federalism would be to enhance prospects for the survival of market-oriented reforms for the simple reason that many local governments benefit from them. As their tangible benefits are demonstrated, such reforms are more likely to be adopted by an increasing number of local governments.[6] The declining power of the central government over the economy, and the competition by localities for access to foreign trade and foreign investment, are fully compatible with the federalism scenario and need not presuppose the collapse of the central government.

In any event, it is extremely unlikely that growing regionalism will result in the disintegration of China, as it did in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Unlike those two countries, China is not an artificially manufactured multinational state. Several non-Han nationalities live in China, but roughly 95 percent of the population belongs to the Han nationality. Except for the strategically important—but economically marginal and sparsely populated—areas of Tibet and Xinjiang, there is no tradition of non-Han national independence elsewhere within the present borders of China, and—again with those exceptions—the deeply rooted traditional norm of a unified China will prevent regions from declaring independence. (Taiwan, of course, is an entirely different matter.) Regional leaders may contend with one another for de facto autonomy and the power that goes with it, all the time declaring their allegiance to national unity. But with nationalism on the rise in recent years, literal secession is not an option for local leaders.

Third, there could be a retreat from reforms and an increase in authoritarian controls. This scenario is especially likely if political activists, party reformers, or an alliance of the two try but fail to promote democratization. While Deng himself was blind to it, most of China's leaders recognize the trade-off between the goals of economic growth and political stability, and many are willing to slow the pace of economic growth and roll back reforms if it proves necessary to restore or maintain political order. Indeed, conservative leaders were able to bottle up the economic reforms and slow economic growth until Deng's "southern tour" of 1992, when his visits to and approval of economic hot spots kick-started the double-digit growth that China has experienced since. In the post-Deng era, conservatives may again try to roll back reforms. The increasingly decentralized nature of China's economy steeply raises the cost of such an attempt, but conservative leaders will be willing to pay it if their fears of instability begin to mount.

In the fourth and last scenario, there could be revolutionary change in Chinese politics, sponsored either by current leaders or through social revolution, or by a combination of the two. The explosive mix of elite mobilization and popular participation clearly represents the biggest threat to political stability in China in the years ahead. In the past, the regime has gone to great lengths to demobilize society after popular upsurges, and the norm of democratic centralism was a powerful constraint on populist appeals by leaders. But during a protracted succession struggle, some leaders might decide that linking up with social protest movements is their last best hope to promote their own candidacy, the political reform agenda, or both.

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[5]See Jack A. Goldstone, "The Coming Chinese Collapse", and Yasheng Huang, "Why China Will Not Collapse", *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1995).

[6]See Gabriella Montinola, Yingyi Qian, and Barry Weingast, "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China", *World Politics* (October 1995).

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Several events could trigger the sort of social upsurge that ambitious politicians could seize for their own purposes. Rumors have circulated for years that some party leaders are ready to reassess the official verdict on the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations as a "counter-revolutionary rebellion." Reversing the verdict would be popular, but would require repudiating Deng's assessment that the demonstrations were both a planned conspiracy and a dangerous turmoil. Moreover, it would legitimize the demonstrations themselves and could encourage their revival, just as the reversal of the verdict on the 1976 Tiananmen demonstrations to honor Zhou Enlai fueled the Democracy Wall movement of 1978-79. Similarly, a reappraisal of Hu Yaobang may be in the offing. In 1987, Hu was forced to resign his post as the CCP's general secretary for being too supportive of political reform, and his death in 1989 triggered demonstrations. Hu and many of his accusers are now dead, so a reappraisal would have little practical significance, but as a political symbol it would legitimize demands for the kind of political change with which he is still identified. Similarly, restoring Zhao Ziyang to an official post would vindicate his support for the demonstrators of 1989. Any of these steps would signal the CCP's willingness to depart from Deng's line and to consider radical and wide-ranging political reform, along with the risk of instability that would inevitably accompany it.

Recent evidence suggests that mobilizing popular support on behalf of political change would be rather easy.[7] Organizing and controlling it, however, would be a much greater challenge. In China, as in other Leninist systems, the ruling party maintains a monopoly on political organization. Those organizations that do exist (the Communist Youth League, Women's Federation, Writers' Guild, Federation of Trade Unions, Student Federation, and so forth) are controlled by the party, and are therefore very ill-equipped to channel popular sentiments upward. Indeed, one of the key demands of the 1989 demonstrations was for the state to recognize the legitimacy of autonomous unions for students and workers, but this was rejected as being incompatible with CCP rule. China lacks the autonomous organizations needed to express and pursue collective action without creating political chaos. Extra-governmental collective action in China is by definition rebellion; they are acts targeted against state policy without authorized organization, planning, or leadership. Similarly, the outcome of rebellion is often framed in zero-sum terms: either the state suppresses the rebellion or its own survival is jeopardized. That was the calculation of conservative leaders in 1989, and the same calculation may hold in the post-Deng succession.

Many of China's leaders recognize that the imbalance between economic and political freedoms is not sustainable over the long run, but remain deeply divided over how best to correct it—by pulling back on economic reform or by opening the political system. Even those who would prefer more political reform do not know how to implement it without jeopardizing the CCP's power. The experience of former communist countries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that tried to reform, but collapsed in the process, is a chilling reminder to China's leaders of the dangers of attempted adaptation.

Even if revolutionary change were to come to China, democracy would by no means be the inevitable outcome. Given the array of severe political, economic, social, and environmental problems confronting China—and given its huge population's lack of experience in representative government—it is by no means certain that a democracy could effectively deal with such challenges. Hence, democracy might not be consolidated even if attempted. While the historical record suggests that failed democracies of the past often lay the foundation for successful democracies in the future, it is also true, as Samuel Huntington has observed, that failure can delegitimize democracy as a plausible alter-

[7]Public opinion surveys reveal consistent dissatisfaction with the current political system. See, for instance, Wenfang Tang and William Parish, "Social Reaction to Reform in Urban China", *Problems of Post-Communism* (November/December 1996).

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native in the near term.[8] The country's size and level of economic and social development being as it is, an old-fashioned authoritarian regime similar to the current one, but stripped of all ideological pretension and perhaps dominated by the military, could arise instead—either directly or from the ashes of a failed democracy.

One last but important point on this matter: Under any of these four scenarios, Chinese nationalism is likely to become more assertive than it already is. Under those scenarios that suggest the possibility of increased authoritarianism, nationalism could and undoubtedly would be used to mask, or justify, heightened repression within and aggressiveness without.

THROUGHOUT THE post-1949 period, the CCP has been unwilling to accommodate popular demands for political change. The experience of other communist parties suggests that it may be unable to do so. Indeed, the historical record suggests that communist governments do not evolve, but collapse. So while it would be foolish to predict *when* major political change will come to China, it is possible to say *how* it will come: suddenly and dramatically, not gradually and incrementally. In 1989, Chinese students and East European intellectuals had no inkling of the events about to unfold, or any sense that a window of opportunity was about to open before them. But once the opportunity appeared, a rapid social momentum developed, sometimes from unexpected sources, to drive events forward. A peaceful, incremental, elite-sponsored transformation from Leninism to pluralist democracy is as remote a possibility in China as it always was in the Soviet Union, and it has been made all the more remote by the historical baggage accumulated by the CCP during past episodes of popular protest. Clearly, for democracy to ever come about in China, the incumbent regime must be replaced.

Many of China's intellectuals know this, and many political activists are undoubtedly looking for the next window of opportunity to resume political protest. Political leaders, wary of this possibility, are anxiously alert for the same type of signal. The succession to Deng may or may not lead to upheaval or revolution, but it is a "critical" moment, full of dangers and opportunities for all concerned. With the stakes so high and the outcome so uncertain, the next few years may well determine the political future of China for many decades to come. □

[8]Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

A Better Standard

. . . A foreign-policy scenario that everyone does seem to have heard of is the idea that China is going to be our enemy in the twenty-first century. To be sure, it is theoretically possible that any two countries might come into conflict. But it seems to me that to have a serious rivalry, you have to have serious ineluctable conflicts of interest. Where are these ineluctable conflicts of interest with the Chinese? Are they showing any real interest in the world beyond their immediate environs—other than to trade with it?

Not that trade will solve everything. It was President Reagan's military build-up, rather than President Ford's détente, that broke the will of the Soviet Union. But China is not the Soviet Union. It is not the country that went into Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan, and Angola, that built a worldwide navy, that strove for nuclear parity.

So I say, give trade a chance and give the Chinese credit for the almost unimaginable progress they have made in the last twenty years.

—Rupert Murdoch, "Reinventing Socialism", *National Review*, September 1, 1997

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china.com?

Diane P. Wolff

IT HAS BECOME clear in recent years that one of the most nerve-racking dilemmas that Chinese government officials face is reconciling the need for openness in the media with the inherent dangers such openness portends for party control. This is an especially vexing problem when it comes to dealing with Western telecommunications companies.

When media baron Rupert Murdoch's company News Corp. faced steep losses in its Asian satellite television business, it fashioned a joint venture between News Corp.'s Hong Kong-based Star TV (Satellite Television Asian Region) and Chinese state-owned companies, including China's sole national broadcaster, China Central Television. The Chinese government, however, did not want Murdoch beaming programming into China from Hong Kong without official supervision. In order to gain access to China's lucrative advertising market, Murdoch agreed to drop the BBC's World Service Television News from Star's broadcasts into China. According to the *Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly* (February 5, 1996), the change in programming occurred after Beijing "expressed unhappiness" with the BBC service.

The recent flap over *Kundun*, the new Disney film about Tibet directed by Martin Scorsese, ended rather differently. Beijing attempted publicly to chastise the American entertainment company, hoping to use Disney's goal to build a theme park in China as leverage against the release of the film. But when a group of Hollywood's creative elite held a widely covered press conference at which they released a public letter of protest to Chinese Ambassador Li Daoyu—and which Reuters then published on the Internet—the Chinese backed down.

Doubtless there will be more contests over such matters, not least because Time Warner, CNBC, Discovery Communications Inc., and U.S. Children's Television Workshop (which will produce a local version of "Sesame Street" in Shanghai) have recently entered into joint ventures with the Chinese government. So has Microsoft, whose Windows 95 will become the standard platform in China (32-bit processing is necessary for computing in Chinese characters). NBC, CNN, and Dow Jones, too, will sell programming to the Chinese without entering into joint ventures with China's state-owned companies. All face the threat of censorship in one guise or another, and how they react could well have an important influence on official Chinese media policy writ large.

Diane P. Wolff is the author of two forthcoming novels about Chinggis and Khubilai Khan. She has written several books on Chinese culture and is a contributing editor of *The New Asia-Pacific Review*.

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NOWHERE IS THE dilemma posed by new media technology more evident than in the area of cutting-edge computer technology—the Internet. China now represents both the world's greatest potential market for computer technology and services and the world's largest telecommunications market. Although China is still in the early stages of developing its data network, industry experts agree that once it completes its technological infrastructure, the PRC will have latest-generation technology that will have simply leapfrogged over intermediate steps.

China's Internet has a three-layer hierarchy: the nationwide backbone known as CERNET (China Education and Research Network) based at Tsinghua University in Beijing; a secondary system of regional nodes in eight major cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Xi'an, Wuhan, Chengdu, and Shenyang); and the campus networks, the lowest level of the hierarchy, which are still in early stages of construction. At its completion, CERNET will have up to three links to the global Internet and network resources such as file transfer protocol, gopher, and World Wide Web, which international users may access with varying degrees of success. At present, however, only a tiny percentage of Chinese have telephone lines and computers in their homes. James Glase, proprietor of an English consultancy firm, estimates that as of 1995 there were 2 million personal computers in use in China, with the numbers increasing by about 30 percent each year.[1] Of these, only about 60,000 are connected to the Internet—most individual Chinese cannot afford computers and phone lines at home and instead must access the Internet through offices in either business, government, or universities. For the sake of comparison, the number of Internet users in the United States is estimated at about 55 million, nearly 1,000 times more numerous in a country with only around 22 percent of China's population.

Commercial accounts first became available in the Chinese capital through the Beijing Telecommunications Authority (BTA) in June 1995, and now number approximately 2,000 in Beijing alone. The subscription cost varies depending on access times and duration of the connection, but one Chinese Net surfer calculated the price of the monthly service and connection to be roughly three times the cost of a standard U.S. commercial account. Although such accounts can be purchased from various companies, they must all connect to the international gateways through the Chinese Ministry of Telephone and Telecommunications (BTA's parent company) in either Beijing or Shanghai.

The rapid expansion of Internet facilities in China has evidently given the party leadership pause. In 1996 the government required everyone with an Internet account to register with the local Public Security Bureau, which has been looking into putting up a firewall around the Internet to block the entry of all "undesirable" content. As of February 1997, registration was not being systematically enforced. Among serious computer scientists it is widely believed that any attempt to build such a wall is futile. Cindy Zheng, a first generation Chinese-American, reports, "The [Sun Microsoft] filtering system that the PRC intends to use will be easy to crack. People will get around it." A Chinese engineering student studying at an American university added,

> Firewalls deal with hackers and how to avoid their hacking into a system, therefore they concern system network security. What the PRC wants to do is ban pornography and democracy-related information. This is not something a firewall can handle without extensive human intervention.

Tibet is a special and interesting case. Nowhere has the exile government of the Dalai Lama, headquartered in Dharamsala,

[1]James Glase, *China Business Review* (November/December 1995), p. 47.

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AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/WWWVLPages/AsianPages/ChineseNet.html
Includes news of the latest developments regarding the Internet in China, as well as access to various newsletters and the Asian Studies www Virtual Library. Includes an explanation of the structure and operations of the Internet in China.

ANU WWW VIRTUAL LIBRARY
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/WWWVL-AsianStudies.html
The best site in the world for Asian studies. Includes links to every country and region from the Middle East to Southeast Asia.

FINDING NEWS ABOUT CHINA
http://freenet.buffalo.edu/~cb863/china.html
Consistently rated the best source on China on the Internet, along with Australian National University's site.

CHINA HOME PAGE
http://www.ihep.ac.cn/
A site of the Institute of High Energy Physics (Beijing) that includes public, scientific, technical, cultural, and business information about China.

CHINA NEWS DIGEST
http://www.cnd.org
Founded seven years ago by overseas Chinese scientists, this site now has five regional editions and a global edition. The global edition now goes out to 43 countries and the editors estimate that 100,000 people access it daily.

CHINA DAILY ONLINE
http://www.snweb.com/pdtext.html
China's only English-language newspaper.

LONGQUAN CHINESE BOOK STORE
http://juliet.stfx.ca/~x94ycj/welcome.html
A source in Hong Kong for Chinese books.

BEIJING UNIVERSITY GOPHER
gopher://pmphpsvr.pku.edu.cn/1
Here you can access, among other things, a map of the Beida campus, which was the site of the Student Democracy Movement.

CHINESE SECURITY HOME PAGE
http://members.aol.com/mehampton/chinasec.html
Information about China's military and security structure, including all the important links and unique online databases.

THE CHINESE FINANCE ASSOCIATION
http://www.aimhi.com/VC/tcfa/update.html
A weekly newsletter published in the United States by the Chinese Finance Association.

SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA PROJECT
http://www.soas.ac.uk/Needham/SCC
Outlines the series through the University of London that surveys the history of science, technology, and medicine in pre-modern China.

ASIA PACIFIC SPACE REPORT
http://www.asiaonline.net/spacerep/
News and features on satellite communications and space-related endeavors in Asia.

HARVARD-YENCHING LIBRARY
http://www-hcl.harvard.edu/hyl/hylhome.html
Includes a guide to the library, selected newspapers in vernacular languages, and links to other East Asian resources.

YANGMINGSHAN NETIZENS' LIBERATION FRONT HOME PAGE
gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org:5000/11/int/hrw/asia/china
Information about news, politics, foreign affairs, human rights, Asia, software, and the Internet.

OFFICE OF TIBET
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This is the office of the Dalai Lama in London. Excellent support for reporters covering Tibet.

TIBET INFORMATION NETWORK
e-mail: tin@gn.apc.org
Based in London, this site contains authoritative and reliable information on Tibetan affairs. Subscription fees are around $100 a year for Americans.

THE TIBETAN STUDIES LIST
e-mail: tibetan-studies-l@coombs.anu.edu.au.
A scholarly newsletter from Australian National University. It includes events, conferences, books, Internet sites, and archived material, which is accessible free of charge.

POTOMAC CONFERENCE
gopher://gopher.cc.columbia.edu:71/11/clioplus/scholarly/SouthAsia/Tibet/potomac
Proceedings of the 1992 conference "Sino-Tibetan Relations: Prospects for the Future." Unique in that its participants are Tibetan, Chinese, and American. Subjects include the environment, economic development, historical perspectives, and security issues.

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India, had more opportunity to explain its point of view than in the international forum of the Internet. A cursory search of Infoseek, Microsoft's Internet search engine, shows a preliminary count of 15,000 sites on the Internet under the heading of Tibet, through which one can access anything from the Tibetan government, to the Tibetan Library of Works and Archives, to the International Campaign for Tibet, a non-partisan public interest group dedicated to promoting human rights and democratic freedoms.

Dissent is not tolerated in the current political climate in China; only the ideologically safe—professionals, university professors, and businesspeople with contacts outside China—are allowed Internet access. As Anthony Kane, director of the Hopkins-Nanjing program at the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, put it, "Before the recent changes, anybody who knew anything about the Internet could start a business selling Internet addresses. This is the 'chaos' that the new regulations are trying to address." It is not clear how much of the current crackdown is a desire for control and how much is greed, but in any event the two go hand in hand: The Chinese government probably thinks it can both control what goes over the Net and make some money on it.

The supreme contradiction, according to intellectual property lawyer Jerome Cohen, is that, "You can't run a complex economy without information. If the Chinese want a modern economy, they're going to have to have information." They cannot have it both ways—they must choose. And when they finally do choose, it will say a great deal about the priorities of the leadership in the post-Deng era. □

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A Place To Stand

Taking the angelic or extraterrestrial perspective gives us the illusion of power—the illusion the greater tempter created when he took our Lord up onto a high place—but not the reality. No matter how much we worry about human rights violations in China, famine in Africa, war in Bosnia, there is nothing practical we can do about it, unless we choose to give up our own lives (with all the commitments we have incurred) and move to China or Zaire. It is a question of leverage. Everyone knows that Archimedes said, 'Give me a lever long enough, and I shall move the earth.' What they sometimes forget is that Archimedes said he needed not just a lever but 'a place to stand.' Without a place to stand—a family, a neighborhood, a people and its language—we move nothing, we do nothing, we are nothing. The first task of a moral human being is not to play the stranger to our friends and judge the world as if we were gods; our obligation is—to use the language of Martin Luther and the Nashville Agrarians—to take our stand. We may not move the earth, but we might stiffen our backbones.

—Thomas Fleming, "Other People", *Chronicles* (March 1997)

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

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Science Friction

The Politics of Global Warming

Brian Tucker

AS EVERYONE KNOWS, there has been much sound and fury over the past decade about the threat of global warming, a condition held to be the result of "greenhouse" gas emissions caused by human activity.[1] Indeed, the argument over global warming has been the main set piece of the international environmental culture wars for several years, with *activiste* Cassandras and conservative Pollyanas both trying to marshal the authority of science as justification for their views. The ensuing battle has reminded us of a key truth of the sociology of knowledge, that while everyone may be entitled to his own opinions, none is entitled to his own facts.

In Kyoto this coming December a major UN-sponsored international conference on global warming is scheduled to take place; it is the culmination of several run-up meetings in Berlin, Geneva, and New York that have seen the various players rehearsing for the big event. From these precursor meetings, several things have become clear: that politics and emotions have distorted what is scientifically known about the phenomenon itself; that the issue is far more politically and morally complex than many realize or are prepared to admit; and that governments find themselves besieged by conflicting interests and pressures, both domestically and internationally. In light of all this, the outlook for anything very useful happening at Kyoto is mixed at best. An examination of the real science, the real issues, and the real choices before us shows why.

Brian Tucker is senior fellow at the Australian Institute of Public Affairs. He is a past president of the International Association of Meteorology and Atmospheric Science.

The Real Science

MANY IF NOT MOST non-expert observers assume that the greenhouse effect necessitates major and relatively rapid reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, particularly carbon dioxide, lest dire

[1] Dry air in the atmosphere is composed of 78 percent nitrogen, 21 percent oxygen, and 1 percent argon and other so-called rare gases. But the way in which incoming solar radiation and outgoing earth radiation affect the primary heat balance of the atmosphere is controlled by water vapor and trace gases that occupy less than 0.04 percent of the volume of dry air. In order of importance these trace gases include carbon dioxide, methane, chloro-fluorocarbons, nitrous oxide, and ozone. Together water vapor and these trace gases keep the earth some 30°C warmer than if they were not there. The effect was misnamed the greenhouse effect some two hundred years ago because of the mistaken belief that greenhouse glass serves the same function as these gases. A better analogy would be to a blanket: the thicker the blanket, the warmer the earth's surface. But the name greenhouse has stuck.

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climatic changes imperil the biosphere. Typical of much media comment on the issue is the assertion, this one from *The Australian* newspaper, that ". . . some scientists are increasingly worried that greenhouse gases could wreak havoc with the earth's climate in future generations, creating huge floods and droughts from global warming."[2] But those who believe such things do not get their data from the international consortium of climatologists who are continually collating results from recent studies.

Much of the scientific theory about greenhouse gas emissions is well founded, but it does not support the conclusion that calamitous effects from global warming are nigh upon us. The work of the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), established in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Program, has yielded a worldwide scientific consensus that has become generally, if not universally, accepted as a balanced state-of-knowledge assessment.[3] In essence, its conclusion is that while human activity has caused no significant direct increase of the major greenhouse gas—namely, water vapor—there is no doubt that other such gases are increasing. The most important of these is carbon dioxide, followed by methane and nitrous oxide. Fossil fuel burning is the main reason for the increase of carbon dioxide, and agricultural methods play a major role in the increase of methane and nitrous oxide. It follows that the energy and food requirements resulting from increases in world population together with the demands of the existing population make it inevitable that these gases will continue to accumulate in the foreseeable future. The rate at which this will occur, however, is still unclear.

Although scientific progress has occurred on several fronts, the timing, magnitude, and geographical distribution of climate change due to higher greenhouse gas levels can be estimated only inexactly and in limited detail. Climate scientists know that many important processes are inadequately treated in their models; notable difficulties include specifying the roles of clouds and ocean currents, and imprecise representation of precipitation processes. While sensible and careful attempts are being made to effect improvements, doubts remain as to how accurate our models can become anytime soon at representing the real atmosphere. Hence, the simulation of any but the broadest aspects of climate in a world with higher greenhouse gas levels is an exercise of uncertain validity.

In view of these uncertainties and the cautious way in which the scientists carrying out climate change studies regard their results, it is unfortunate that some on the periphery of this knowledge extrapolate so freely as to predict calamitous consequences even within the next century. There is no scientific justification for such a view. Only one prediction can be hazarded with any reasonable degree of confidence: that when an effective doubling of current greenhouse gases occurs, probably toward the end of the next century, average near-surface air temperatures will be 2° or 3°C higher than they are at present. This represents the middle range of estimates, with some models predicting one or two degrees higher and others one or two degrees lower. Even this limited prediction depends on a correct treatment of climate processes represented in the models, and we are still not sure of their accuracy extrapolated out as far as eighty or ninety years.

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[2]Natasha Bita, "No Excuse to Duck Our Duty", *The Australian*, June 6, 1996.

[3]Early predictions of both large sea level rise due to melting of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (J.H. Mercer, "West Antarctic Ice Sheet and CO_2 Greenhouse Effect: A Threat of Disaster", *Nature*, 1978, vol. 271, pp. 321-5) and increased intensity and destructive potential of hurricanes (K.A. Emanuel, "The Dependence of Hurricane Intensity on Climate", *Nature*, 1987, vol. 326, pp. 483-5) are examples of hares set running; they are running still although the work in the first case was not confirmed and in the second was subsequently withdrawn.

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Associated with these air temperature increases are higher near-surface sea temperatures and, with somewhat less confidence, sea level rises of up to half a meter due to thermal expansion of sea water. These changes would be superimposed upon vertical land movements of similar magnitude due to tectonic processes; in some cases, such movements would exacerbate the effects of higher sea levels, in other cases they would mitigate them. Another century on, that is to say around the year 2200, at a time when greenhouse gases may be three times their present concentration, models indicate a total climate change from the present of an additional 50 percent beyond the above-cited figures.

There is scientific consensus on little else. The belief that events such as the January 1995 and summer 1997 floods in Western Europe and the January/February 1996 cold spell in central and eastern parts of the United States were caused by higher greenhouse gas levels is taken seriously by many environmental activists. But they are, strictly speaking, scientifically unjustified. Indeed, *all* assertions that climate models indicate progressively extreme weather are highly questionable. Suggestions that global warming is increasing the frequency of tropical cyclones or of droughts are unfounded; indeed, some data suggest that a decrease in extreme weather is more likely. Analyses of recent climate model results do reveal a small rise in the frequency of high rainfall events in the presence of twice as much carbon dioxide as currently exists in the atmosphere, but this may be accepting too much detail from the surrogate model's crude spatial resolution and very inexact grasp of rainfall processes.

The Real Issues

MISCONSTRUED science, however, is perhaps the least of the problems associated with the global warming scare. Far more significant is the misconstruction of the underlying politics of the thing.

Casual observers have a very truncated notion of what is at stake in the global warming debate. The typical newspaper reader appears to think that what is at issue is the extent to which the earth's ambient temperature is increasing and what needs to be done to prevent presumed calamity. If the problem were really that simple, we could expect that an objective consensus of qualified experts would suggest the path to prevention and remediation. But even if all the necessary unambiguous scientific facts were available—and as we have seen, this is not so simple a task—the very

In one of his last poems, the late W.H. Auden wrote:

> Nothing can be loved too much,
> but all things can be loved
> in the wrong way.

One wishes our more rabid environmentalists would take these lines to heart. They might then reconsider their crusade, which has by now gone beyond the limits of even the purest reason. Making the world safe for the environment is not the same thing as making the environment safe for our world.

—Irving Kristol, "The Environmental Crusade", *Wall Street Journal*, December 16, 1974.

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wording of the main objective of the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), negotiated at the 1992 Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro, suggests the key complication. Article 2 of the FCCC commits signatories to achieve

> . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

This is an illuminating formulation for two reasons. First, no empirical definition is given (here or elsewhere in the FCCC) of what constitutes "dangerous" anthropogenic interference with the climate system, or a time frame "sufficient" to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change. What is dangerous or sufficient in these contexts is not obvious, short of extreme cases. And the entire statement begs the question of the extent to which any measurable change in the climate system has in fact been caused by humans. Not only has this proved difficult to determine, but, thanks to one of the most astonishing scientific episodes of the century, we know something in 1997 that we did not know in 1992: that a slight increase in water vapor, the most plentiful of the greenhouse gases, may come from a constant bombardment of the earth by small ice comets.

Second, and more important for our purposes, the FCCC acknowledges that the greenhouse gas emissions said to cause global warming are to a large extent a consequence of efforts to meet the energy and food requirements of a growing world population. In short, it suggests, obliquely at least, that there are trade-offs to be reckoned. And so there are: The only realistic way to reduce greenhouse gases sharply is to burn less fossil fuel, and the only way to do that without jeopardizing living standards, particularly in the poorest countries, is to rely far more heavily on nuclear-generated electricity. But many of the meliorist-minded political activists who are concerned about the environmental damage caused by modern industrialism are equally concerned about the poverty of the less developed parts of the world, and equally adamant opponents of generating electricity from nuclear power.

We can add to this already vexatious equation the contentious issue of world population control, which is part and parcel of the issue of world poverty. As the failure of the September 1994 World Population Summit at Cairo showed, there is no general international agreement on realistic plans to limit world population increases any more than there is general agreement on a plan to attack poverty in the world's poorer lands. Indeed, this entire mélange of issues defines the current standoff between the OECD countries and what used to be called generically the Third World. Many relatively poor countries with high population growth rates have seen population control as a ploy of the advanced countries to deny them their future power, or to fob off responsibility for sharing global prosperity. Representatives of the more advanced countries, with generally more moderate rates of population growth, see such arguments as highly self-defeating and often unjustifiably conspiratorial in inspiration. The global warming argument between rich and poor countries is a variation on the same theme: Efforts by the industrialized powers to impose greenhouse gas emission limits on developing countries are seen by the governments of those countries as an alternative means of reducing their rates of economic growth and hence their national power; while the developing countries' refusal to accept limits on themselves is seen by the developed countries as cynical and self-serving.

The global warming controversy is therefore bound up not only with uncertainties about the objective causes and extent of the phenomenon, but also with impassioned arguments over global development, power, and morality. While most of the relevant gov-

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ernment officials appreciate these complexities, many environmentalists have difficulty acknowledging that the Framework Convention objective itself begs the question of what is desirable, let alone what is possible. Having to make painful trade-offs between desirable but irreconcilable objectives is precisely what true believers of all stripes are temperamentally incapable of doing. In this instance, they are extremely reluctant to pose the crucial question: Which is worse, embracing nuclear power with its potential dangers and costs, imposing poverty-inducing restrictions on world energy consumption and agriculture, or accepting the costs of adjustment to climate change?

It is not surprising, therefore, that since the Rio meeting strong emotion has led many governments, including that of the United States, to try to capture the high moral ground of domestic politics by making promises that are, at least for the foreseeable future, manifestly impossible to keep. Indeed, several governments have adopted national interim targets even more ambitious than those of the United States. Germany, for example, aims for a 25 percent reduction of 1990 carbon dioxide emissions by 2005. Of the more than 150 national signatories that have ratified the FCCC and accepted its aim to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, most have adopted national targets that are highly unlikely to be achieved. As Kyoto approaches, these governments find themselves caught in a crisis of wishing, suspended between the short-term political expediency of affirming such goals and the reality of actual limits to achieving them in light of the conflicting political and moral interests at stake.

Why the Alarm?

THE SCIENTIFIC evidence thus far suggests that adjusting to what is liable to be rather moderate and very gradual climate change—with some conversion from fossil fuels to nuclear power to provide time for adjustment to a more moderate level and pace of change—is the most sensible answer to the question of trade-offs posed above. But this is not likely to be the conclusion reached in Kyoto. Instead, a combination of international beggar-thy-neighbor politics and a rush of millenarian fear seems to be taking over.

If there is so little evidence to support the notion of calamitous climate change associated with global warming, why has so much alarm been generated? The answer lies in part in the sky-is-falling perspective that seems to characterize the views of environmental activists, and their success at imparting this perspective to the general public through a media industry more interested in selling its wares than it is adept at understanding basic science. Not only is the magnitude of change exaggerated, but environmental activists have also been able to popularize the unwarranted assumption that all change must be deleterious.

Fear is as hardwired into human thought processes as the temptations of utopia, and both have influenced social development throughout human history. No doubt the increased popularity of declinist thought among intellectuals these last few decades owes at least a little something to an awareness of the finite nature of the physical world, and to a keener appreciation that humanity has prospered materially only *because* we have exploited this finite environment.[4] As a result of these fears, the precautionary principle has become a major plank in many environmental platforms as a means of stopping environmental degradation. This principle states that, when faced with development proposals, regulators should anticipate environmental harm and act to ensure that such harm does not occur.

This sounds innocuous enough; surely no rational person would advocate deliberate and needless environmental degradation. But, as suggested above, there is not just one moral imperative at issue—the environment—but competing moral imperatives, or at least competing desired objectives, includ-

[4]See Arthur Herman's *The Idea of Decline in Western History* (New York: The Free Press, 1997), and Kenneth Minogue's splendid review of it in *The National Interest* (Summer 1997).

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ing the right to life, food, and comfort, and concern for both international and intergenerational equity. The precautionary principle of environmentalism, however, assumes that any developmental activity has a latent tendency to do more harm than good, and that whatever societal benefit may come from such activity cannot justify further environmental alteration. The key to such an assumption is that the environmental value necessarily takes precedence over all others because if the biosphere is wrecked beyond redemption, then no other value can be served. This key assumption, however, reflects an excessive fear of the future and a highly timorous view of the relationship between humanity and the environment.

The application of this gloomy perspective to the subject of climate change is much encouraged by a tendency to focus on potential damage to systems *based on the present climatic state*. Yet adaptation has been a hallmark of human resilience throughout history, and opportunities actually to benefit from prospective climate change are consistently ignored. Typically, for example, a broad indication of more rain tends to be regarded as likely to result in more floods rather than fewer droughts, and of less rain as causing more droughts rather than fewer floods. Such misplaced anxiety has caused one senior scientist to bemoan, "We have created the most unnecessarily fearful generation of humankind that ever populated the earth."[5]

Fear of climate change has also been bolstered unwittingly by the development of "scenarios", a term that describes sets of climate change parameters regarded as feasible in the light of emerging model results. Scenarios were first prepared by climate scientists to provide a benchmark for estimating the sensitivity of different sectors of society and the economy to possible climate change. From their inception such scenarios were tagged with strong caveats indicating that they should not be regarded as forecasts, and were openly acknowledged to be based on models widely considered inadequate in many ways. But such warnings and qualifications have often been ignored, partly because many environmentalists feel happiest when they assume the worst, and partly because the explanatory notes issued with early scenarios were sufficiently ambiguous to imply forecasts to the non-expert.

A gradually changing climate may well be the inevitable consequence of human activity, and it may indeed pose serious problems of adaptation. It bears repeating that the evidence does not support the dismissive view that those concerned about global warming are spinning fantasies from thin air. But dramatic descriptions of potential calamity are hyperbole, and the assumption that all change will be for the worse is less a sign of perspicacity than paranoia.

The Real Choices

IT IS SOMETIMES said that realism is the impact of thinking upon wishing. With world population rising more rapidly than at any previous time in history, and with industrialization spreading fast to formerly impoverished regions, the prospect of reducing world emission of the greenhouse gases necessarily involved in the industrial programs of developing nations and in world food production is, to put it mildly, not good.

It is important to distinguish between greenhouse gas emissions, which are what is put into the atmosphere, and gas concentrations, which are what stay there. An approach to stable emissions will be possible only when world population and associated development expectations have themselves stabilized—probably a century or more hence, or when alternatives to fossil fuel become widely available and commercially competitive. To stabilize concentrations of gases in the atmosphere would require worldwide emission reductions in excess of 50 percent, and that

[5]J.L. Farrands, *Don't Panic, Panic! The Use and Abuse of Science to Create Fear* (Melbourne, Australia: The Text Publishing Company, 1993).

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over a time interval during which world population is expected to double.

The situation is not totally irredeemable, however. Fossil fuel combustion accounts for some 75 percent of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions, and substitute means of generating electrical power on a large scale already exist. The most dramatic recent example of a national effort to reduce fossil fuel burning emissions is the French conversion to nuclear energy. France achieved a 40 percent reduction in carbon dioxide emissions during the 1980s, largely by increasing its nuclear-powered electricity generating capacity from about 10,000 to 56,000 megawatts. By 1994, about 78 percent of France's electricity was generated by nuclear power. No other country has undertaken such a massive transfer from fossil fuel to nuclear energy, although several other industrialized countries have moved in this direction. As a result, Sweden, South Korea, Switzerland, and Spain now have some of the lowest per capita rates of carbon dioxide emissions. For the United States, with the highest per capita emissions, carbon dioxide emissions in 1993 would have been 30 percent more than occurred had it not been for 109 nuclear-powered electricity generating stations. For the world as a whole, the amount of carbon dioxide accumulating in the atmosphere would be some 10 percent greater than at present without the existing nuclear production of electricity.

It is clear that policies fostering energy conservation, energy efficiency, and renewable energy alone cannot stabilize worldwide emissions, let alone reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gasses. Nor is the drastic decrease in consumption required for such reductions remotely in prospect, for it would lead to a politically unacceptable reduction in living standards in the economically advanced countries, and to a politically unacceptable limit on development in the less advanced countries. The stabilization of emissions might be achieved, however, within about fifty years if there were an immediate international push to maximize nuclear-powered electricity production. But that, of course, raises concern about cost and safety—and here we come back to another difficult trade-off.

Concerns regarding the safety of nuclear power station operations are not something idly to be dismissed, even if one were satisfied that safe disposal of low, intermediate, and high-level wastes had been achieved. It is not fabricated paranoia to take such problems seriously, nor is it trivial to note that waste disposal problems have still not been solved. But nearly 450 nuclear power reactors in some 30 countries currently supply approximately 17 percent of the world's electricity needs, and nuclear power is today safer and less of an environmental threat than other means of generating electricity, at least as long as there is a willingness to pay the costs of safe reactor operation and waste management procedures. Such costs make nuclear-generated electricity more expensive than the fossil fuel method, but if we seek rapid reductions of carbon dioxide emissions, it is clear that any extra costs involved with nuclear power would be less than those of the only other alternative—namely, the economic and social disruption consequent upon drastic food and energy curtailment.

Political realities being what they are, there is no way that the FCCC objective of reducing emissions—which is likely to be reaffirmed in Kyoto—will be reached within the time frames agreed so far. There is no rapid way either to curtail emissions or to achieve substitution of nuclear-powered electricity generation capacity. The international scientific establishment knows this, having declared two years after Rio that even the "stabilization at present carbon dioxide concentrations . . . obviously is an impossible option."[6] It is even clearer today that the

[6] *Statement of Purpose* by IPCC Chairman Bert Bolin, for a conference held in Brazil in October 1994 to study the scientific implications of the FCCC wording.

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direct economic costs of the magnitude of emission reduction being contemplated as we move toward the Kyoto meeting are enormous. To the extent that there is any political willingness to achieve the Rio targets, it is likely to be soon smothered by realization of the staggering price tag that comes with it.

Perhaps this is just as well since the actual extent of climate change is going to be much less dramatic than most nonexperts think. It is important that emotions not lead governments into chasing nonexistent solutions to highly exaggerated problems, if only because that will make it harder to achieve less daunting but still necessary solutions to real problems. If dispassionate analysis cannot put an end to the current alarmism, then perhaps the inevitability of failure to meet unrealistic goals will eventually induce a greater sense of realism.

Such a realism would take as its first principle with respect to issues of relative cost that policies aimed at adapting to gradual climate change make more sense than impossible efforts to stop all anthropogenic climate change in its tracks. Put somewhat crudely, it makes more economic and moral sense to build dikes to prevent coastal flooding, to relocate especially vulnerable human habitats, to adjust irrigation schemes for variant rainfall patterns, and to accelerate efforts to replace fossil fuel burning to meet energy requirements than it does to drive world GNP backwards several percentage points per year for half a century or more.

Even such an effort, undertaken over the better part of a century, will be no stroll in the park. It will require, first of all, accelerated research aimed at obtaining improved and unbiased scientific assessments of change, and the most sensible ways to adapt to it. But if one takes a factually based view of the problem, it is clear that the costs for adjustment spread out over time will be vastly lower than any serious effort to meet the Rio targets.

Lost in the Ozone

NOW THAT IT IS obvious that there is no way to meet the main objective of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, is there any indication of a shift in thinking from a noble but impossible approach to a less dramatic but more rational one? Will we see more sober deliberations in Kyoto? From the evidence of the Conference of Parties to the FCCC convened in April 1995 in Berlin, of a second conference in July 1996 in Geneva, and of the UN/WMO conference in New York in June of this year, the answer has to be "maybe."

The Berlin meeting was designed to provide a forum for countries to compare and assess their programs to formulate, implement, publish, and regularly update emission reduction measures to mitigate climate change. As expected, representatives of environmental movements also sought to increase and strengthen reduction targets for industrialized countries. A similar line was taken by many poor countries (a more realistic term for what used to be called developing countries), who refused to accept any reduction target applying to themselves.[7]

The impossibility of attaining the 1992 Rio targets was not acknowledged at Berlin, let alone the lunacy of setting still more stringent ones. Little more was decided than to launch a new round of negotiations, termed

[7]All countries that are signatories to the FCCC are required to implement national programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Developed countries (listed in Annex I of the Convention and comprising most OECD countries and the East European economies in transition, but not including Asian countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) have agreed to an implied uniform target to return their national emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. Developing countries (those not listed in Annex I) have general commitments to abate emissions but do not have a target and enjoy softer reporting requirements.

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the Berlin Mandate, aimed at delivering a legally binding instrument on which all delegates could agree at a December 1997 Kyoto conference. Indeed, most participants at Berlin seemed more concerned with making new commitments than with meeting old ones—it was, after all, easier. The real trade-offs were not mentioned, and many strains of hypocrisy were in evidence. Bureaucratic opportunists, having pushed policy formulation well ahead of scientific justification, now saw emerging career prospects from continuing rounds of expensive international negotiation. Environmental opportunists, grasping at any information no matter how selective or exaggerated to foment alarm, appeared completely oblivious to the downstream effects of their extravagant demands. Rich nation opportunists, because their current economic circumstances involve a temporary stabilization of their own gas emissions, saw a means of imposing economic restrictions on competitors not so favorably placed. Poor nation opportunists, while rejecting emission reduction targets for themselves, sought restrictions on rich nations on the grounds that their extravagance caused the problem in the first place.

And so it goes. In Geneva in July 1996, a 1995 scientific update of our understanding of the greenhouse gas-climate change connection, prepared by the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change, was received. Its most important component was the report of its Scientific Working Group, because in any logical progression its other two components (estimating impacts and devising strategies to cope) must be based on climate change predictions, which in turn are based on an understanding of how greenhouse gases get into the atmosphere and what happens once they do. The treatment accorded this report was as illuminating as it was discouraging.

Background information and the first draft of documentation were provided by hundreds of scientists who had met to coordinate and articulate the results of their research. An executive group edited the detailed material, prepared summary findings, and published both—which were then sharply criticized from within the ranks of both science and industry. Bias and exaggeration were apparent in the final policymakers' summaries. For example, while there is an implied increase in the frequency of severe droughts and floods in the final wording, there is no "on balance" evidence in the research results to justify this. Also, where there are clear results showing that, for example, tropical cyclone occurrence will remain unchanged, this is interpreted weakly as there not yet being sufficient evidence to show an increase. Careful study of the report by "IPCC watchers" associated with major world industry associations has revealed many examples of last minute changes to the earlier wording, the effect being to "scientifically cleanse" the final report of equivocations and caveats in the background documentation.[8] The World Energy Council has also cited evidence of scientific bias, technical weakness, and political influence in the policymakers' summaries provided by other IPCC working groups.[9]

Whether due to naivete or bias, the credibility of the IPCC has been damaged by these shortcomings. Those responsible for the final wording of the summaries appear to have been unaware that any selected passage that could advance alarmist prejudices would be seized upon by the environmental lobby and widely quoted, whether in context or not. These experiences, in turn, have made prospects for Kyoto even dimmer than they might otherwise be, because the credibility of the core scientific work has now been compromised.

NOT ALL THE NEWS is bad, however. From the national reports presented at Geneva, and later in New York, it was evident that few countries would get near their existing and modest target of stabilizing emissions by the year 2000.

[8]See S.F. Singer, "Climate Debate", *Nature*, 1996, vol. 382, p. 392.

[9]"Climate Change 1995", World Energy Council, Report No. 5, March 1996.

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Developing countries, meanwhile, are still excluded from such targets. Not surprisingly, then, much of the preparatory negotiations for Kyoto involve squabbling over whether any targets should involve "differentiation", that is, considerations of social and economic differences between countries. The United States, currently allied with part of the European Union, opposes differentiation; most other industrialized countries support it. Nevertheless, no country regards such "burden sharing" as other than a means of reducing its own share, while developing countries show little sign of any willingness to make sacrifices.

Still, reading between the lines of these discussions one can detect an increasing recognition of the unrealistic nature of worldwide emission reduction targets, of the still major scientific uncertainties at hand, and of the need to assess the full consequences of a policy before embarking upon it. A small group of countries, including Australia, Iceland, Japan, and Norway, refuses to conform to the pretense of being bound to even more unrealistic emission reduction commitments beyond 2000. Other countries, most notably the United States, while supporting the principle of binding targets, have demanded that they be realistic and verifiable, not compromise national prosperity, and include targets for developing countries.

That is good, of course, but not good enough. It remains politically incorrect, and hence so far impossible, to discuss the issues rationally, with all the attendant assumptions openly scrutinized, and with all the competing values acknowledged and analyzed. From what has been said, it should be clear that the global warming scare is based on four related assumptions: (1) that the greenhouse gas-climate change scientific theory is valid; (2) that any such climate change will necessarily be detrimental to human well-being; (3) that realistically we can achieve a sufficient reduction in greenhouse gas emissions to effect a worldwide stabilization of gas concentrations in the atmosphere; and (4) that the cost to society of such a reduction is less than the cost of adapting to the climate change. It follows that if even one of these assumptions is untrue, then the argument behind a policy of rapid and extensive reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is undermined. As we have seen, the basic scientific theory of global warming is sound, but predicts substantially more moderate effects than those that have captured the popular imagination. Imprecise and uncertain climate change estimates and the complexity of climatic impact assessments make the second assumption indeterminate; while the foregoing arguments have shown the third and fourth to be essentially false. Unless the Kyoto summit acknowledges these basic truths, it looks to be a dreadful affair that will needlessly worsen political tensions between rich and poor, mislead millions of scientific innocents, and misdirect government policies that must deal with the less severe but still real challenge before us. □

> To see human beings as destroyers as well as creators is sensible. But to see nature as mainly benign, as wise in the way it governs itself, and as majestically unchanging and harmonious—and at the same time to depict human beings as simply the meddlesome enemy of kind nature—is to create an unreal theology.
>
> —Geoffrey Blainey, *A Shorter History of Australia* (Melbourne: Heinneman, 1994).

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Tin Cup Diplomacy

Hans Binnendijk

FIFTY YEARS AGO the United States entered a new international system armed with resources to meet the new challenge of communism. At the height of the Marshall Plan, for example, some 16 percent of the U.S. federal budget was dedicated to supporting Europe alone. Today we are again in the early stages of a new international system, but without a unifying challenge to raise foreign affairs resources much above 1 percent of the federal budget. Remarkably, with tin cup diplomacy and some triage, the United States has been able to deal fairly successfully with post-Cold War complexity. Our capabilities are now fraying, however, and international leadership cannot be sustained unless the resource slide is reversed.

Reductions in the international affairs budget have been deep, with constant dollar cuts of about 34 percent over the past decade, including a 14 percent cut in just the last two years. Defense expenditures have also fallen 34 percent since 1986. Expressed as a percentage of GNP, defense and international affairs spending together has dropped from 6.9 percent to 3.7 percent during this period. International affairs cuts have also been targeted at specific accounts. For example, the drop in international security assistance has been 74 percent over the decade, so deep that if aid to Israel, Egypt, and Turkey is excluded, the United States has basically given up security assistance as an instrument of foreign policy. Other areas particularly hard hit are the United Nations, information and exchange programs, and multilateral development aid.

Analysts disagree about the impact of the international affairs cuts. The Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy concluded last year that resource problems are already harming the capacity of the United States to lead and that the national security capital built up during the Cold War is being depleted. The Heritage Foundation, on the other hand, has argued that some key accounts have increased and that no real harm has been done.

There is some truth to both sides of these apparently contradictory conclusions. Innovative U.S. approaches have masked the impact of reductions, especially in vital areas of the world. Passing the tin cup and designing ad hoc solutions have worked so far. In Central Europe, for example, the Partnership for Peace is a bargain at $100 million, while the United States intends to pay for less than 10 percent of the NATO enlargement bill. In Korea, U.S. creation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization helped halt North Korea's nuclear program, and Japan and South Korea are picking up more than 90 percent of the tab for it. In the former Soviet Union, Western disbursements of more than $20 billion since 1991 have been made primarily by international financial institu-

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tions. In the case of Mexico, the United States found an obscure account—the Exchange Stabilization Fund—to provide $20 billion in financing to deal with the 1994 financial crisis there. In the Zaire crisis, the United States promised to help the new leadership retrieve billions of Mobutu's stolen dollars as an incentive to stop the massacres—a skillful use of someone else's money. Only in the Middle East has the United States continued to pour aid funds in at pre-1990 levels. But when it came to Operations Desert Storm and Vigilant Warrior in the Persian Gulf, the United States again successfully turned to its allies to pay most of the bills.

According to a new book entitled *Who Needs Embassies?*, U.S. embassies in strategically significant countries have also managed, at least until now, to pursue critical U.S. interests successfully despite fraying caused by cutbacks.[1] The book examines recent U.S. operations in five key countries—Germany, South Korea, South Africa, Israel, and Guatemala—and concludes that despite policy successes, demands on these embassies are increasing dramatically even as they are being pinched financially. In addition, the State Department reports that thirty-one new missions or embassies have been created since 1991, mostly in countries formerly part of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. And the National Defense University's *Strategic Assessment 1996* shows that the number of U.S. personnel stationed in our embassies has actually increased from 15,000 to 19,000 during the past ten years.

But all this is misleading. What has been happening is that other U.S. agencies have stepped in overseas to help the often beleaguered State Department. Most of the increase in U.S. embassy personnel, for example, is from the military or from U.S. law enforcement agencies. In Mexico City, over thirty U.S. agencies are represented at the embassy, and seventeen work on counter-drug efforts. A Defense Department publication entitled "Foreign Military Interaction: Strategic Rationale" lists thirteen different defense engagement programs overseas, most of which have diplomatic purposes. The National Guard works closely with "sister states" in Central Europe, where it helps to implement the Partnership for Peace. And three new U.S.-run regional military education centers have been established for Europe, Asia, and Latin America.

Allied nations and other organizations are also filling some of the gaps left by the United States. In Bosnia, private voluntary organizations provide vital services that thirty years ago would have been performed by the U.S. government. In Haiti, Canadians and Pakistanis perform international policing functions that the United States left to them last summer. In North Korea, the International Atomic Energy Agency provides continuous on-site monitoring of nuclear material, and its teams include a substantial number of specialists from the U.S. Department of Energy. During the Cold War, of course, all treaty verification obligations were carried out directly by the United States, either through remote technical means, or, where agreed, treaty-specified U.S. on-site inspections. In El Salvador, our stabilizing influence has been partially replaced by the United Nations.

IF TIN CUP DIPLOMACY is working, why then the concern about budget cuts? Because while these activities may be useful, they cannot compensate fully and indefinitely for the shortfall in the core foreign affairs budget. In order to save key programs, State has had to sacrifice others. For example, *Who Needs Embassies?* notes that in order to support democratic transitions in countries such as Guatemala and South Africa, resources for other embassies in those regions have been sucked dry. To open the thirty-one new missions of the kind men-

[1]Mary Locke and Casimir Yost, eds., *Who Needs Embassies?* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1997).

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tioned above, State had to close thirty-five other embassies and consulates. Some of the less important embassies that have stayed open suffer like our poorly constructed embassy in Guinea-Bissau. In what should become a classic cable, sent to Washington in February, the embassy sought guidance on pesticides to kill both the hundreds of rats that eat documents and the thousands of locusts that penetrate into the deepest security areas of the post. At the Agency for International Development (AID), planners will cut the number of overseas AID missions by more than half in order to save critical programs. And the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) is closing libraries by the dozen, giving rise to the concern that our friends see American librarians and development officers leaving just as Drug Enforcement Agency personnel arrive.

Behind the façade of success, then, our basic foreign affairs infrastructure is eroding. The State Department has cut two thousand employees and USIA has cut 25 percent of its work force during the past four years, many of them experienced regional experts that are needed to deal with today's complex world. Half of State's computers and three-quarters of its phone systems are obsolete. The archaic State Department Wang computer system cannot read e-mail documents prepared in a Windows program. Some of our embassies, such as those I visited recently in China and South Korea, are apparent firetraps. Departing overseas personnel routinely leave their posts three to four months before their replacements arrive, in order to save money but at the expense of continuity. In other embassies, biographic files on key local figures are no longer kept up to date, so valuable information is sacrificed. There are not enough funds to enable political officers to travel often outside the capital city, and consequently reporting suffers. We now run the risk of developing diplomatic Alzheimer's disease.

International affairs budget cuts are also beginning to affect our ability to influence events and to practice preventive diplomacy. It is only because an unrivaled military stands behind the diplomatic tin cup that the United States retains any influence at all. Our Economic Support Fund, designed in 1977 to provide influence-generating economic aid, is now focused almost exclusively on Israel and Egypt. In the multilateral banks, we are losing our ability to block loans of which we do not approve and direct other loans to projects we support. In Panama, we may lose access to military bases critical to the counter-narcotics fight because we cannot afford security assistance. In Africa, declining foreign aid resources coincide with a marked increase in civil conflict in failed states.

The negative impact of these budget cuts has reached the point where constructive actions are now being taken in the administration, on Capitol Hill, and in the private sector to regenerate our capabilities. Negative budget trends may have bottomed out. The administration has agreed with Congress to undertake an ambitious merger of the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), USIA, and AID. ACDA and USIA would become one with State, while AID would remain separate but would report to the secretary of state rather than the president. This would eventually result in greater efficiency and possibly some savings, but more importantly it has created a smoother relationship between the two branches of government on the question of foreign affairs resources. That cooperation is also evident in the deal made with Senator Jesse Helms to repay over three years $819 million owed in arrears to the United Nations. In exchange for authorizing the funds, Senator Helms extracted various useful UN reforms, and he intends to shave future American contributions to UN operations from 25 to 20 percent of the total bill, in order to bring U.S. dues in line with new international realities.

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has also given higher priority to fixing the resources problem. She has initiated a much needed effort to explain to the American

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people the benefits of engagement overseas. She has convinced the President and the director of the Office of Management and Budget to increase the fiscal year 1998 international affairs request to Congress by $1.2 billion over last year's appropriation of $18.2 billion. Albright's State Department has created a new strategic planning system that for the first time sets out specific budget-driven policy goals, designs a strategy to implement them, and establishes indicators to judge progress. Ambassador Max Kampelman took the lead in stimulating private sector initiatives such as the "Advocacy of U.S. Interests Abroad" project, which, under the guidance of the Stimson Center, seeks to create a clearer national consensus on foreign policy goals and means.

Both efforts attest to the recognition that the pendulum has swung too far and that the foreign affairs budget has been cut too deep. Now is the time to sustain the new cooperation between the administration and Congress so that the United States can indeed lead the world into the twenty-first century. □

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The Man Who Ran Françafrique

Kaye Whiteman

ON THE MORNING of March 19, 1997, an eighty-three year old Frenchman died in an apartment on the rue de Prony, in the 17th *arrondissement* of Paris, after suffering for several years from Parkinson's disease. Such was the legend of Jacques Foccart that, while his period of greatest influence had been thirty years earlier, the death sent tremors through all of French-speaking Africa. Indeed, the tremors were far stronger there than in France itself, even though the only biography of him, *L'Homme de l'Ombre* (*Man of the Shadows*) by Pierre Péan, was subtitled "The most mysterious and most powerful man of the Fifth Republic."[1] For those involved with what has come to be known nowadays as "Françafrique", denoting the special French sphere of influence in Africa, many, along with Albert Bourgi of *Jeune Afrique*, saw Foccart's death as "the end of an epoch."

It had already become impossible to distinguish between the myths and the realities of the Foccart legend, given the extreme secrecy with which he surrounded his activities. Was he really a great spider manipulating away at the center of a residual imperial sphere of influence, a genius of neocolonialism? Or did his legend owe more to exaggeration and misguided speculation than to reality?

I have long been fascinated by the Foccart mystery. As a young journalist in the 1960s, increasingly preoccupied with the France that had struggled hard to keep an extraordinarily high profile in its former African colonies, I gradually became aware of Foccart, there in the shadows. The first references to him sprang from the pages of *Le Canard Enchaîné*, which was convinced that he was one of the controllers of the *barbouzes* (the bearded ones), the agents who used none too clean methods to fight the decidedly unclean OAS (*Organisation Armée Secrète*) in the Algerian War. Later his unusual and secretive role in helping to prop up African leaders or mount clandestine operations was occasionally highlighted, and in the early 1970s Foccart took *Le Canard* to court for suggesting that he had bugged an eighteenth-century commode in Charles de Gaulle's office, and was awarded a symbolic one franc for having done so.

Then there was the story of all the files being removed from the Élysée Palace after de Gaulle resigned in April 1969, another hint of the secret world to which he was wedded. The avuncular Daniel Pépy, an agronomist brought in to perform Foccart's functions in the post-de Gaulle interim reign of Senate President Alain Poher, told me that

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[1]Pierre Péan, *L'Homme de l'Ombre* (Paris: Fayard, 1990).

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every document had been removed, and there had been no question of a handover brief. So Pépy found himself trying to advise on difficult issues such as Chad and Biafra without a compass, or even a file of records.

Seven weeks later Foccart was back in the Élysée, and so presumably were the files. I once visited the office that Foccart notionally ran, the so-called Secretariat of the Community, de Gaulle's attempt to find a structure halfway between colonies and full independence, lodged in the Hôtel de Noirmoutiers on the rue de Grenelle (the phone number was of that most delicious of Paris districts, before all-figure numbers came in, "Babylon"). The Community had no real function after it was overtaken by events during 1958-59, except perhaps to supervise payments to French army veterans in Africa, so it was an ideal front for whatever were Foccart's real activities. I called on the so-called press officer of this "virtual" organization, who was courteously uncommunicative, but I was struck by the complete absence of files, documents, papers of any kind. The high corridors and rooms were without shelves. Wherever the action was, it was not here.

I first actually saw Foccart during the ceremonies for the tenth anniversary of the independence of Cameroon in 1970 (it was in fact only the francophone part that was ten years old). Foccart, a bald poker-faced figure in a perpetual pair of dark glasses, was one of the guests, and though he was as usual self-effacing, it was possible to slip him into photos sitting there behind larger-than-life figures like Jean-Bédel Bokassa. One photographer did his best to try to get an amusing picture of him walking past a poster for a gangster movie at Yaoundé's Abbia cinema.

The only time I saw Foccart close up was during President Pompidou's visit to Gabon in 1972. After the presidential press conference there was a reception for journalists, and a cheeky Gabonese reporter asked, "Is it true, Monsieur le Président, that France is behind all these coups in Africa?" To which Pompidou replied, smiling broadly, referring to the figure who was, as always, standing behind him, "You'd better ask Monsieur Foccart." The man of the shadows, a little pink, remained impassive.

I saw him only once more, twenty-two years later, at the funeral of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, in Yamoussoukro in 1994. The French political class attended in such droves that one wondered who was running the government in Paris: President Mitterrand and the Socialists (as well as ex-President Giscard) flew in on the Concorde, and the Gaullist RPR leaders came on a separate flight and stayed overnight at Yamoussoukro's Hôtel Président. I happened to be loitering in the foyer when they all arrived—the then-Premier Edouard Balladur, stiff and uncomfortable, Jacques Chirac, jovial and informal, a gaggle of Gaullist barons like former Prime Minister Pierre Messmer. And along with them walked slowly a frail little old man with his mouth drooping open. Could this really be the same Foccart, sinister man of mystery? It was said he was too ill to go to the basilica the next day, but watched the funeral service from his hotel room. It made one deeply aware of the passage of time, and of generations.

THE VEILS AROUND HIM were to some extent lifted late in his life, when he chose to talk to Philippe Gaillard, who has published his extended interviews with the man in two fat tomes titled *Foccart Parle*, under the joint publishing labels of Fayard and *Jeune Afrique*. While this partially lifted some of those veils, much ambiguity still envelops the more controversial aspects of his career. And in trying to defend himself, he created new questions. One doubts whether Foccart's diaries (1965-74), which *Jeune Afrique* is also to publish, will enlighten us much more. Apart from the special pleading and the historical spin-doctoring, it is certainly too late to destroy the Foccart legend, either as neocolonial devil or prime mover in the success story of France in post-colonial Africa.

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One of the secrets of Foccart's power lay in his relations with the leadership of French-speaking Africa, which he took great pains to cultivate. "You are our fetish": the words are those of President Maurice Yaméogo of Upper Volta, spoken in 1960 to the visiting Foccart, then the newly appointed adviser to President de Gaulle on African affairs. It was the year in which Upper Volta became independent, along with a dozen or so other territories that had constituted France's African empire.

Many of them had not expected to achieve independence on their own. Upper Volta in particular, a landlocked stretch of land in the drought-prone Sahel, had only been put together as a territory in the 1930s. It was—and remains—one of the poorest countries in the world. In its short existence it had been part of the AOF (French West Africa), which collapsed on the eve of independence in 1960, with its eight territories going their separate ways, and most still feeling a desperate need for French protection.

Hence the naming of Foccart as a "fetish", reflecting a feeling that he had magical or mystical properties. Because of his unique connection to de Gaulle, he was even then a symbolic figure, the door through which access to the General was obtained. De Gaulle at that time was in the process of betraying French Algeria in the highest interest of state, paving the way for one of the more enduring aspects of his reputation, that of "the great decolonizer."[2] The context was one of military defeat in Indochina and Algeria, so it was vital that futile colonial wars not be repeated south of the Sahara. This was France's last significant imperial stamping ground, and a successful decolonization, in the manner of the British, was important for the self-esteem, indeed for the future, of the French state.[3]

Decolonization south of the Sahara did not happen as de Gaulle had intended. He had wanted a Franco-African Community that stopped short of total independence. But when Sékou Touré's Guinea voted "no" in the 1958 referendum on that Community, the idea was effectively dead. Guinea was cast into outer darkness because of its decision and a Community of sorts came into existence, but the call of full independence proved too strong to resist.

Not really having planned for it, in 1960 de Gaulle had to improvise structures for a collection of small newly independent states, each with a flag, an anthem, and a seat at the UN, but often with precious little else. It was here that Foccart came to play an essential role, that of architect of the series of Cooperation accords with each new state in the sectors of finance and economy, culture and education, and the military. There were initially eleven countries involved: Mauritania, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (now Benin), Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Niger, Chad, Gabon, Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Madagascar. Togo and Cameroon, former UN Trust Territories, were also co-opted into the club. So, too, later on, were Mali and the former Belgian territories (Ruanda-Urundi, now Rwanda and Burundi, and Congo-Kinshasa), some of the ex-Portuguese territories, and Comoros and Djibouti, which had also been under French rule for many years but became independent in the 1970s. The whole ensemble was put under a new Ministry of Cooperation, created in 1961, separate from the Ministry of Overseas Departments and Territories (known as the DOM-TOM) that had previously run them all.

This Cooperation Ministry, focal point of the new evolving French system in Africa, regarded Foccart both as their "guarantor" and their advocate with de Gaulle. If the General had conceived the apparatus (though in fact some of it simply happened by improvisation), Foccart was the machine minder.

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[2]The phrase is that of Sékou Touré, president of independent Guinea, who respected de Gaulle despite their quarrel.

[3]"In 1958, when he told me that he was entrusting me with African problems, he had already decided on the mission to achieve: a successful decolonization", Péan, quoting Foccart, p. 261.

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He was in many respects ideally equipped for this role. His family were white planters from the Caribbean island of Guadeloupe, so he already had the feel for overseas France. In 1940 he found it easy to become an unconditional Gaullist, joining the Free French soon after de Gaulle's celebrated June 18 BBC broadcast of that year. He was drawn to his natural milieu in the Free French security organization (the *Bureau central de renseignements et d'action*) under Passy. His unconditional loyalty only came to de Gaulle's attention after the war, but when it did it was a major asset. Foccart seemed to have had no political ambitions of his own, which made it easier for him to stay with de Gaulle through the *traversée du desert*, the wilderness years of the 1950s, when most of de Gaulle's political friends abandoned him. Foccart had been secretary-general of the RPF, the Gaullist party, in decline in the years before 1958, and, significantly, he had accompanied the lonely leader on his 1953 journey through all the French African territories. As he had in 1940, the General again found spiritual comfort there, and regeneration.

Foccart had also demonstrated his talents as a political organizer, especially of the *Service d'action civique*, the quasi-military units set up by the Gaullists to defend the Republic (seen by critics as neofascistic anti-communist militia), and his taste for semi-secret and clandestine operations, which were part of the legacy of the Free French as a resistance movement. It was this kind of "occult" view of the world that fitted him to carry out dirty work for the General in his fight with the OAS. This is the part of *Foccart Parle* that leaves one particularly unsatisfied, as he often pleads silence or tergiversates. But although he says he was not responsible for Algeria, he does admit that relations with the intelligence service (the SDECE) were among the responsibilities given him by the General. His biographer's claim that General de Gaulle asked Foccart to reorganize the SDECE (in view of the tainting of both the armed forces and the intelligence agencies by the movement for *Algérie Française*) is indirectly confirmed, but there is not a clear picture of the organization of the *barbouzes*. Unsavory though this may have been, it was in the higher interests of the French state, as de Gaulle was in the delicate process of shedding French Algeria without destroying France.

What does come through both volumes of *Foccart Parle*, and Péan's biography, is Foccart's total commitment to the General and to the cause of Gaullism, which, as he saw it, justified all manner of brutalities. The same reasoning, it can be said, was applied to African policy. Most of the two volumes of memoirs play down the unpleasant side of Foccartism, the still unexplained suspicion of dirty tricks and underhanded practices—the world of "parallel services" (or unofficial intelligence networks) with which the Foccart approach to Françafrique was surrounded. Foccartland, an expression used by Péan to describe Gabon, but which could apply to the whole area, was almost a state of mind, which helps account for its durability.

One of the secrets of Foccart's success lay in his control of information. His SDECE connections were one aspect of this, but he also had a remarkable network of personal contacts through Africa. It was this that led to the belief that he ran his own private intelligence services. He explains it thus in *Foccart Parle*:

> I disposed of several antennae. It is correct that I was a well informed man. Many people are inclined to think that someone who has numerous precise, exact and rapid pieces of information can only have obtained them by dubious means and has clandestine networks. However, it is simply a question of organization. Why was I well informed? First because I knew a lot of people in France and in Africa, who were themselves well informed, each one in his sector because of his political, administrative or economic functions and his contacts. They knew my telephone numbers and I

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knew theirs. We called each other without particular motives, simply to maintain relations.[4]

It was a sleazy world, however, one in which a great deal of manipulation was required to maintain French influence. One revealing moment comes when Foccart admits that the French secret services eliminated the Cameroonian Marxist leader Félix-Roland Moumié in 1960. First, he volunteers the information that there had been an "execution." Asked who decided it, he responds evasively that "the archives will one day answer your question", a fall-back position he often adopts. Gaillard then quotes a book by Pascal Krop in which it is written, "Debré, advised by Foccart, decided to eliminate the irritant", which produces the cool response, "To tell the truth, not particularly Foccart." However one reads this, Foccart is conceding that he was among those who took the decision to murder someone who was inconvenient to French interests. A legacy, perhaps, of the resistance mentality?

Maybe it is this sinister undercurrent that makes *Foccart Parle* such compulsive reading. You never quite know when you are going to come up against it. One is also struck by Foccart's mastery of the detail of African politics, the ethnic tapestries, the sometimes brutal thumbnail sketches, related with complete detachment, of those who probably thought of him as a friend. He had a card-index mind that could produce at will the names of the children of each African head of state, revealing him as an Africanist *extraordinaire*, and he possessed a measure of instinctive courtesy and priestly sympathy for those with whom he dealt (he writes almost with affection of a murderous clown-like Bokassa). But there is always a sense that everything he does is performed as an almost religious duty in the service of the General, and thus, automatically, of France.

There is a story that Louis Joxe, deputy prime minister under de Gaulle, when asked what Foccart's function was, replied laconically, "copinage des présidents et la fin du mois" (which translates loosely as "nursemaiding presidents and making sure that African civil servants were paid at the end of the month"). In *Foccart Parle* he tells of how he guaranteed a loan for President Gnassingbé Eyadema of Togo to buy an apartment in Paris, and there are countless other stories, told both by him and others, of his *disponibilité*. But as well as the cozy, sanitized image fostered by such mundane episodes, which serve to play down the underhand, clandestine activities, there is also the sense of someone who glories in his own legend. He refers almost approvingly to the fact that his reputation as a man of mystery, a spymaster-general, caused many to contact him or seek his advice or even tap into his power. Which brings us back to Foccart as the "fetish", and to the secret of his African success.

A mystique of all-powerfulness (in his case deriving from the strong magic of de Gaulle, that greatest of all fetishes) gave him much of his African credibility.[5] He was also astute enough to find a fellow machine minder of the system in President Houphouët-Boigny, who had a similar mystique, and came to be considered the doyen of francophone African leaders. Some reports suggested that Foccart and Houphouët spoke on the phone every Wednesday, and there is no doubt that he considered the Ivoirian leader the African centerpiece of his network.[6] They operated together on a number of issues. Interventions

[4] *Foccart Parle*, vol. 1, p. 355. The personalized nature of Foccart's *reseaux* makes it hard for anyone to inherit them, although others, such as the hardline Gaullist Charles Pasqua, have built their own.

[5] There was actually a de Gaulle cult called Ngol reported in Moyen Congo and Gabon in the 1940s and 1950s. See *Le Général de Gaulle et l'Afrique Noire 1940-1969* (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurispridence, 1980), pp. 4-5.

[6] The telephone was a vital feature of Foccart's network. After Eyadema came to power in Togo in 1967 and was unfamiliar with administration, Foccart was said to have ruled Togo by telephone.

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such as that in Gabon in 1964 and Chad in 1969 were encouraged by the Foccart-Houphouët tandem. The most significant collaboration between Foccart and Houphouët was the way they tried to persuade de Gaulle to back the Biafran secession from Nigeria in 1967. Despite the pressures they exerted, however, de Gaulle refused to recognize Biafra, and, in retrospect, so guarded and elliptical are some of Foccart's statements that one cannot be sure what he really wanted or expected from de Gaulle at the time.

Under Pompidou (1969-74), Foccart's situation was never quite the same as it was with de Gaulle, even though he kept his adviser status as a Gaullist totem. By then Foccart was fully aware of his symbolic status and refused to come out into the open by accepting the post of minister of cooperation, just as he refused it from Chirac when the latter became prime minister in 1986. Interestingly, President Giscard d'Éstaing removed Foccart in 1974 for the same reason, because he was too representative of the Gaullist past from which Giscard sought to break. But by then the Foccart system and the Foccart style were so entrenched that everyone had to have a "Foccart", and Giscard employed Foccart's deputy Réné Journiac, who operated very much in the master's manner.

Foccart says that Journiac, out of prudence, seldom consulted him, although they remained friends. But he is very critical of two special operations: the fiasco of the mercenary landing in Benin in January 1977 (with which he denies having had any connection, and would not have supported because it was badly conceived and executed); and "Opération Barracuda", the military intervention that deposed Emperor Bokassa in September 1979. Ironically, Foccart writes sympathetically of Bokassa, whom he sees as a fool who was stitched up to save Giscard's face. The intervention was a gross admission of failure by Giscard, who cultivated Bokassa because, according to Foccart, Giscard was obsessed with hunting game, in which the Central African Republic offered special opportunities. Of such is the stuff of politics made.

During his twelve years out of office, Foccart kept up his network and maintained his telephonic conversations, and in 1986 was rehabilitated by the new Premier Chirac as an adviser on African affairs for the two years of "cohabitation." When Chirac finally made it to the presidency in 1995, Foccart was brought back to the Élysée at the age of eighty-one, in the main because he still had remarkable contacts with African leaders such as President Omar Bongo of Gabon, who had been one of his original protégés.

Although to critics of French policy in Africa (by now increasingly vocal in France itself) this looked like "back to square Foccart",[7] the tide of history was moving on and France's system in Africa was increasingly looking as if it were coming undone. The psychological turning point was the devaluation of the CFA franc by 50 percent in January 1994, which came a month after the death of Houphouët-Boigny.[8] In his published interviews, Foccart is deeply critical of the devaluation, even though some of the benefits it brought, such as improved export earnings, were apparent even within a year. But it had been a terrible blow to the psychological (some would say umbilical) bonds between France and the *pré carré* (the backyard), the feeling of family that Foccart had cherished. It had the added disadvantage, in the eyes of West Africans, of having been proposed by the Americans, the World Bank, and the IMF. Balladur, the prime minister who cut the Gordian knot of devaluation, had already surrendered ultimate control over the franc zone economies in a famous letter to franc zone heads of state in September 1993, and the devaluation several months later appeared to

[7]The title of a critique of French African policy produced by the radical groups *Agir ici* and *Suivre* was *Jacques Chirac et le Françafrique: Retour à la Case Foccart?* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995).

[8]CFA stands for *Communauté Financière Africaine*, or the franc zone, where the currency was freely convertible from country to country, and had fixed parity to the French franc.

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clinch it. Thus Houphouët-Boigny's funeral in February 1994 seems in retrospect almost like an act of mourning for the death of a relationship.

FOCCART'S OWN death had the air of an epilogue. Despite Chirac's glad-handing assurances to African leaders that everything was the same, it soon became increasingly clear that it was not. Apart from the new dominance of the Washington financial institutions over the economies, there appeared to be a loss of military nerve on the part of the French.

This, in fact, came from the Rwandan debacle at the end of the Mitterrand presidency, which exposed France not just as having been on the wrong (i.e., losing) side, but of having their allies, the extremist Hutus, exposed as *génocidaires*. Even the French military intervention "Opération Turquoise", which occurred soon after the genocide in July 1994, ostensibly for humanitarian purposes, seemed like a guilty reflex with an odor of cover-up. The latest solo French intervention was in the Central African Republic, to prop up the democratically elected regime of President Ange-Félix Patassé in Bangui against a mutinous army three times in 1996. Even though it had been possible to bring in an inter-African force in December, the event that had been feared above all—the death of French troops—occurred in January, when four French soldiers were killed by the mutineers. This was the one thing that could have a dramatic effect on public opinion in France; the bloody reprisals that followed also did the French no credit.

Even more seriously, France proved unable to put together a coalition for a "humanitarian" intervention in eastern Zaire late in 1996, as the wildfire rebellion of Laurent Kabila exacerbated the refugee problem there. There were too many suspicions that the real intention was to prop up—once again—the moribund regime of the dying Mobutu Sese Seko. Once the bulk of the Hutu refugees returned to Rwanda, the Americans in particular were unwilling to join a UN-sponsored force, even though the UN Security Council had already approved it. And without the Americans the French proposal had no hope, for France was broadly disliked throughout the region, not least in Paul Kagame's Tutsi-led Rwanda.

This setback to French hopes released a visceral anti-Americanism among the French, who detected an Anglo-Saxon plot against francophone Africa. This was Foccart's element, tracing back to de Gaulle's phobias, and although by 1997 he was seriously ill, it may well have been that France's prolonged support for Mobutu long after it was reasonable was due to Foccart's influence and advice. Mobutu had been sucked into Françafrique in 1970 after ten years as a CIA protégé, and the old habit died hard. Foccart was said to have been telephoning African personalities on the subject of Zaire right up to the week before his death.

Certainly the fall of Mobutu two months after Foccart's death was a serious blow to whatever remained of Foccartland. The smooth arrival of the Kabila regime in Kinshasa (although not without its own problems) marks a major power shift in central Africa, and France's impotence in the face of the upheaval in early June 1997 in Brazzaville (where French troops simply evacuated French nationals) has only confirmed the impression of a crisis. The humbling of the Gaullist party in the parliamentary elections in June augments that crisis, in part because cohabitation brings the attendant uncertainties about French power to the fore.

So although Foccart's system proved highly resilient in the past (evident when Mitterrand took over in 1981 and slipped easily into Gaullist clothes, with his own Foccart-like advisers, including his son Jean-Christophe), the situation is now different. The Socialists have done a certain amount to reassure disillusioned francophone Africans by trying to repair some of the damage done in recent years by the brutal and over-rigid policies on immigration, the more hurtful for hav-

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ing been implemented particularly by Gaullists, who were supposed to have special connections with Africa going back to the Second World War. But the realities of France's difficult economic situation are likely to dominate policy, and there is a strong current in all French political parties to both "banalize" and "moralize" relations with Africa. It is unlikely that the power of the "fetish" can be exercised from beyond the grave. □

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
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A Book for the Times

Anthony Hartley

Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1,365 pp., $39.95.

IT IS UNUSUAL for a standard work issued by the Oxford University Press to be obscured by a fog of controversy. Unfortunately, it has happened with Norman Davies' huge history of Europe—for reasons that are not always easily comprehensible. Admittedly, there were a certain number of errors and literals in the first edition (I am assured that corrections have been made in the second), but this is surely not sufficient reason for dismissing a work of great originality without even discussing its leading ideas or the novelty of its method. To do so is to open oneself to the charge of pedantry, or else of hostility for some unstated reason.

For instance, Professor Theodore K. Rabb of Princeton, in his review in the *New York Times* (December 1, 1996), describes how he abandoned in despair the enterprise of reading Davies' *Europe*. Since he seemed determined to restrict his critical scope to the noting of errors and literals, this is hardly surprising. It must indeed have been a discouraging task to read so long a book purely to spot mistakes, and without any realization of what the author was getting at. Nor are his lists of errors entirely accurate, as noted by Anne Applebaum in *The New Criterion* (May 1997). I am sure that Professor Rabb does not wish to be known as the pedant from Princeton, and would prefer, therefore, the conclusion that the reading of Davies' *Europe* has been too difficult for him. It would be a pity, however, if readers should follow his example, since, as Tim Blanning, professor of modern European history at Cambridge University, writes in the *Times Literary Supplement* (December 20, 1996), "Despite all these blemishes, it is a tremendous achievement, before which one must stand in admiration, if not awe."

The obvious absurdity of Professor Rabb's review leaves one puzzled. It is so clearly meant to be a "killing" review, and the emotion contained in it is far beyond the ordinary irritation caused by inadequate proofreading. Applebaum has sensed this too and puts it down to outrage at Davies' remarks on the Holocaust. The "worst" of them, it would appear, is that after describing in the same capsule the murderous anti-Jewish 1942 actions of German Reserve Police Battalion 101 at Otwock, Poland, and the 1944-45 actions against Germans of the mainly Jewish-staffed communist Security Office (UB) in Gliwice, Poland, Davies concludes, "In this light, it is difficult to justify the widespread practice whereby the murderers, the victims, and the bystanders of wartime Poland are each neatly identified with specific ethnic groups."

If umbrage over this capsule is indeed the main explanation for Rabb's hostility to Davies, it is strange that it has become increasingly difficult to comment broadly on these terrible happenings; immediately after the opening up of Auschwitz or Treblinka there was not such sensitivity. The Holocaust remains a mysterious event, one whose motives seem clear but which leaves much to be known about how ideology was translated into awful fact. It is also mysterious because it

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involves the descent of one of the more civilized peoples of Europe into an abyss of intolerance, persecution, and cruelty, culminating in the slaughter of most of the Jewish population of Germany and the countries around it—a slaughter, moreover, carried out at great inconvenience and with the expenditure of vast resources in the middle of a life-and-death struggle. How did the Germany of Goethe and Schiller, the Germany of small states, each furnished with its local opera-house, theaters, and orchestras, the Germany where families played Bach or read the Bible in the evening, manage to gestate these hellish events?

This is not the place to seek an answer to this terrible conundrum. But, at the very least, it is obvious that it poses a very difficult problem for all other Europeans. For, unless we have some idea of the special circumstances that produced it, then we must come to the conclusion that such an appalling development might have happened in any other European country. If Germany is not "special", then other countries might similarly hold the seeds of a final intolerance within themselves. If it is "special", in the sense of a special intolerance, a special brutality, then how does Germany fit into alliances or future plans for Europe? The question is one of some importance. It is not only legitimate but necessary to discuss it.

When, then, Professor Tony Judt asks—in a letter to the *London Review of Books* (April 3, 1997) objecting to Neal Ascherson's favorable notice of February 20—why Davies should "feel constrained" to compare the Holocaust with past events, the answer, surely, is obvious, and it is unnecessary to draw the sinister conclusions that seem to lurk in the background of Professor Judt's mannerly prose. Comparisons with, say, the massacres carried out by the "blues" in the Vendean war that resulted from the French Revolution reveal the readiness of human beings to resort to brutality to wipe out opponents in a civil war—and the Vendée was a peculiarly bloody affair—without, it is true, possessing the means furnished by modern technology (efficient bureaucracy plus Zyklon B) that swelled the death toll of the Holocaust to such monstrous proportions. Such comparisons may at least suggest that the urge to brutality is not the possession of one people alone, and making them is not a proof of Davies' turpitude or secret prejudice. There is nothing in this book to justify the fears and suspicions floating beneath the surface of some reviews. If Davies showed less than perfect tact in the way he phrased the capsule "Batt-101" on pages 1,022-3, he showed nothing less than pro-Jewish sentiment in his capsule "Auschwitz" on pages 1,026-7.

EUROPE is not only a work of high merit but a very timely one. When the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have just emerged from "the enormous, badly organised school"—Ronald Hingley's apt image for Russian-inspired communism—it is particularly useful to have a history that does them justice. Davies' book shows the connections between the two halves of Europe. It completes our knowledge and indicates our future. For it seems likely that the more interesting events in our continent will happen in its eastern half in the years to come. Now we shall have an inclusive Europe and an inclusive history as well. Davies' book is the first serious attempt at such a history, a mammoth work based on great erudition, strong opinions, and a fiery prose style.

In the past Eastern Europe's role was confined to being sometimes the victim, sometimes the conqueror, of the steppes (first the Mongols, who hardly figure in Western history, and later the Turks, whom an East European king, John Sobieski, defeated outside the walls of Vienna). Russian history was permanently diverted from its course by the Mongol conquest and Russian political manners changed for the worse by the hegemony of the Golden Horde. Significant too was to be the German migration into Eastern Europe, and the organized attack on states such as Poland and Lithuania by the

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Teutonic knights—the "Baltic Crusade", which, inevitably, became an exercise in German eastward colonization. With these clashes of peoples, as well as the quarrels between kingdoms, it is not surprising that the German state that grew up on the edge of Eastern Europe should have been a military monarchy. Prussia brought into German politics the authoritarianism of czarist Russia, combined with some of the logical elements of eighteenth-century France. Its final gift to Europe was President Hindenburg and his worries about the fate of East Prussian estate owners, which had such a bad influence on the last years of the Weimar republic. Now a reunited Germany finds itself face to face with the enormous potential of Russia (even without Ukraine). The relations between them, and how these will affect the countries of Eastern Europe, will probably be the deciding factor in European history over the next half century.

As Davies shows, there have been innumerable historical definitions of Europe. A recent "history of Europe", sponsored by the European Commission, distinguished itself by leaving out Greece entirely. Nor has the emergence of the European Union, carrying with it aspirations to economic and political unity as well as a formidable bureaucratic apparatus based in Brussels, made things simpler. Our present EU may be meliorist in intent, but it brings with it no spur to the enthusiasm of peoples, though it may create a select band of initiates. A great historian, Hugh Seton-Watson, made the point when he observed how badly Europe needed a *mystique* and how insufficient were anti-communism and free trade as an ethos. Jean Monnet may have been an idealist, but the Europe he helped to create appears singularly unexciting to subsequent generations.

Davies himself has made his choice. His history is a history of facts—great quantities of fact, various, swarming, proliferating in all directions throughout the book. There are no rejections, except perhaps rejection itself. Throughout his methodological discussions Davies can be seen constantly refusing to accept the placing of Europe on a procrustean bed of definition, its ill-fitting limbs lopped off, and the huge mass of information is presented as part of the case against the over-neat European history of the past. Inevitably, however, this risks confusion, and he has had to perform miracles of compression and tours de force of clarity to avoid it. At his best Davies is witty and crisp in his narrative. The section on ancient Greece (with Hellenism and Byzantium looming up over the horizon) and the treatment of the Renaissance are particularly good, especially as the latter takes in the extension to Poland and Hungary. Then there are the celebrated "capsules" with which the work is studded. Ranging from information about medieval table manners to the trumpet notes that sound every day in Krakow to commemorate the Mongol attack in the thirteenth century, these constitute a fascinating reminder of the infinite variety and apparent strangeness of human nature. But there is no denying that they also interrupt what is already a packed narrative, and they require a high degree of alertness on the part of the reader if he is to avoid being led away by the lure of the capsules—to being "encapsulated", as it were.

Of course, there is room for legitimate differences of opinion about the balance of the work. One might, for example, complain that what has been gained in the East has been lost—or, at any rate, diminished—in the West. To describe England's Civil War in the seventeenth century as "a tragedy of essentially regional significance" is to neglect its impact on one of the main currents of political philosophy, as well as on the future history of the United States, Canada, Australia, and various other parts of the globe. The issues raised did not concern simply the court-imposed centralization of a small state on the periphery of a continent, but the shaping in the eighteenth century of the ways of thought of an entire people. Debates such as those held among the officers of the New Model Army in Putney

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Church raised questions of universal significance, and Hobbes, Harrington, and Locke were hardly of merely "regional significance."

But perhaps this is beside the point. It is not so much in dealing with the well known rubrics of English history that Davies excels as in the assignment of new roles to actors on the European stage and in the limelight he switches on to figures previously unknown to most of us. Possibly, he does overreact against the old "Armada-Trafalgar-Waterloo" view of English history, but it is salutary for us to be chivvied out of the grooves of habitual orthodoxy. Naturally, the re-adjustments required are the more painful, the more recent the events with which they deal. Though some may feel that the United States and Great Britain did play a rather larger part in Hitler's defeat than he is willing to concede, Davies' view of the Second World War as the most recent great struggle between Germany and Russia, ending with the latter's incursion into Central Europe and the moving of the frontiers between Teuton and Slav further to the West, is hard to contest. Certainly, we can hardly begrudge Russia the lion's share of the victory.

EARLIER I SUGGESTED that this book "indicates our future." What I meant is that to read it is to be led to contemplate the combinations that will become possible now that the countries of Eastern Europe have been released from the bondage imposed on them in the 1940s. Now they are more mobile pieces of the European puzzle. There are signs too that some have learned to shun the ethnic and religious hatreds that have been the curse of the region. Others, of course, have not, and the frightful massacres in Bosnia and the Krajina, carried out by neighbors who had lived alongside each other peacefully for decades, show just how unforgiving the message of history—whether real or spurious—can be. The Serb Orthodox bishop who said that it was time to shut the New Testament represented the authentic voice of great Serb nationalism. And the fact that the massacres in Bosnia were only stopped finally by American intervention through the NATO machinery should have carried another kind of message to a Europe that often appeared to believe in the reality of its own speeches and communiqués.

It would be naive to think that those faced with solving Europe's problems might be able to learn from Davies' book lessons that will help them in a task that seems to grow more complex as the ideological barriers come down. But should they ever read it, they would at least realize that no one solution fits a continent whose heritage is so diverse and whose desires so hard to understand. If we consider what Europe was in the nineteenth century and what the twentieth century then made of it by dint of sheer human folly, it is not easy to be optimistic about its future. Do statesmen learn from history? Are there still men at the head of affairs in Europe whom one can dignify by the name of statesmen? If such men exist, the lessons they might learn from Davies' book are to avoid oversimplification in their plans, to be moderate in their ambitions, and to be neither legalistic nor ideological in their choice of means to achieve those ambitions. Those who seek to unify Europe should not give way to the natural bureaucratic desire to eliminate differences for the sake of a false uniformity. Peoples are attached to their symbols, and to strike these down in order to demonstrate a European unity that does not yet exist is both foolish and dangerous.

Davies has written a work worthy of the remarkable continent with which he deals; a continent that is now struggling to redefine and reunify itself, and whose cultures have been released once again to meet and mingle. □

Anthony Hartley is a contributing editor to *The National Interest.*

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Trading on Ideas

David S. Bruce

Douglas A. Irwin, *Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 265 pp., $29.95.

FREE TRADE IS, as always, in trouble—the best tribute to its power and effectiveness. But, also as always, the centers of support for and opposition to free trade are shifting. Ross Perot focused his 1988 campaign on resistance to free-trade doctrine. Even the U.S. Trade Representative's Office, long a sanctuary for openness, was headed in the first Clinton term by Mickey Kantor, who said publicly that Americans had never been keen on the idea and tried to act accordingly. His successor and ex-deputy, Charlene Barshefsky, a classic example of the bookkeeper taught to read, busies herself with the theology of bilateralism while running interference for America's most vested interests in the name of anti-dumping.

Amid such turbulence, we should welcome an overview of the intellectual history of free trade. Douglas A. Irwin of the Chicago Business School has attempted such an undertaking, appropriately entitled *Against the Tide*. The book divides into accounts of the origins of free-trade doctrine and the controversies it has aroused—fifteen sections in all, examining in detail the ideas of leading theorists from Adam Smith to Harry Johnson. It depicts the turmoil of intellectual countercurrents and criticism as acutely as the positive arguments on behalf of free trade. Irwin's essentially chronological presentation quotes widely and judiciously to provide a useful and economical synopsis of the literature, especially valuable for bringing to bear the views of such great twentieth-century thinkers as Jacob Viner. The historical and intellectual connections play illuminatingly backward as much as incrementally forward.

After a brief chapter on "Early Foreign Trade Doctrines", Irwin focuses in earnest upon the mercantilists, as they came to power in the principal countries of Europe around 1650; for "mercantilist doctrines not only constitute a major epoch in economic thought, but provide the immediate backdrop for the emergence of free trade thought." He further points out that mercantilist thinking broke with previous economic doctrine in actively promoting the expansion of trade, albeit under state guidance. From mercantilism Irwin progresses to Adam Smith's counterattack, seeking, among other things, to show how Smith's thinking originated in what he terms the "physiocratic and moral philosophy" of the previous century, and emphatically *not* in the economic literature of his own epoch.

Having clearly and capably articulated Smith's arguments, Irwin closes his first section with a general treatment of free trade's part in classical economic doctrine before moving in his second section to treat the influence and arguments of Robert Torrens, John Stuart Mill, Frank Graham, and Mikhail Manoïlescu. He follows these with omnibus intellectual sketches of "The Australian Case for Protection", "The Welfare Economics of Free Trade", "Keynes and the Macroeconomics of Protection", and "Strategic Trade Policy." The book's brief conclusion is clear, to the point, and well expressed, but the chapter on Mill and his classic defense of special-case protection—the famous infant industry argument—stands out. This is a well chosen case to emphasize, because Mill's argument is one entirely grounded on economic, not political, consid-

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erations. The doctrine that the state should be obligated to nurture significant domestic industries that would otherwise perish under the leveling winds of international competition is one of the earliest and most enduring cases for state intervention in the economy.

Irwin's work, then, is admirable in its choices and basic sympathies—which makes all the more disappointing its substance. Much of Irwin's strictly intellectual history is arguable and he shows real epistemological deficiency in the overall approach to his task. His exposition of the intellectual history of free trade concerns itself with the history of economists rather than of economies or of societies. He has produced a discussion of intellectual, or theoretical, analysts from Adam Smith to the present day with a certain emphasis upon free traders, but he leaves out too much of economic reality in the process. Perhaps most unfortunate of all, he does not discuss internal free trade, crucial though the issue has been over the last two hundred years. Theories rightly deemed to hold true across international borders are never put to the very interesting tests of internal application; binary international trade relations are taken for granted as the staples of trade theory, whereas the taxation and subsidy of such internal facilities as roads, canals, or railways are passed over.

The imbalance in Irwin's treatment of ideas is sometimes striking. The merit of Ricardo's original issue-framing analyses is that they extended Smith's depiction of comparative advantage into the larger postulate that two countries should engage in commerce even if one is more efficient in producing all traded items, because the consequent differentiation of type and price will lead both countries to maximize their output. But such key refinements to the central elements of free-trade doctrine go neglected, while secondary economists are indulged with entire chapters. This is like a study of Elizabethan literature that offers us nothing on *Antony and Cleopatra*, while devoting whole chapters to *Greene's Groatsworth* and *All's Lost By Lust*.

In reviewing marginal speculations, Irwin awards the palm for the most penetrating criticism of the classic argument for free trade to the Englishman Robert Torrens, who elaborated an entire theory of the optimal tariff as he believed it to operate upon a purely bilateral system of trade, which Irwin solemnly intones to be "the most durable and important exception to free trade ever conceived." If this indeed be so, no one wearing an Adam Smith necktie will ever choke. With a formalism characteristic of his age, Torrens posited a precise binary trade relationship between two countries, a remarkably frozen model that allows no substitution—a constriction that the real world very rarely imposes. Torrens' own, almost eccentrically special, instance is the Anglo-Cuban trade of the 1840s, in which Cuba had neither the incentive nor the short-term capacity to substitute any other commodity for its sugar exports. But substitutions are the long-term rule of our experience of trade, and a multiplicity of trade relations clearly works to overwhelm any single binary fiat that may underlie the calculus of an optimal tariff. Such a closed-system economy as Torrens erects into his model for the world as a whole was even then unusual; today it is totally inapplicable.

Irwin's chapters delineating other trade theories are little more successful, despite his considerable powers of exposition; and the reason, again, is that he seems to forget that ideas are modified more profoundly by experience than by collision with other doctrines. A reader coming unprepared would imagine that the principal arguments over trade have been preserved in aspic for the last hundred and fifty years, and that the forms of the world's economy and the content of their profitable exchange have been similarly pickled. *Against the Tide* never even mentions any of the literally thousands of technological initiatives that have, even in the last half century, carried the world into another age. Nor does it give any weight to how different forms of corporate organization and the

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stunning range of cultural differences exercise transforming force on the ways the world's societies reach out to each other.

Although Irwin repeatedly cites, and with justifiedly high approval, the late and extraordinary Canadian economist Harry Johnson, he seems to have drawn surprisingly little from Johnson's superb exposition of the ever more important technological factors in modern trade, and the richness of Johnson's thinking about "human capital." His model presents productive knowledge as the most powerful force in economic success; research and development are the essential potentiators of technological renewal. So it has been for many years. As early as the late eighteenth century, the primacy of talent and motivation over raw material made itself felt in such cutting-edge technologies as were employed by the great Carron Iron Works in Scotland to turn out advanced artillery and the first commercial steamships. Today it is difficult to find a sector of the economy not continuously being remade by education, training, research, and development, all of which must be figured as prime factors in the relentless accounting of planetary comparative advantages.

The first classic example of the transformation of an entire nation by a human capital revolution was nineteenth-century Germany. By mid-century, a third of Prussian schoolchildren were enrolled in technical schools, and less than thirty years later they rewarded the oligarchs who had put them there by making their country the point nation in such knowledge-intensive fields as engineering, optics, and especially chemicals. German society's prosperity was, to a striking degree, an unintended byproduct of the military and administrative objectives of the state, whose horizons had been conditioned more by the production of explosives and artillery officers than the possibilities of the second Industrial Revolution. On the face of it, this presents a challenge to basic free-trade theory, for civil society gained greatly from zero-sum-intended state intervention. But, alas, Irwin nowhere engages the problem of the role of the state as anything but an obstructer of trade flows; certainly a curious omission, since traditional free-trade theory, classically exemplified by Adam Smith, is primarily concerned with what the economy can do for the overall betterment of its citizens, while mercantilist and neo-mercantilist doctrines limit their object to the prosperity of the state.

Nor does Irwin find it necessary to examine the larger questions of currency and exchange—a fact made the more curious because his chapter on Keynes displays a fine sense of how English "finance-capitalist" currency policies squeezed a million unemployed out of the British economy in the name of an overvalued exchange rate. But he does not carry his sense of currency doctrine and practice into the present, when competitive devaluations—the last refuge of a protectionist—are a common tactic in international trade and the European Union is pushing a common currency unit on its members to counter this.

READERS SEEKING a concise summary of what trade theorists from Louis XIV's time to the present wrote about each other will indeed profit from Irwin's book, but its major constituency will probably be graduate business students, such as those Irwin teaches at the University of Chicago. Generation X evinces little interest in history or geography, and appears to thrive on sound-bite encapsulations of all subjects, including the advance of the knowledge revolution and the world economy—among which brevities neoclassical theory, Keynesianism, and monetarism are likely to sound like impertinent academic fustian. Those who like their economic philosophy placed in an adequate context of history and technology should turn instead to Irwin's 1991 compilation of Jacob Viner's *Essays on the Intellectual History of Economics*—to which Irwin himself does not allude, despite frequent and well chosen references to Viner.

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This is how it must be placed, because at no point in history has world politics been less than an equal partner of world economics, however much some may wish otherwise. Given so rich a world, Irwin could have fleshed out his purely intellectual examination of trade theory not just by considering how historical experiences mold a society's choices of how to marshal its possibilities, but by considering as well the head-on challenges that technology continuously poses to policymakers. Had he offered a single example of how one given application has helped or hindered economic development, or imparted vitality to some academic doctrine, his presentation could have leapt to life with the authority of those who actually make money and benefit others. Instead he indulges in an astonishing conceit—though he is hardly unique in resorting to it—to imagine that a doctrine of trade and economics can migrate from mind to mind, century over century, and never establish significant commerce, as it were, with the world of wealth and struggle, which, after all, gave it birth.

Irwin's reluctance to provide this proper context is especially glaring when seen against the model of change—intellectual and otherwise—literally before our eyes today. Although he cites Joseph Schumpeter several times, Irwin does not seem interested in the great Austrian's pioneering theories of innovation. Schumpeter emphasized that there comes a point in development where economies are more dynamized by the ongoing incorporation of new technologies than by the perfection, however skillful, of existing ones.

Traditional—and, at earlier stages of development, not ill-founded—conceptions of innovation as deriving from individual inventors and entrepreneurs are now being displaced by "systems" approaches. Scientific teams and expertly staffed laboratories are the drivers of change, and given that crucial breakthroughs are usually so expensive, private industry may well lack the capital and time horizons to develop them, compelling the state, alone or in partnership with private interests, to make up the resources necessary to surmount the threshold. Advancing the cutting edge of high science cannot be completely left to an "invisible hand." The case for judicious use of state-directed resources, particularly but not exclusively in education, is the most likely means of bringing about what the ordinary competitively lean corporation dare not invest in.

The advantage of the "systems" approach that this ushers in means that otherwise invisible benefits steadily circulate through the economy rather than succeeding or failing at their supposed final point—just as the Jacquard loom provided the matrix for the computer. Christopher Freeman presciently wrote ten years ago,

> The new technological regime will differ from that prevailing in the 1950s and 1960s. . . . 'Intangible' investment in information systems and software is becoming the critical resource in all areas of the economy rather than dedicated fixed investment in plant and machinery.

The depth of this economic dimension can now be assessed by its extraordinary flow in both directions.

Had Irwin been as prescient in 1995, he would have written a book that could have provided a guide into the next decade. As Schumpeter wrote even half a century ago, "Most of the fundamental errors currently committed in economic analysis are due to a lack of historical experience more often than to any other shortcoming of the economist's equipment." □

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Another Country

Guenter Lewy

David Horowitz, *Radical Son: A Journey Through Our Times* (New York: The Free Press, 1996), 444 pp., $27.50.

Roger Rosenblatt, *Coming Apart: A Memoir of the Harvard Wars of 1969* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1997), 234 pp., $24.95.

ON MAY 1, 1997, the Nation Institute sponsored a meeting at Town Hall in New York City billed as "a look back at the most celebrated and controversial decade of the century"—the 1960s. The program featured some of the decade's most ardent participants, including former Congresswoman Bella Abzug, Daniel Ellsberg of Pentagon Papers fame, and Kathleen Cleaver, formerly communications secretary for the Black Panthers and now a law professor at Cardozo Law School. Not surprisingly, in view of the sponsorship of the meeting, all of the participants celebrated what they regarded as a decade of great promise that unfortunately had not achieved its lofty goals. Transnational corporations, "devoid of life-affirming values", Bella Abzug argued, had succeeded in defeating the Sixties spirit of hope and youthful dynamism. Some suggested that the movement, in a mistake of tactics, had wanted too much too soon; others felt that it had not been radical enough.

The authors of the books under review here represent two more voices of the Sixties, but they provide us with a rather different picture of what undoubtedly was a fateful decade. David Horowitz was born in New York City in 1939. His nonobservant Jewish parents were members of the Communist Party, and he grew up absorbing a special sort of family values. After Nikita Khrushchev's 19th Party Congress speech of 1956 denouncing the crimes of Stalin, the older Horowitzes, like many of their contemporaries, withdrew from the party in disillusionment—though they continued to cling to the belief that a new socialist world of equality and justice would eventually triumph. For the seventeen year old son, on the other hand, the communist debacle became a challenge. How had it happened? How could such disasters be avoided in the future? How could the socialist vision be reconstructed free from the taints that Stalin had placed on the movement? Eventually, Horowitz, together with other "red diaper babies", became a prominent figure in what became known as the New Left. It was to be a movement that set itself the task of learning from the mistakes of the Old Left, to which an earlier generation of radicals had devoted their lives, but which had failed so miserably.

The birth of the New Left out of the Port Huron Statement of 1962, composed by Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), an affiliate of Norman Thomas' Socialist Party, has been recounted many times. What Horowitz adds is an intimate and fascinating portrait of many of the New Left's leading players in California, where he began his political activism as a graduate student of English literature at Berkeley and soon became a full-time activist. There is Tom Hayden, who became obsessed with ending America's "imperialist war" against the people of Vietnam, and who after a visit to North Vietnam proclaimed that he had seen "rice roots democracy" at work. He soon emerged as one of the confidants of the North Vietnamese Communists. There is *Ramparts*, where Horowitz became one of the editors. The staff also included Bob Scheer, the radical who ostentatiously traveled first class and

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stayed in the finest hotels, and Warren Hinckley, a flamboyant Irishman who had similar tastes, despite his rebelling against the system that provided the luxuries he craved. Above all, Horowitz gives us an informative and highly instructive account of life inside the Black Panther Party, which *Ramparts* promoted in the late 1960s as the vanguard of the nation's revolutionary struggle. It was alarm over the vicious violence promoted and practiced by these darlings of the New Left that contributed to Horowitz's disillusionment and eventually led to his abandonment of the movement he had helped bring into being.

The close relationship that Horowitz developed with Panther leader Huey Newton grew out of the creation of a model school, the Oakland Community Learning Center, in which Horowitz played a central role. It was not to be a Black Panther Party institution, even though almost all the 150 youngsters were children of party members. When Newton was charged with murder for shooting an eighteen year old prostitute, he fled to Cuba. Several of his close associates also disappeared from view, among them the party's treasurer. There now was no one to run the party's finances, so Horowitz suggested someone who had done accounting work for *Ramparts* and the Oakland school. Betty van Patter was a woman of forty-two, sympathetic to the movement, but also scrupulous in her work. On December 17, 1974, van Patter was seen alive for the last time. As Horowitz learned, she had asked too many questions about party finances and Newton's successor had ordered her killed. One month after her disappearance, her body was found at the far end of San Francisco Bay.

This was not the first murder attributed to the Panthers, but Horowitz had always believed the other charges to have been manufactured by the police. To think otherwise was to be on the side of the enemy. But this time the evidence was all too clear. Moreover, since Horowitz had been instrumental in van Patter's employment by the Panthers, he now felt a special sense of guilt over her brutal killing. The soul searching that set in did not stop with the Panthers. Disquieting reports were coming out of Vietnam of tens of thousands held in "re-education camps", and thousands of others were risking their lives on the high seas to escape their communist liberators. Horowitz began to entertain the proposition that there was something in Marxism, or in the socialist idea, that was at the root of all of the problems that had begun to plague him. And yet giving up the socialist idea was still unthinkable. "It had been the standards by which I judged right and wrong", he recalls. "The pursuit of the ideal had made me what I was, until I had no conception of myself without it. When I thought of leaving the socialist movement, the feeling was the same as leaving my own life."

Horowitz's friends in the movement sought to keep him in the fold. When he told Michael Lerner, today the editor of the left-liberal Jewish magazine *Tikkun*, of his doubts about the viability of the socialist idea, Lerner answered, "Even to raise such questions is counter-revolutionary." Yet once the process of disillusionment had set in it could not be halted. In the spring of 1985 Horowitz and his friend Peter Collier wrote a *Washington Post* article entitled "Lefties for Reagan", in which they explained what had made them vote for Ronald Reagan in the presidential election of 1984. They had "come out."

Today David Horowitz is a conservative activist. His Center for the Study of Popular Culture boasts a yearly budget of $2 million and more than twenty employees; it publishes books as well as four magazines, among them *Heterodoxy*, which at times has had a press run of 100,000 copies. Horowitz compares himself to Whittaker Chambers; like Chambers he has become the most hated ex-radical of his generation. He, too, has had to face savage personal attacks by former comrades. Those who know Horowitz agree with this appraisal: Driven by a sense of guilt over the havoc and long-lasting damage he feels he and his fellow New Leftists have caused to the American polity, Horowitz now is a man with a mission.

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The transformations he has experienced have at times been agonizing. There have also been personal tribulations, such as the breakup of a long and happy marriage and two unsuccessful subsequent marriages; Horowitz bares these trials with Rousseau-like candor and fervor, in the process intruding upon the privacy of others. Still, the book ends on a note of optimism. The nation, he feels, has recovered from the radical decade and its destructive agendas. "What I learned, one way or another in the course of my journey, other Americans seem to have learned as well"—or knew all along.

ROGER ROSENBLATT'S account of the tumultuous events at Harvard during the year 1969 is a different sort of book, by a different sort of author. Rosenblatt never was part of the New Left. He admired what he considered the moral courage of the students engaged in antiwar protests, but soon came to resent their fanaticism and violent tactics. Never having been a Sixties radical, Rosenblatt's memoir has none of the passion of those who converted from one side of the ideological divide to the other. Besides lacking sharp emotion, the book's analysis of events, actors, and motives is often shallow and superficial—a less forgivable failing.

By his own account, Rosenblatt was drawn absentmindedly into what he calls the "Harvard Wars of 1969." He was then a young instructor in the English Department and resident dean of one of the Harvard dormitories; he did not consider himself a "political" person. "Like most everyone at Harvard", he writes, "I opposed the war, but that was it. I rarely read a newspaper or watched TV news." His detached attitude came to an end on Wednesday, April 9, 1969, when about three hundred protesters seized University Hall, Harvard's administrative offices. Most of the occupiers were students and members of SDS—although some were *lumpenstudentariat*, hangers-on from outside the university. Several deans were roughed up and hustled out of the building. Then came the announcement of "Six Demands"—and in the spirit of the times, these demands were put forth as non-negotiable. The four most notable of these were that Harvard abolish ROTC (its army, navy, and air force officer training programs); that ROTC scholarships be replaced with regular scholarships; that no more Harvard-owned buildings in slum neighborhoods be torn down to make way for new university structures; and that rents in these houses be rolled back. With this last demand SDS sought to ally itself with blue-collar workers in Cambridge, though these workers had nothing but scorn for their would-be champions.

Less than twenty-four hours later, four hundred local and state policemen in riot gear entered Harvard Yard and lined up outside University Hall, in a show of determination ordered by President Nathan Pusey that was by then already rare in the academic world. When the occupiers refused a demand to leave within five minutes, the assembled police force charged the building. One student protester threw an empty Coke bottle at the policemen and others hurled heavy brass knobs they had pulled off University Hall doors, but the police probably did not need an excuse to use their clubs. Little love was lost between the police, who represented the real working class of Cambridge, and what they saw as the spoiled young elite of Harvard. Forty-one students were injured, and many score others were carried off to Cambridge city jail and charged with trespassing.

Most Harvard students had been critical of the University Hall takeover, but the forceful expulsion of the occupiers by the police changed many of their sentiments. A large rally attended by 1,500 students protested the police "bust" and declared a three-day boycott of classes. The students also voted to demand amnesty for the protesters, and demanded as well the creation of a full-fledged Department of Black Studies—until then, Harvard had only a "committee" rather than a department.

The faculty, too, met in several long meetings. Criticizing those who had decried

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the forceful clearing of University Hall and who had called the police "storm troopers", Dean Franklin Ford declared, "Storm troopers have indeed entered University Hall, but they didn't do it Thursday morning—they did it Wednesday noon." A majority of the faculty, however, condemned Pusey's action and were ready to give in to the demands of the students. In a meeting held amid the presence of black students who predicted dire results if their demands were not heeded, the faculty voted to establish a Department of Black Studies. In a unique step, it also gave black students the right to join the new department's executive committee and to vote on tenure appointments. One professor, John V. Kelleher, called this day "the most shameful in Harvard's history." The faculty also voted to create a special committee to review and act on the disturbance that had taken place. Known as the Committee of Fifteen, it was charged to write an account of the event, to make recommendations for future governance, and to discipline the students responsible. Rosenblatt was one of two junior faculty members elected to the committee. Two reporters from the *New York Times*, he recalls, called him the "fair-haired boy, beloved by students and colleagues." Rosenblatt does not contest this characterization.

The 135 students identified as having been in University Hall were asked to come before a tribunal of the committee to explain their actions, but they refused to appear. Eventually the committee proposed and the faculty ratified the suspension and conditional separation of thirty students. No student was expelled permanently, a victory for the self-declared liberal caucus to which Rosenblatt belonged. Yet his views of the radical students were beginning to change. Watching fanatics at work, he recalls, "had greatly reduced my admiration for them, no matter how much I believed in at least some of their causes." He even had come to the conclusion that ROTC was a useful institution, for "who would not want to be led by a more thoughtful and educated first lieutenant?" However, as he admits, at the time he would never have said this in public. "I thought that being loved was the most important thing in life."

WHILE BOTH Rosenblatt and Horowitz have had second thoughts about the 1960s, their assessments of this fateful decade are strikingly different. Rosenblatt concedes that the "victory" of the antiwar movement had several less than admirable effects. For a time at least, it undermined respect for the military; it also contributed to a new isolationism. On the whole, however, he is glad that the student protesters helped bring an end to a "costly, wasteful, ill-inspired venture" and he defends their motives. Horowitz, on the other hand, draws attention to the humanitarian disaster that followed the American defeat in Vietnam and assigns part of the blame to the antiwar protesters who, he feels, helped bring about that defeat.

Altogether, Horowitz takes a far less benign view of the 1960s: Pointing to the use of violence and terror by the Black Panthers and the Weathermen, he argues that a criminal-intellectual outlook was central to the vision of Sixties radicalism and that such an attitude has indeed been a core tradition of earlier radicalism going back to Bakunin, Sorel, and Lenin. From its beginnings, Horowitz maintains, the New Left was not an innocent experiment in American utopianism, but a self-conscious effort to rescue the communist project from its Soviet fate. This assessment is probably a bit harsh, for, innocent or not, a strong utopian sentiment, fed by compassion and moral concern, was undoubtedly present in the New Left. And yet Horowitz is, of course, right in his basic point: Good intentions are never enough. A responsible political outlook must take account of foreseeable consequences, and the attempt to build paradise on earth is the surest road to tyranny. □

Guenter Lewy, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Massachusetts, is author of *The Cause That Failed: Communism in American Life* and other books.

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Richard Kohn, Christopher Gray, David Gress, Daniel Mahoney

Tradition Abandoned:

ANDREW Bacevich, in "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era" (Summer 1997), perceptively attributes much civil-military tension to the deep contradictions in American national security policy. The United States behaves like a hegemon, promoting Western institutions (market economics and democratic politics) to make the world safe for American values (liberty, peace, and prosperity). Seed for a "clash of civilizations"?

Yet our military policy looks backward. We maintain a two-war force structure not for Somalias and Bosnias, but for NATO, Korea, Taiwan, and the Middle East, holdover commitments from the past. We are stuck, for, having created the structures to contain communism, we cannot very well abandon key regions (and friends) to instability and conflict.

Having forsaken our traditional policy of mobilization and citizen soldiers, our professional military establishment struggles to meet conflicting demands: readiness, deployments, aging weapons, and possibly radical new technologies. Contrary to Dick Cheney's tireless speechifying years ago, we haven't bungled demobilization in the past; we disbanded wartime forces to prepare for the future. This time we *did* botch demobilization; we didn't demobilize. As long as these contradictions continue, we will suffer civil-military tension (but not, thankfully, over race, as Alan Gropman so convincingly explains in the same issue), while a military establishment soured by the politics of gender and budget deteriorates—frozen in Cold War organization and weapons, privileging technology over thoughtfulness and understanding (as Wick Murray points out so pungently, also in the Summer issue), and hemorrhaging many of its finest, who bail out to keep themselves and their families together in body and spirit.

Money is neither the problem nor the solution. It's reconceptualization.

What we need today is a great national discussion on what role the United States should play in the world. Hopefully the Senate will use NATO enlargement to carry out its constitutional duty. Only from such a debate can there emerge a foundation for connecting military power to the national interest.

Richard Kohn
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The Adolescent Empire:

JAMES KURTH'S "The Adolescent Empire: America and the Imperial Idea" (Summer 1997) is wise as well as provocative. Yet it fails to analyze the Portuguese seaborne empire that preceded and outlasted most of the various national empires discussed in the essay. Portugal was the first Western power to project its culture and trade deeply into Africa and Asia. It also joined with Spain to penetrate South America. St. Francis Xavier S.J., the greatest Christian missionary since St. Paul, and revered by the Catholics of India, Pakistan, Japan, and China, made his journeys on Portuguese ships. Most Jesuit, Franciscan, and Dominican priests who invaded Asia and Africa in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries operated under Portuguese protection. Professor Kurth also neglects to mention that *all* Spanish and Portuguese colonies were united under the Habsburg dynasty during the crucial years between 1580-1640.

The Portuguese imperial experience deserves more than academic curiosity since it found a way of ameliorating the racial and eth-

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nic prejudices plaguing most European empires. Just contrast Angola and Mozambique with neighboring South Africa. Brazil managed to blend white Europeans, black Africans, and red Amerindians into a shared culture more peacefully than the United States did. Goa and Macao contain Catholics who carry the blood of three continents in their veins. Because of their skill in reconciling different races into a shared Catholic Christian culture, the Portuguese enabled their empire to outlast more powerful rival empires by decades and sometimes centuries. Surely we adolescent Americans can learn much from their example.

Christopher Gray
Falls Church, VA

Time to Kill:

STEVEN MULLER tackled a problem that he himself termed "of utmost consequence" in "Time to Kill: Europe and the Politics of Leisure" (Summer 1997). The reader was led to expect a probing economic and cultural analysis of European societies as they face the challenges of financing their welfare states, assuring social stability and social reproduction, and revitalizing the work and production ethic among their aging citizenries.

Unfortunately, the essay nowhere came to grips with these questions, which were adumbrated in the accompanying boxes of statistics but not followed up in the text. The article consisted mostly of impossibly broad generalizations, unsubstantiated by rigorous analysis, logic, numbers, or concrete detail. And the basic thesis of the article as a whole—that high structural unemployment in industrial societies is inevitable—rests on a particular understanding of work and economics that is, at the least, highly disputed among economists.

This particular understanding is the "lump of labor" theory, which states that the total amount of work that needs to be performed in an economy is more or less fixed, so that if productivity increases permit this work to be done faster and by fewer workers, the total employment in that economy will fall.

The lump of labor fallacy became popular in the Depression, when it seemed confirmed by experience. But in fact unemployment remained high in the 1930s not because the amount of work was fixed, but because real wages were rising relative to prices, making labor more expensive. It was because prices were falling faster than wages that employers were caught in a negative spiral, making it ever harder for them to increase employment.

In recent decades, lump of labor advocates have pointed to the decline in manufacturing employment, where, sure enough, the same work (more, in fact) is being carried out by fewer workers. But there is absolutely no evidence on either national or global levels that the total amount of available work of any kind—manufacturing, service, or other—is fixed.

The political sociology of the aging, partly dysfunctional, regulation-ridden, risk-averse, and culturally stodgy European nations needs to be undertaken, but, from my vantage point at least, I regret that Dr. Muller signally failed to meet the challenge.

One hesitates to take issue with a university president emeritus, who is presumably au courant with current theory in all major disciplines. So, if Dr. Muller has performed the feat of confirming the lump of labor argument after all these years, will he please share with us the proof?

David Gress
Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia

Muller replies:

DAVID GRESS IS quite right to chide me for the paucity of concrete detail in my article. I confess without apology that my purpose in the essay was to present ideas rather than rigorous proof. However, as to the "lump of labor" argument, this quite simply does not apply. Nowhere do I maintain that the total amount of work in society is fixed. Rather, my thesis is that the amount of

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work being performed by smart technology is causing a steep decline in the need for human labor. More to the point, Gress ignores my extended argument that—in sharp contrast to the American economy—the European welfare states are burdened with too much employment in the tax-supported public sector. And as for the comment that former university presidents must be presumed to know current theory in all disciplines, some of us may at least still be able to identify an irrelevant argument when it is dredged up.

Mahoney on de Gaulle:

IT HAS BEEN brought to my attention that readers may want to know more about the intellectual sources of de Gaulle's idea of grandeur.

It is my contention that de Gaulle learned the idea of a "mystique" of the greatness of France that could overcome its division into two great ideological parties of the Left and the Right from Charles Péguy. See *Notre jeunesse* [originally published in 1918] (Paris: Gallimard-Folio, 1993), especially pages 102-16. On de Gaulle and Péguy readers can consult my own *De Gaulle: Statesmanship, Grandeur, and Modern Democracy* (Praeger, 1996).

For earlier scholarly analyses that also recognize the domestic and larger human purposes served by an emphasis on grandeur, as well as the link between greatness and measure, see Philip G. Cerny, *The Politics of Grandeur: Ideological Aspects of de Gaulle's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge University Press, 1980); Will Morrisey, *Reflections on de Gaulle: Political Founding in Modernity* (University Press of America, 1983); and Ghita Ionesco, *Leadership in an Interdependent World: The Statesmanship of Adenauer, De Gaulle, Thatcher, Reagan and Gorbachev* (Westview, 1991). The writings of Stanley Hoffmann also have many illuminating things to say on the subject of grandeur.

The phrase "the politics of grandeur", which I used in my article, was, in fact, pioneered by Edward A. Kolodziej in *French Policy Under De Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur* (Cornell University Press, 1974), and Philip G. Cerny in the above-mentioned work.

Editorial note:

IN A COMMENT on Samuel Huntington's book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Summer 1997), Pierre Hassner alleged that Huntington inaccurately attributed the phrase "les odeurs d'Islam" to Jacques Chirac. Professor Huntington based this attribution on the report by Roger Cohen in the *New York Times*, March 13, 1994, p. E3, that stated, "Jacques Chirac, the Gaullist leader, has even referred to '*les odeurs d'Islam*'—'the whiff of Islam'—permeating the French urban landscape." Mr. Cohen now explains that M. Chirac did not use those exact words but that:

> Chirac, at a 1991 meeting of his RPR party, referred to 'the noise and the smell' emanating from immigrant families that drive French workers mad. He made clear what kind of immigrants he was talking about by referring to families 'piled in with the father, three or four wives and about twenty children, and naturally earning 50,000 francs without working.' This was conflated in subsequent French press accounts to *'l'odeur d'Islam.'* The quote, while conveying the essence of what Chirac said, is thus incorrect. *Mea culpa.*

The correspondence on this issue is now closed. □

Letters to the Editor

We welcome brief comments (under 300 words) from our readers. Due to space constraints, all letters are subject to editorial revision. Remarks should be sent to the Managing Editor.

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

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You Broker It, You Buy It

Adam Garfinkle

THE PROBLEM WITH common sense is not only, as Voltaire said, that it is not so common, but that it is often wrong. Much analysis of the recent shift in U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict is a case in point. While some of its errors reflect recent misjudgments by U.S. policymakers, others are wholly original—and the combination has begun to elicit some of the most seductive, but worst policy advice on the Middle East that any administration has received in years. As a result, it is not obvious whether it is the peace process that stands closer to the well worn "edge of the abyss", or U.S. policy toward it.

The usual cast of policy experts on this topic overwhelmingly agrees that Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's August 6 speech presages a far more active and substantive U.S. role in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations than has been the case since the August 1993 signing of the Oslo accords. That role, it is said, has come none too soon, for it is understood as an act of contrition for excessive U.S. diplomatic passivity since the brokering of the Hebron accord of January 15, an achievement widely hailed as having saved the peace process largely *because* it presaged greater U.S. involvement.

The current common sense also builds prediction onto interpretation. The United States has now taken up two of Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu's peace process demands: that the by-now counterproductive incremental logic of the Oslo process give way to immediate negotiation over final status issues such as borders, refugees, and Jerusalem; and that the Palestinian fulfillment of its security-related obligations precede such a negotiation. But Washington has done so, it is believed, only to "get at" the rectification of Israel's own sins, which the administration is said privately to view as equal to if not greater than those of the Palestinian Authority (PA). So if the PA does take its security commitments more seriously, it will mark the opening act of a drama scripted to pass quickly into a withering, though of course well intentioned, barrage of U.S. pressure on Israel. As an old friend puts it: Before you knife someone in the back, you first have to get behind him.[1]

Opinions divide over whether the coming U.S.-Israeli ordeal, like many before it, will be on balance a good thing for Israelis, Palestinians, and the United States; or, more pointedly, over whether it will be good for only some of the above. Many influential observers—from a coterie of former high officials to the editors of the *Washington Post*—believe that all will benefit, the more so and the more quickly if the United States endorses Palestinian statehood as a lever with which to

Adam Garfinkle is executive editor of *The National Interest.*

[1]That being Harvey Sicherman, former aide to three secretaries of state, and hence an expert observer of the stilletoist's art.

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bend a final status negotiation into a permanently successful diplomatic structure.

This, then, is the latest dose of common sense: that the United States is prepared to push hard; that it is Israel that will mainly get pushed, and rightly so; and that if certain American words about Palestinian statehood are intoned in the process, everyone will be the better off for it. But, as Ira Gershwin once put it, "It ain't necessarily so."

As to the first proposition, the current common sense expects too much; Arafat may flunk the security test, and the administration's immediate goal may be not to make a quick peace, but to make Labor Party leader Ehud Barak prime minister of Israel. Either eventuality will diminish the anticipated American diplomatic profile.

As to the second, that Israel will not only be pushed hard but deserve its pushing, this is an error inherited from officialdom. The Netanyahu government has hardly been blameless for peace process woes, but much less so since the Hebron accord than before it. It is Chairman Arafat who has been stiffarming the peace process lately, yet many U.S. officials, seemingly caught in a diplomatic version of the Stockholm Syndrome, keep finding ways to "understand" the Palestinians and blame the Israelis.

As to the emerging third element of the current common sense, the advice that Washington should endorse Palestinian statehood as a means to a final Arab-Israeli peace, it is very bad. Since we may hear it in future, both in coming weeks and beyond, and since it stands to do much damage if adopted, it is a point that deserves special attention.

IF THE COMMON sense is right about the expansive swath of current U.S. policy ambitions, that would be most unfortunate. There are several reasons why the United States should keep a safe distance from the key substantive details of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, but the most important is that if Washington were to succeed in brokering a final status accord with itself enthroned as guarantor, it would inherit responsibility for the inevitably fragile outcome. That great powers are obligated to what their power brings into being is as close to a law as anything international politics has to offer. So, too, if the United States were to endorse Palestinian statehood, it would become responsible, literally, for a semi-sovereign Palestinian state no less than, through Dayton, it has become responsible for a vulnerable rump-Bosnia.

This does *not* mean that the United States should oppose Palestinian statehood if the local protagonists agree to it. But there is a world of difference between accepting a result that emerges from the regional principals themselves and pressing for such a result in order to shoehorn a recalcitrant party into acceding to it. An American endorsement of Palestinian statehood, were it of this latter variety, would be calamitous for at least three reasons.

First of all, Washington would bind itself to a very costly and frustrating exercise in "nation-building." If a Palestinian state were to harbor too many ambitions and bad habits, or simply display too much general incompetence, the United States would be pressed to do for Palestinians what it tried (unsuccessfully) to do for Haitians and Nicaraguans in the 1920s and 1930s—only this time under circumstances in which major interests are at stake and in which every false step would be diplomatically parboiled in the Middle Eastern sun. These are hardly fanciful anticipations; as serious a danger to the peace process as the collapse of Israeli-Palestinian trust is the possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority itself. Arafat and his "Tunisian" outsiders are trying to impose a standard Arab strongman regime on a population that is not reconciled to it. It is a population mobilized by the *intifada*, hardened through years of military occupation, and wide-eyed from gazing at close range for thirty years on the institutions of Israeli democracy. Moreover, only Arafat can run the crazy-quilt system of authority he has built, and when he passes from the scene—if not before—the

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prospect for a Hobbeseanesque internal collapse is all too real.

Becoming primarily responsible for dealing with such a collapse is something the U.S. government should avoid. Whatever we may call what we do to commute the obligations of great power guarantor, we will have taken sides in intra-Palestinian and inter-Arab conflicts whose minimal range will encompass Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as the West Bank and Gaza. Angry people may be counted upon to shoot and bomb us, compromising sharply the American ability to palliate the array of Arab-Israeli troubles that are bound to endure into the future. Nor will the specter of Americans policing Arabs in Palestine have a positive impact on U.S. relations with the Arab Gulf states, a strategically vital region in which we already have a full quota of challenges.

Becoming principally or substantially responsible for a Palestinian state's internal order and external relations would also endlessly complicate U.S. relations with Israel and with Jordan, the latter being a more important ally than is often recognized and a country whose long-term stability is more vulnerable to Palestinian irredentism than is Israel's. Just imagine the political fallout of a terror bombing in Jerusalem after a U.S.-brokered and guaranteed final status accord. Israel demands answers and justice according to the new peace treaty; the new Filastin Arab Republic discounts responsibility or foreknowledge and blames Hamas operatives in Amman; Jordan cracks down on its Palestinian refugee camps only to find them seething with pro-Filastin rebellion, complete with provoking agents and smuggled literature; and all turn to the United States for judgment and diplomatic recompense. Having become responsible for peace, even when the local partners may occasionally doubt its benefits and sideswipe its rules, Washington would soon learn that the only thing worse than trying to mitigate such horrors from afar is having to manage them up close.

Finally, America-as-guarantor of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement would raise expectations for a final, stable peace beyond those that even the wisest ensemble of diplomats could satisfy. Thinking about the Arab-Israeli conflict often suffers from a kind of "endism", to employ the useful phrase coined by Samuel Huntington in these pages, according to which it is imagined that if Israel signs formal peace agreements with all its Arab neighbors, the sinews of geopolitics will suddenly go limp. But many countries enjoying formal arrangements of peace have nevertheless gone to war, and the Arab-Israeli domain is hardly the place to look for immunity from this particular historical truth. All that will be achieved by formal peace agreements, if they are ever signed, is the fulfillment of the Zionist founders' dream to renormalize Jewish history after 1,600 years of exile—except that "normal", by Middle Eastern standards, is hardly synonymous with serene. Not even the U.S. State Department can change this.

The point here is that an American diplomacy that promises more than reality can bear is bound to fail, no matter what incidental good it does along the way. American statesmen can push Israel's difficulties with the Palestinians to a more enlightened level of belligerence, but, because the United States will not countenance heavy costs to solve someone else's problems, they cannot push them to a stable, final peace. Only the vitally interested parties can do that, and both sides are still hesitating over the many political and psychological obstacles blocking the way. That being so, America's measured distance from the conflict is a truly precious asset, one to be guarded closely; it makes a more delicate type of American mediation, which will be needed for years to come, immune to terminally disabling error. As American officials slowly come to terms with the impossibilities of implementing Dayton, it is clear—or it ought to be—that one lunge at a futile diplomatic endism is already one too many. □

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

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"SOME OF THE themes of the Baltic national revivals suggest the story of Sleeping Beauty, as re-written by the Wicked Witch."

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"IT IS SURREAL to watch Yeltsin surface every few months and profess surprise and outrage at the incompetence of a government chosen and appointed by none other than B.N. Yeltsin."

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—Bruce J. Dickson

"IF GERMANY is not 'special', then other countries might similarly hold the seeds of a final intolerance within themselves. If it is 'special', in the sense of a special intolerance, a special brutality, then how does Germany fit into alliances or future plans for Europe?"

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